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British literature from the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries has long been 
important to critical investigations centered on ecology and environmentalism. Ecocritical 
explorations of this literature, however, often look through texts to the plants, animals, and 
environments they represent, bypassing important questions about the act of representation itself. 
Resisting the temptation to take literary representations of the environment at face value, this 
dissertation moves the focus away from what written representations of the environment say about it 
to how those representations are made. Through a combination of close reading and examination of 
works in light of the literary critical and scientific ideals of their moment, I investigate the 
epistemological beliefs held by individuals and communities of authors about how knowledge is 
absorbed by the mind, what standards of documentation are necessary for its transmission in a 
written text, and which proofs of authenticity are required for it to be accepted as legitimate. Grounds 
of Knowledge discusses both literary and practical texts from the mid-1740s to the mid-1830s, 
including the works of William Collins, Joseph Warton, Thomas Warton, Charlotte Smith, John 
Clare, Jane Austen, and the agriculturalists Arthur Young, William Marshall, and William Cobbett. 
As these authors portray the environment in both literary and practical works, I argue, they use 
representational methods that are based on epistemological ideals as well as aesthetic and practical 
considerations. In each case, their works are governed by “unofficial” epistemologies—philosophies 
of collecting, apprehending, and disseminating knowledge that are implicit in written works and exist 
independent of academic and professional philosophy. By focusing on the epistemology of 
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representation, this dissertation fills a gap left open by traditional thematic ecocriticism as well as 
more recent ontologically-based forms of ecocriticism. It does not seek to undermine the ecocritical 
project but rather to provide a much-needed foundation for ecocritical investigation in 
understanding how and why British authors of the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries 




Introduction: “A real world & doubting mind” 
 
John Clare’s long poem “January” (1827) depicts a family sitting snug by the fire side 
listening to a housewife’s supernatural tales—“from her memry oft repeats | Witches dread powers 
& fairey feats”—as a winter storm howls outside.1 Eventually, the scene itself gives way to the 
speaker’s solitary meditations about similar moments from his own past. He mulls over the stories 
that used to terrify him as a child, particularly Jack and the Beanstalk, and reflects on how the 
transition from belief to disbelief in their truth has changed his experience as a listener over time. 
While the information in the stories remains the same, the embodied act of listening has changed: 
“Memory may yet the themes repeat | But childhoods heart doth cease to beat | At storys.”2 
Listening to the mental echo of the Giant’s bloodthirsty roars, the speaker suddenly emerges from 
his reverie: 
I hear it now nor dream of harm 
The storm is settld to a calm . . . 
Those truths are fled & left behind 
A real world & doubting mind3 
 
The “truths,” fears and fantasies roused by listening to both these tales and the sounds of the storm 
outside, are only exposed as truths at the moment when they cease to be believed. In receding, these 
temporary beliefs provoked by aesthetic and sensory experience (the stories and the storms) leave 
behind both what is real and what makes a feeling of reality possible: a mind that can doubt. Here, 
self-consciousness about what one knows and believes is what in fact makes the truth—not the 
pure, blind belief of a child. Truth for Clare, then, is not exactly synonymous with belief or reality, 
but it is a category of knowledge that carries certain markers with it. The poem ends with the 
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“doubting mind,” having raised but refusing to explicitly work through questions about the nature 
of truth and its relationship to representation. What is the relationship between the “truth” 
conveyed by aesthetic mediation (in this case, fairy tales) and the “real world”? And what methods 
do works of art employ to allow or prevent us from knowing the difference between them? Clare’s 
poem, then, implies a philosophy of knowledge, but only partially exposes it and it is here that we 
see what I call Clare’s unofficial epistemology. In saying so, I mean that “January” is among other 
things a philosophical inquiry into the nature of knowledge, how it is absorbed by the mind, and 
how it is transmitted through language. But Clare’s enquiry cannot interface with the academic, 
scholarly philosophical discourse of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries because such 
discourse was closed to all but a few. Instead, the thorny questions about knowledge he raises are 
only implicitly philosophical and never allowed to rise to the level of official discourse.  
Grounds of Knowledge: Unofficial Epistemologies of British Environmental Writing, 1745-1835 is an 
account of several unofficial epistemologies in British literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Specifically, it centers on one of the most potent and enduring sites of philosophical 
enquiry in this period: how is knowledge about the environment made through written 
representation? In describing the ways that literature of this period accounts for experience and 
conveys truth, I will tease out the beliefs in these works about how environmental knowledge is 
made. I do this not in order to expose the ideologies inherent in these texts, but to account for their 
implicit understandings of the mind and its relation to environment in a historically conditioned 
moment.  
 The meanings of both literature and environmental knowledge are fairly fluid among the 
texts I discuss. While this dissertation mainly considers texts that are literary in a more traditional 
sense of the word, such as Charlotte Smith’s Beachy Head or the Odes of William Collins, it also 
includes other environmental literatures, particularly agricultural prose and scientific poetry. The 
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works featured here speak to each other across not only the boundaries of genre, but the boundaries 
of purpose. And therefore, for instance, the latter half of this dissertation concerns soil, agriculture, 
and land use as well as narrative technique in agricultural prose and in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park. 
The environmental knowledge these works make is equally fluid. Generally speaking, I use the term 
environmental knowledge to specify any information about the non-human material world that 
authors convey to their readers. This could be anything from taxonomic names for birds to tables of 
agricultural experiments to descriptions of landscapes to accounts of wild plants overgrowing the 
ruins of a building. In contemporary usage, the term “environmental knowledge” is used most often 
in studies on sustainability practices and environmental education in both industrialized and 
traditional cultures.4 Environmental knowledge in these cases means one of two things, first: 
knowledge of the effects of one's actions on the environment, such as knowing the environmental 
impact of one's daily commute. The other use is related to the term “environmental literacy”—one’s 
knowledge of the environment around one, such as the ability to know in which direction one is 
facing, knowledge of the movement of constellations and planets in the night sky, acquaintance with 
the topography of one's region, or of the species of local flora and fauna. In practice, the meaning of 
environmental knowledge in this dissertation does not differ significantly from its use in other 
disciplines, but my purpose in exploring the creation of environmental knowledge does. Whereas 
anthropologists and sustainability experts are concerned with preserving traditional environmental 
knowledge and introducing new forms of it into modern education, I am concerned with the 
moment of its creation in the text and philosophies of knowledge that underlie it. 
 My inquiry begins with the young poets of the 1740s—William Collins, Joseph Warton and 
his brother Thomas—and closes in the mid-1830s at the opening of the Victorian period in 
literature and art and the establishment of the Rothamsted Experimental Station, signaling the 
transformation of British agriculture into a modern scientific discipline. Within that time my main 
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subjects are the careers of the agriculturalists Arthur Young and William Marshall, Charlotte Smith 
poetry, Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park , William Cobbett’s last years, in which he published on 
agricultural practice, and John Clare’s appearances in print, excluding later periodicals. There are also 
a few supporting characters whose works crop up in more than one chapter: John Aikin’s poetry and 
works of literary criticism, William Gilpin’s Three Essays on the Picturesque (1792), and the Scottish poet 
James Grahame’s Birds of Scotland and British Georgics (1806-9.) Instead of building a narrative of 
progress, the chapters are porous, with ideas and practices swimming back and forth between 
writers and across decades. Nonetheless, this project has a strong sense of being appropriate to, and 
bounded within, the period of about a century that is defined in terms of beliefs about and practices 
of knowledge, aesthetic representation, scientific methodologies, and the environment.  
 Given that this dissertation covers the time period between 1745 and 1835, the reader may 
now be wondering why Romanticism and Preromanticism have thus far been absent from the 
discussion.  Many of the authors I discuss in this dissertation have a troubled relationship with the 
Romantic period. Or rather, scholars of the past century have had a troubled time determining 
whether they fit into a Preromantic/Romantic paradigm and accordingly, much of their work on 
these authors has consisted of attempts to include or exclude them from the canon of Romantic 
literature. For instance, William Collins and the Warton brothers were brought into the category of 
“Preromanticism” in the early decades of the twentieth century—a categorization that has been both 
effective and controversial. Charlotte Smith, despite her enormous influence on Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, and other Romantic writers, was excluded from most serious literary study until feminist 
criticism of the 1970s drew her into the Romantic circle as both a strong influence on male 
Romantic writers and a critic of patriarchal literary practices. John Clare, most likely because of his 
stature as a “peasant poet” and his mental illness, was excluded from the Romantic canon until the 
1970s and 80s as well, existing, if at all, merely on the margins of it under a “Wordsworthian 
5 
 
shadow,” as Harold Bloom put it.5 Jane Austen’s relationship to Romanticism has long been 
grounds for debate, her own subtle critiques of Romantic thought leading critics to wonder whether 
she is engaged fully in a more widely defined Romantic movement, a hold-over from the Age of 
Sensibility, or even a “proto-Victorian.”  
 While these debates are in many cases necessary—for within the institution of literary 
studies, an author’s inclusion on syllabi, graduate concentrations, and conference proposals often 
hinges on inclusion in a period—the enormous amount of time and energy, ink and pixels, devoted 
to the topic of canonization and category makes very little difference to the explorations of this 
dissertation. Like holograms, Collins, the Wartons, Smith, Clare, and Austen are simultaneously 
Romantic and not, depending on the angle from which we view them. Their works are on paths that 
sometimes parallel or cross Romanticism, and sometimes lead far away. In the end, I chose to forgo 
discussion of Romanticism, and without the burden of needing to articulate a new way of thinking 
about Romanticism per se, I found a network of texts and questions that a strictly Romantic project 
may not have allowed me to find.6  In what follows, I will introduce the major sites of inquiry that 
are of concern in the chapters. 
 
Knowledge and the Sciences 
It was during the period that this dissertation covers that philosophy and science, in the 
forms of natural philosophy and natural history, began to pull apart.7 And so while my authors’ 
epistemologies are unofficial, their dialogues with the sciences are often explicit. Charlotte Smith, 
John Clare, and James Grahame share the greatest interest in the sciences of the writers discussed 
here—particularly botany, zoology, ornithology, and geology. Each poet reacted to the specialization 
and professionalization of the sciences in a different manner. While Grahame, in his book-length 
poem Birds of Scotland (1807), drew heavily upon both scientific works and his own observations, he 
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abjured any claim to scientific authority. Perhaps anticipating criticism of the poem on scientific 
grounds, he prefaces it by stating that “neither do I give it as a scientific performance: I have studied 
not so much to convey knowledge, as to please the imagination, and warm the heart.”8 For 
Grahame, a poet who publicly renounces his or her work as a scientific performance also renounces 
his or her ability to convey knowledge. Smith and Clare, however, would not be so easily cowed by 
the specter of their work being criticized as unscientific. Smith bolstered her later poems with 
scientific footnotes, displaying her proficiency in technical description and taxonomy as well as her 
wide reading in scientific literature. Clare, on the other hand, rejected Linnaean taxonomy outright 
and preferred to use a highly technical and precise system of common names when describing plants 
and animals in his poems.9 These artistic choices were made against the backdrop of changing public 
discourse about the sciences and the arts. For instance, the increasing tension between the scientific 
and the aesthetic forms the history of one of the most important scientific institutions to emerge 
from eighteenth century England: Kew Gardens. The Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew were originally 
founded by Queen Caroline in the 1720s as a pleasure ground, which then became a center for 
botanical research throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century under the guidance of John 
Stuart, 3rd Earl of Bute and Sir Joseph Banks, and were made the national botanic garden in 1840.10 
While the gardens are perhaps more well known as a tourist attraction, Kew’s librarian-historian Ray 
Desmond notes that in the present, Kew is in fact “primarily a scientific institution dedicated to 
research in taxonomy, anatomy, cytogenetics, biochemistry, and conservation” and that historically 
the directors of the gardens have had to “reconcile the needs of recreation and research, of aesthetic 
considerations and scientific display.” 11  The literature discussed in this dissertation, then, is only a 
small but important part of the change in the relationship between the arts and sciences from the 




 While scientific disciplines that emerged in the eighteenth century—particularly botany, 
geology, and chemistry—have garnered much attention from scholars of Romantic literature, there 
was one scientific discipline that worked on a different timeline than others, and which is most 
important to this dissertation: agriculture. Agriculture, the science of growing food, breeding and 
maintaining livestock, converting and enriching arable land and pasture, and minimizing the damage 
of pests, is of necessity a composite science. Geology, botany, chemistry, entomology, and zoology 
are necessary for understanding soil composition, plant nutrition, animal breeding, and pest control. 
The century between 1740 and 1840 saw a leap forward in British practices of agriculture and, 
importantly for this dissertation, the invention of a new kind of agricultural prose.  Unlike the 
science into which it was first subsumed, chemistry, which began to be recognized as its own 
discipline as early as the 1780s, agriculture was not transformed into a scientific discipline until the 
early 1840s. This is not because people were uninterested in approaching agriculture in a scientific 
way, but because of the struggles of taking the everyday practice of farming and conducting the 
knowledge-making practices of classification and experimentation. In other words, unlike botany or 
chemistry, which bore little in relation to ancient herbal medicine or alchemy, agricultural knowledge 
had to be transformed from the practical to the experimental and from the tacit to the explicit even 
as day-to-day farming continued.12 The unique position of agriculture as an everyday science makes 
it particularly compatible with my method of reading for philosophies of knowledge both implicit 
and explicit in environmental writing. Knowledge and writing practices for both literary and practical 
works crossed and re-crossed the boundary between tacit and explicit knowledge during this period. 
My inspiration for understanding agricultural writing as a genre that deals with problems of 
knowledge was John Barrell’s chapter “The Landscape of Agricultural Improvement” from The Idea 
of Landscape and the Sense of Place 1730-1840: An Approach to the Poetry of John Clare. Commenting on the 
agriculturalist William Marshall’s written notes describing the state of agriculture in a tour through 
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northern England, Barrell notes that Marshall’s detailed descriptions which accompany lists of facts 
“are there to answer the question, how do you know?”13 It is this question that, I found, was not 
only of the utmost concern to Marshall in his writing, but an insistent, implicit refrain throughout 
British agricultural writing of Marshall’s day.  
But even as agriculturalists carried on their unique struggles, they were always in 
conversation with and influenced by the larger scientific discourse. I am indebted to the works of 
historians of science, particularly Lorraine Daston, Peter Galison, Jan Golinsky, and Stephen Shapin, 
who, despite their different interpretations, account for the transformation of scientific epistemology 
over time: the philosophies and ideologies under which science was practiced, recorded, and 
disseminated, as well as how scientists were perceived by the public and perceived themselves. Their 
works, which stretch from before the foundation of the Royal Society in the mid-seventeenth- 
century to the rise of objectivity in the mid-nineteenth century and its fall in the late twentieth, have 
had a considerable influence on how I was able to take peculiarities I had found in the literature of 
this period and understand them in a larger context. In short, these works make clear the importance 
of not reading twentieth century scientific ideals into the scientific work of the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. Daston and Galison show that objectivity—the willful suppression of the self so 
as not to interfere with outcomes and data—did not become the dominant scientific paradigm until 
the mid-nineteenth century. Jan Golinski’s works suggest that the scientists of this period 
understood themselves in relation to the work of producing scientific knowledge. Being a good 
scientist was not a matter of having no self, but having the right kind of self. Even at this time, the 
practice of empiricism was founded on facts gathered within the framework of subjective existence, 
one reason why, as many have noted, the literary arts and science cross-pollinated so freely. In this 
dissertation, we will not only see early scientific agriculture written as autobiographical narrative, but 
literary works that utilize scientific discourse for aesthetic ends. 
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In addition to works on the history of science, two works of literary scholarship have helped 
me construct a more complete picture of the interrelation between scientific and aesthetic 
discourses: Jonathan Smith’s Fact and Feeling and George Levine’s Dying to Know.14 Smith’s work looks 
specifically at Baconian induction—or what people took to be Baconian induction—in literature 
from Wordsworth to Arthur Conan Doyle. Naïve Baconian empiricism, as it was understood by 
these writers, was the mere accumulation of facts without any guiding hypothesis or theory, and in 
attacking it made a “new formulation of scientific method that consciously sought to portray science 
as an imaginative, speculative, creative enterprise.” Even while remaining true to the ideal of 
objectivity, in this new science “truth is obtained through, rather than at the expense of, the creative 
imagination.”15 Levine’s book, which begins with Descartes and jumps to the 1850s, is an 
examination of science’s understanding of itself plays out in narrative form—in this case, the heroic 
story of the self-abnegating scientist, who will go to any length, even almost to the point of death, to 
erase his or her subjective experience in the name of truth. Smith and Levine books produce 
convincing readings of both the scientific method appearing in literature and scientific works taking 
their cues from imaginative genres, but their insights are mostly limited to a canon of nineteenth 
century thinkers and writers—Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, Dickens, Charles Darwin, George 
Eliot, J.S. Mill, Doyle—who were often perceived by their contemporaries as major contributors to 
public thought. This dissertation, on the other hand, focuses on the somewhat lesser-known literary 
and scientific traditions of this period and varied methods of making knowledge that arose from 
them: charts and tables, footnotes and endnotes, didactic and descriptive poetry, and fictional and 







Scholars have often had difficulty approaching eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
representations of the material world in part because the literature of this period has for so long 
been considered coextensive with Romanticism. From William Wordsworth’s claim that description 
“supposes all the higher qualities of the mind to be passive” to Erich Auerbach’s exclusion of 
Romanticism from his account of mimesis in Western literature, description, mimesis, verisimilitude, 
and representation have often been seen as inferior modes unconcerned with the true objectives of 
literary thought.16 But the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries was in fact a time of intense 
literary engagement with representation. Descriptive and didactic poetry flourished, amateur natural 
history writing began to come in to its own, and the novel, with its growing emphasis on everyday 
life, continued to mature. All of the authors featured here thought deeply about why and how texts 
should represent the material world, but because they for the most part did not see themselves as 
contributing to philosophical debates about representation, statements about the value of 
representation itself are few and far between. Part of my argument is not only that representational 
modes are important aesthetic qualities of some literatures of this period, but that these literatures 
worked with representation and its problems, rather than trying to use representation to ascend to 
other, loftier planes of expression. 
 
Ecocriticism, Ethics, Epistemology, and a Note on “Nature” 
In his recent book Back to Nature, early Modern scholar Robert Watson makes a point of 
bringing a discussion of ecological advocacy to the period he terms the Late Renaissance (1566-
1660), where it has long been neglected by critics. While we find little in practice that resembles 
modern ecology in this period, what Watson does uncover is a reverse teleology provoked by the 
epistemological crisis of Renaissance humanism. Baconian empiricism uncovered a world that was 
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never entirely knowable; a world, in fact, which became more complex and unknowable the more it 
was examined through telescopes and microscopes. This unknowability, a new type of estrangement 
from the world, provoked a longing for unmediated contact with nature and its essences, in other 
words: a return to Edenic origins. Thus, “From the moment of their conception, modern ecological 
and epistemological anxieties were conjoined twins.”17 Watson’s study is an important reminder that 
ecology and epistemology have always been relevant to one another in the British tradition—and 
still are, as I demonstrate in the Coda to this dissertation. An important aspect of this project, then, 
is to bring a greater emphasis on the epistemology of representation into ecocriticism. 
British literature of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was one of the first 
fields of literary studies where the discipline of ecocriticism gained purchase. Since the 1990s, 
ecocriticism has evolved from the study of nature in literature at a thematic level to the opening up 
of larger questions of ontology. In other words, ecocriticism has moved from thinking about literary 
texts as representations of real beings and environments to thinking about what being is in the first 
place. In both cases, literature performs an ethical function, either in allowing us to appreciate and 
therefore want to protect the non-human, or by making us deeply question the category of humanity 
so as to see our fate bound up with the fate of all beings and species. But in the jump from the 
thematic to the ontological, ecocriticism has largely bypassed considerations of representation of the 
non-human in literature and whether or not representation is the basis for a sound ecology. 
Recently, Dana Phillips has taken ecocritics of American literature to task for being “spooked by 
literary theory and continu[ing] to resist the challenges it poses to the naive forms of realism central 
to the American nature writing tradition.”18 While Phillips unfairly ignores much ecocritical 
engagement with philosophy and theory (as well as unfairly criticizes ecocritics for printing their 
scholarship on paper and wearing t-shirts that say “I’d rather be hiking”), his point is that any refusal 
to engage with theories that pull apart language’s so-called ability to represent reality dooms 
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ecocritics to unquestioningly accept literary representations of environment at face value. The work 
of this dissertation is along the same lines that Phillips is trying to encourage—to pull apart the 
beliefs, biases, and structures of thought and language that undergird literature about the 
environment. In doing so, I am questioning ecocriticism’s assumptions about the status of the real 
world in environmental texts and providing studier groundwork for ecocritical inquiry.  
 Before going further, I wish to acknowledge three sets of ideas that contributed to the 
formation of this project: associationist epistemology, the phenomenology of perception, and the 
picturesque. While none of these became central to the dissertation, as I had originally thought, 
thinking about them together led me to focus on epistemology when reading environmental 
literature, rather than themes or ontology. Firstly, of importance to me is John Locke’s short chapter 
on the association of ideas—ideas are in this case objects in the mind such as sensations and 
memories, rather than the products of thought—in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. This 
chapter became the seed for what would be by the end of the eighteenth century one of the 
dominant theories of human cognition and mental development in British philosophy. Locke noted 
that while “some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion with each other,” there 
is “another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom; ideas that in themselves are not at 
all of kin, come to be so united in some men’s minds, that ’tis very hard to separate them, they 
always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes to the understanding, but its 
associate appears with it [. . .].”19 In the next fifty years, this chapter on ideas associated by chance or 
custom provided the grounds for David Hartley’s theory of how association works at a material 
level, by which sensations that enter the mind create physical impressions on the brain.20 And by the 
end of the century, thinkers like Archibald Alison and Richard Payne Knight popularized association 
of ideas by using it to explain aesthetic taste. 21 
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 What none of these thinkers explicitly articulate, however, is that the association of ideas is 
greatly influenced by not only chance and custom, as Locke has it, but also by environment. One of 
Locke’s examples illustrating the existence of association shows how he saw environmental 
influence on the human mind: 
[. . .] a young gentleman, who having learn’t to dance, and that to great perfection, 
there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt. The idea of this 
remarkable piece of household stuff, had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of 
all his dances, that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well, yet it was 
only whilst that trunk was there, nor could he perform well in any other place, unless 
that, some such other trunk had its due position in the room.22 
Locke’s overall discussion of human understanding—discrete ideas entering an empty and fairly 
passive human mind and clumping together into complexes—seems to reduce human knowledge of 
the material world to a mechanical and non-interactive process, but his anecdote of the young 
gentleman and the trunk suggests something else. Knowledge is—terrifyingly—out of the control of 
the human will much of the time and depends on environmental influences that seem incidental. 
 While the association of ideas may never have been thought of as an environmental theory 
of human cognition by Locke and eighteenth century thinkers, it was prescient nonetheless. As I 
read more deeply into associationist epistemology, I also became interested in the work of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, particularly his landmark book Phenomenology of Perception (1945.) For Merleau-Ponty, 
perception is what happens before language, before intellectual analysis. Perception in this sense is 
situated, embodied, and reciprocal—the world of perception cannot be flatly reduced to what we 
perceive, but is in fact a function of our relationship with the sensed and unsensed dimensions of 
things. Knowledge, then, has a far more complicated relationship with perception than was thought 
by the positivists whom he critiqued. 
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All knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up by perception. There 
can be no question of describing perception itself as one of the facts thrown up in 
the world, since we can never fill up, in the picture of the world, that gap which we 
ourselves are, and by which it comes into existence for someone, since perception is 
the “flaw” in this “great diamond.”23 
Merleau-Ponty’s work has proven to be influential in recent environmental thought, being the main 
philosophical influence behind David Abram’s important books on environmentalist 
phenomenology, The Spell of the Sensuous (1997) and Becoming Animal (2010.)24 Additionally, the 
critique of positivism in Phenomenology of Perception, which questions scientists who look through the 
microscope without ever stopping to consider what the act of looking is or means, parallels my 
critique of criticism that looks through the text without questioning what it means to “look” through 
textual representation in the first place.  
Finally, we find an unlikely meeting place of epistemology and phenomenology in the 
picturesque. While the picturesque is an enduring aesthetic category, I am particularly interested in 
the period of its popularization by William Gilpin in the 1780s through the Picturesque Controversy 
of Humphry Repton, Uvedale Price, and Richard Payne Knight that lasted into the first few years of 
the nineteenth century. The theory of the picturesque is important to both practical and 
philosophical ideas about perception, knowledge, and taste. Gilpin’s treatment of the picturesque 
first gained currency in his travelogues about various places in Britain. When he attempted to 
systematically define this term in his Three Essays on the Picturesque (1792), it becomes clear just how 
muddied this category is. Where does the picturesque reside? In the landscape itself? In the mind of 
the viewer of a picturesque scene? In his or her landscape sketch or description of it? In the mind of 
the person reading the description or sketch? Gilpin’s essay leaves these questions unanswered, 
leaving others to take them up. While in 1794 Uvedale Price claimed that the picturesque—like 
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Burkean sublimity or beauty—resides in the landscape itself, Richard Payne Knight suggested that 
the picturesque is a result of the “pleasure derived from association” of landscapes with paintings, 
making the picturesque a category only available to those “in a certain degree conversant with that 
art.”25 In response to Price and Knight’s philosophical observations on the picturesque in landscape 
gardening, the landscape architect Humpry Repton criticized them for “not having carefully traced, 
to all its sources, that pleasure which the mind receives from landscape gardening,” many of which 
reside in the body, such as comfort, or rely on the effect of looking at a scene while bodily moving 
through it, such as variety, contrast, and the change of seasons and times of day.26 Knight relies on 
the association of ideas to circumvent the philosophical problems of aesthetics raised by Gilpin and 
unsatisfactorily answered by Price, while Repton—who actually participated in the day-to-day work 
of landscaping far more than the dilettantes Price and Knight—is closer to a phenomenology of 
perception in his thinking about what makes garden design effective. And so while I decided to leave 
a formal discussion of the picturesque out of the chapters, it was in many ways the philosophical 
problem of the picturesque that convinced me of the centrality of epistemology in environmental 
literature. 
Overall, my approach to environmental literature may seem a bit cynical, particularly since 
neither the real, material world nor an ethical consideration of that world are my first concerns here. 
The reader will find few readings that assess the ecological commitments of the texts I discuss, 
although I will make no attempt to hide environmentally destructive practices or ideologies they 
display. Doing so may seem like a retreat from ethics back into the safety of the aesthetic text, but 
the truth is that we cannot discuss texts as ethical objects without understanding the world-views 
behind their production. Refusing to look only through the text at the material, then, is not the same 
as ignoring the material world. I contend that an epistemological approach can be grounded in 
ethical concerns. In his defense of Cartesian epistemology from dismissive, wholesale charges of 
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being unethical, George Levine answers the claim that because objectivity—selfless observation of 
outward phenomena—is impossible, those who attempt to practice it delude themselves into 
mistaking ideology for science. (The scientific racism of the nineteenth century is one of the most 
prominent examples.) While fully agreeing that the ideal of objectivity is impossible in practice, 
Levine argues that just because a system for creating knowledge could be appropriated for unethical 
ends does not mean it is itself unethical. It is “dangerously mistaken,” he says, to assume that 
“certain abstract theoretical scientific and philosophical positions have necessary and intrinsic 
connections with particular ideological positions.”27 Those who bulldoze the experiences and the 
rights of others in the name of science, utility, and truth have are not entirely to blame when “the 
refusal of community, of shared discourse, of nonviolent grounds for belief”—all values of the 
scientific community—“has produced the most dreadful consequences.”28 Levine’s questioning of a 
necessary relationship between epistemology and ideology is, I believe, necessary, but his 
motivations for doing so seem limited in the light of ecocriticism. Levine shares with other thinkers 
the baseline assumption that “knowledge is always inevitably for some human end” and 
“underpinning traditional epistemology is the desire for human benefit.”29 While human benefit may 
always be behind traditional epistemology, I question whether epistemology benefits only human 
beings, or whether an epistemology that benefits human beings at the expense of other life forms is 
in fact truly ethical. (This question is not new—think of Victorian debates about vivisection, for 
example.) New work on the intersection of epistemology and ecology, such as Lorraine Code’s 
Ecological Thinking, suggests that epistemology can take cues from ecology in forming systems of 
knowledge that are anti-hegemonic. But even Code’s argument uses ecology as a model for 
restructuring systems of knowledge in human institutions, rather than using epistemology to change 
ecological practices.  
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And yet this dissertation, while holding open the possibility that an epistemological project 
need not be an unethical one, does not rush into a wholesale conclusion that epistemology is always 
an ecological practice. If anything, this work is a kind of proto-ecocriticism written after the fact, a 
necessary foundation for it. Onno Oerlemans, after surveying several strains of environmentalist 
thinking, notes their “common desire for a firm ethical footing by rooting value in the physical 
world. [. . .] The goal in each case is the ability to open human consciousness to the possibility of 
meaning, being, and value in [. . .] the realm of the physical or phenomenal.”30 My interest is in a 
word that crops up twice in this analysis: value. While Oerlemans claims here that environmental 
criticism is a search for, or an argument for, value in the material world, I am interested in his and 
others’ unquestioned assumption that the environmental, ecocritical project is a search for the valuing 
of nature altogether. The value that ecocritics look for in literature could be intellectual, sentimental, 
religious, or aesthetic, but critics especially feel they have hit pay dirt when they find a Romantic 
writer with a seemingly deep-ecological perspective: valuing nature for its own sake. Lest it seem like 
my line of argument is about to take a deeply cynical turn--dismissing the value of value, for 
instance--I should state that I have no intent of casting the value of animals and environment in this 
period as an unimportant feature of its intellectual and aesthetic commitments. At the same time, I 
do not claim that all, or even most writers of this period valued the environment in the kinds of 
ways that seem so necessary for us in our current ecological crisis. Rather, my goal is to excavate a 
little ground under this search for value--this unquestioned assumption on which much ecocriticism 
over the past few decades has rested. For this reason, I am more concerned with method: not only, 
how did these writers make knowledge about the natural world, but also what methods do we as 
literary critics employ in ascertaining what they thought about, and how they valued, the natural 
phenomena that appear in their writings? 
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 I would like to probe, question, and at times reject the assumption that just because a natural 
phenomenon appears in a writer’s work, the work itself is a testament to that phenomenon’s value. 
More importantly—and this is my specific intervention—I would like to undo the assumption that 
aesthetic works which display a great amount of empirical knowledge about natural phenomena do 
so out of a feeling of value for those phenomena alone, or that there is any direct proportion 
between the amount of knowledge about nature displayed in written work and the value it has for 
nature. This assumption—for instance, that since John Clare described nature more carefully and in 
greater detail than any of his contemporaries, therefore he loved nature the most and his work is a 
greater testament to the value of nature—is a slippery one. For on one hand, the truth of this 
statement seems self-evident to anyone who has read Clare and his contemporaries, but on the other 
its grounding in critical knowledge about Clare’s aesthetic goals as a poet and the value of the 
environment in the poetry he read generally are completely unquestioned. While it would be 
cynicism to the point of absurdity to say that a personal interest in, or love of, nature is not reflected 
in Clare's poetry, it is also dangerous to assume that knowledge, and the display of that knowledge, is 
tantamount to love or value. Recently, Scott Hess has published a persuasive caution against using 
Wordsworthian Romanticism and its legacy as a basis for modern environmental ethics, and this 
project follows his lead in calling for self-consciousness about the kinds of environmentalism we 
might wishfully read into the literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.31   
 
Chapters 
Chapter One begins with three young poets of the 1740s: William Collins and the Warton 
brothers, Joseph and Thomas. In their youthful rebellion against the previous generations of poetry 
based on social morals, these poets claimed to be lovers of nature despite the fact that realistic, 
empirical descriptions of nature appear nowhere in their poetry. Taking their claims to love nature 
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seriously, this chapter analyzes the material basis for the highly aestheticized and allegorized 
appearance of the environment in their works. Joseph Warton’s poem The Enthusiast, or Lover of 
Nature (1744-48), a manifesto of primitivism and anti-artificial aesthetics, begins by setting “nature” 
in opposition to the artificial or artful, but over the course of its evolution as a text, nature 
transforms into something similar to popular contemporary use of the word: the non-human 
environment. William Collins’ poetry, written at the same time as Warton’s, undergoes a different 
transition in its thinking about nature. Collins’ ode “The Manners” links nature with knowledge, but 
in this case nature is the spontaneous and non-contrived, particularly in human behavior. 
Meanwhile, Collins’ poetic landscapes undergo another transition, from allegorical representations of 
environmental figures like Evening in his earlier odes to traditional superstitions in his last great ode 
on the “Popular Superstitions of the Highlands of Scotland, Considered as the Subject of Poetry.” 
In Collins’ transition from allegory to superstition, it becomes clear that although Collins never used 
the word “nature” to refer to the material environment, he used allegorical and superstitious figures 
as a means of connecting the material environment with the human mind. Finally, the chapter ends 
with Thomas Warton’s mature poetry of the 1770s-80s, in which he tests his ideas about the 
relationship between knowledge and the environment through his interest in Gothic ruins. Warton 
attempts to disavow his passion for Gothic architecture by opposing it to neo-classical style, 
enlightenment, and modernity. However, the material conditions of Gothic buildings themselves—
overrun with plants and mosses, or filled with brilliant stained glass—mean that even as he praises 
enlightenment knowledge, his poetry undertakes its own intimate empiricism of the Gothic. 
Continuing several of the threads of Chapter One, my second chapter, “Charlotte Smith, 
John Clare, and the World as if They Had Witnessed It,” looks at environmental poetry in the 
decades after Thomas Warton’s works leave off. Examining the methods of knowledge making for 
which Smith and Clare are known—explanatory notes and description, respectively—I articulate the 
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epistemic virtues of their poetry. “Epistemic virtue” is a term I borrow from Lorraine Daston and 
Peter Galison’s book Objectivity, which denotes the historically and culturally specific ideas about how 
to define and produce sound scientific research, experimentation, and data. In other words, a 
botanist in 1788 would have very different ideas about what constitutes a definitive description of a 
new plant species than a biologist would in 2015. While Smith and Clare have different methods of 
conveying natural historical knowledge in their poetry, both are committed to poetry that conveys a 
sense of a first-hand experience of the things they describe, whether or not that first-hand 
experience actually occured. This epistemic virtue has as much to do with science as it does with 
Smith and Clare’s understanding of the poetic tradition in which they write and their sense of what 
makes environmental literature aesthetically appealing. Therefore, this chapter also discusses Joseph 
Warton’s Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope (1756) and John Aikin’s Essay on the Application of 
Natural History to Poetry (1777), both influential essays that advocate for the use of accurate scientific 
descriptions in poetry based on the author’s experiences. Finally, this chapter also includes a note on 
scientific poetry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and its use of endnotes. 
Taken together, chapters One and Two constitute the first section of this dissertation, 
“Nature,” which is concerned with how poets from the 1740-1830s defined nature and portrayed 
the material environment in their poetry. Chapter Three, “‘ACTUAL OBSERVATION and SELF-
PRACTICE’:  The Subjective Science of Agricultural Prose, 1760-1830” opens the second half of the 
dissertation: “Soil.” This chapter focuses on three agriculturalists writing prose in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries: Arthur Young, William Marshall, and William Cobbett. These men 
wrote about agriculture in a transitional time, when agricultural knowledge was being transformed 
from the tacit to the explicit, but before objectivity became the dominant paradigm in scientific 
thought and practice. Therefore their ways of justifying their own writing was not always, or 
necessarily, an appeal to the things they did out in the real world, but how they processed those 
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things through their subjective consciousnesses and recorded them for others to read. Their 
practices are empirical, but are rarely objective in the sense that the word took on in the mid-
nineteenth century. In their insistence on the validity of their own personal experience at the 
expense of all other agricultural writers, Young, Marshall, and Cobbett made agricultural prose into 
an autobiographical practice and their meticulously recorded data only made sense within the 
framework of their life histories. In their emphasis on personal experience, these writers shared the 
epistemic virtues of Smith and Clare, but their works are set apart by both their practical focus and 
their use of narrative method.  
My fourth chapter is about the much-studied appearances of landscape gardening—and the 
virtually unnoticed presence of soil—in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park. Although landscapes and 
discussions of landscape aesthetics appear in almost all of Austen’s novels, it is in Mansfield Park 
where the sinister heart of estate improvement is offered up for comment. As such, Mansfield Park is 
also the novel which has drawn the most critical commentary about the politics of landscape. This 
chapter, then, is not about landscape as a theme, but as a narrative strategy. At the same time, it 
discloses what is perhaps the novel’s greatest instance of the effect of the real: the naming of soil.   
Finally, the Coda “Knowing Real Nature in Contemporary British Culture” looks at the 
continuation of these ideas in contemporary high- and middle-brow British culture. The problem of 
representation in the “new nature writing,” a recent wave of memoir-based books on natural history, 
is complicated by the disappearance of so many plant and animal species from the island of Britain. 
Is British environmental writing even possible, critics might ask, given that so little of the 
environment remains? A different problem of representation is presented by the works of the 
sculptor Andy Goldsworthy, who, since the 1970s has been producing works of environmental art 
that are as ephemeral as ice and leaf sculptures and enduring as dry stone walls. Given the 
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impermanent nature of his art, Goldsworthy uses photography to “talk” about his sculptures, setting 
the audience at a remove from them. 
                                                          
1 John Clare, “January,” in The Shepherd’s Calendar, ed. Tim Chilcott, New ed. (Manchester 
England: Carcanet Press Ltd., 2006), 26 ll. 109-10. These lines are from Chilcott’s transcriptions of 
the MS. The 1827 version published by John Taylor renders them, “I hear it now, nor dream of 
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intended.  
Often throughout this dissertation, I have preferred to use original printed texts instead of 
modern editions when available so as to preserve the conventions and eccentricities of eighteenth 
century print. In the few cases where modern texts exist, such as Stuart Curran’s edition of Charlotte 
Smith, I have consulted them to check for major differences and alternate readings. To me, the work 
of modern editors has been invaluable in understanding textual history. Nowhere in this dissertation 
do I use the term sic. 
2 Ibid., lines 269–71. 
3 Ibid., lines 325–32. 
4 A few recent titles from the disciplines of ethno-biology and anthropology give a sense of 
how “environmental knowledge” is used in these fields, although, like all technical terms is it under 
constant re-evaluation and debate. Alan Bicker, Roy Ellen, and Peter Parkes, Indigenous Enviromental 
Knowledge and Its Transformations: Critical Anthropological Perspectives (Routledge, 2003); Serena Heckler, 
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(Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
5 Harold Bloom, The Visionary Company: A Reading of English Romantic Poetry (Cornell 
University Press, 1971), 444–55. 
6 That said, I am aware of my enormous debt to the body of Romantic scholarship that is 
evident in the notes and bibliography throughout. I am also aware of the viability of the road not 
taken. For Chapter Two’s Romantic twin, see Theresa M. Kelley’s essay “Romantic Exemplarity,” 
which deftly reads Charlotte Smith and John Clare’s natural history poetry in light of Romantic 
debates about exemplarity and the whole vs. the part. Theresa M. Kelley, “Romantic Exemplarity: 
Botany and ‘Material’ Culture,” in Romantic Science : The Literary Forms of Natural History, ed. Noah. 
Heringman, SUNY Series, Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2003), 223–54. 
7 Noah. Heringman, Romantic Science: The Literary Forms of Natural History, SUNY Series, 
Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 3–4. 
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8 James Grahame, The Birds of Scotland: With Other Poems (David West and John West, 1807), 
v. 
9 For an account of Smith and Clare’s uses of taxonomy, see Kelley’s “Romantic 
Exemplarity.”As recent scholarship has made clear, even as scientific practices became more 
specialized and the ideal of objectivity arose, there was not a complete separation between science 
and literature in the nineteenth century. Kelley, “Romantic Exemplarity: Botany and ‘Material’ 
Culture”; Daniel Brown, The Poetry of Victorian Scientists: Style, Science and Nonsense (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); James A. Secord, Visions of Science: Books and Readers at the Dawn of the 
Victorian Age (OUP Oxford, 2014). 
10 Ray. Desmond, Kew: The History of the Royal Botanic Gardens, History of the Royal Botanic 
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493 p. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966) devotes only 100 pages of its nearly 500 to agricultural 
science before 1840, despite the fact, for instance, that some of the first papers published by the 
Royal Society were on agriculture (particularly John Evelyn’s work on soil science, Philosophical 
Discourse of Earth.) When did agriculture become scientific? This suggests that for Great Britain, it did 
not do so in any meaningful way until the 1840s and beyond. Russell’s two chapters that deal with 
pre-1840s agriculture are entitled “Seeking a Road” and “The Way Becomes Clearer,” suggesting 
that early agricultural science was closer to blind groping for a path that would only become clear in 
the 1840s.  Sara. Wilmot, in The Business of Improvement: Agriculture and Scientific Culture in Britain, 
C.1770 - C.1870, (Bristol, England: Historical Geography Research Group, 1990), without 
undervaluing pre-1840 agricultural science or giving a teleological account of its development, makes 
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particularly chemistry, around the same time that the Rothamsted Experimental Station was created 
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13 John. Barrell, The Idea of Landscape and the Sense of Place, 1730-1840; an Approach to the Poetry of 
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1st ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Jonathan Smith, Fact and Feeling: Baconian Science and 
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PART I: NATURE 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
Enthusiasts, or, Lovers of Nature:  
Collins, the Wartons, and Poetry’s Proper Materials 
 
In 1755, an anonymous poem entitled “To a Gentleman, who Desired Proper Materials for a 
Monody” appeared in Benjamin Martin’s General Magazine of Arts and Sciences. Modestly wedged 
between two poems down the left-hand column of the page and almost easily overlooked, it proves 
a biting parody of mid-18th century British poetry. 
Flowrets—wreaths—thy banks along— 




(“Excuse me—here I want a rhime.”) 
Black-brow’d night—Hark! scretch-owls sing! 
Ebon car—and raven wing— 
Charnel houses—lonely dells— 
Glimmering tapers—dismal cells— 
Hallow’d haunts—and horrid piles— 
Roseate hues—and ghastly smiles— 
Solemn fanes—and cypress bowers— 
Thunder-storms—and tumbling towers— 
     Let these be well together blended— 
Dodsley’s your man—the poem’s ended.1 
 
While this poem appears impenetrable to those unfamiliar with the poetry of the mid-eighteenth 
century, its contemporary readers would have immediately recognized that it is composed of nothing 
but popular clichés. The source of these “materials” is a complex of poems written in the 1740s and 
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50s and the images and phrases that seemed to circulate among them like contagious diseases. The 
most direct target of “To a Gentleman” is probably Thomas Denton’s Immortality: Or, the Consolation 
of Human Life. A Monody (1754), a religious meditation in which “black-brow’d Night” appears in the 
first line, followed in train by “roseate hue,” “dulcet dew,” an “ebon car,” a “dark charnel,” 
Melancholy’s “Raven Wing” and a screech-owl.2 Denton, however, is only a late-coming imitator, 
culling what were by that time stock phrases. For instance, Mark Akenside’s Pleasures of Imagination 
(1744) features the antiquated “what time” (for “when”),“dulcet,” “silent eve” and a “horrid pile.”   
William Mason’s “To a Water Nymph” (1747) features a “silver-slipper’d” female figure as well, and 
Robert Blair’s wildly popular The Grave (1743) contains both the “glimm’ring” taper and another 
screech-owl.3  As the last line of the poem suggests, most of these were published by Robert 
Dodsley and showed the influence of Dodsley’s house style on the poetry market. Despite these 
recent trends, however, the original source of many of these materials goes farther back than the 
1740s. “Paynim” and “whilom,” for example, are not coincidental archaisms; they were favorites of 
Edmund Spenser, and were already antiquated by the time Spenser was writing in the 16th century.  
Likewise, “flowerets,” “paynim,”  “dulcet,” “eremite,” and the “ghastly smiles,” appear in John 
Milton’s early works.4 Parodied here, then, are the young poets of the 1740s and ‘50s who, in 
reaction against Popeian moral satire, placed themselves in a poetic lineage descended from Spenser 
and early Milton that deliberately bypassed writers like Dryden, Pope, Swift, and Montagu.5 
Included—rightly and wrongly—in the poem’s parody are three young poets who placed themselves 
at the front lines of this revolt: The Warton brothers, Joseph and Thomas, and William Collins. In 
the poems of the Wartons from the early 1740s we find wreaths, “Silver slipper’d” Isis, paynims, the 
world “clad in Midnight’s raven-colour’d robe, | mid hollow charnel [and] taper dim,” ebon thrones 
and scepters, piles of all descriptions, and so on.6 William Collins’ Odes (1746) escapes the lash 
directly, but includes among other things a cypress wreath, a fane, thunder, and a “hoary pile.” 
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“To a Gentleman” skewers bloated diction and endlessly recycled images, but also makes a 
larger point: that the poets of the previous decade had failed to find proper materials. That is, they 
had not found suitable subject matter about which to write poetry. The interstices of the poem mark 
a refusal to account for how Denton, Akenside, Mason, Blair, Collins, and the Wartons make their 
arguments. Only the raw materials matter here. While many poets from the mid-eighteenth century 
shared the same materials, they had different reasons for doing so. Writers like Edward Young, 
Robert Blair, and Thomas Denton—later labeled “graveyard” poets—were mostly concerned with 
questions of religion and the state of the soul. They used morbid images to create a vulnerable, 
meditative state of mind for the reader, but have little to say about the worth of those images in 
themselves. But for the Warton brothers and William Collins, the search for materials about which 
to write poetry was at the forefront of their concerns. While they exhibit all the foibles displayed in 
“To a Gentleman,” their search for proper materials led them to take up a more complex problem 
than the parody suggests. That is, not simply what the proper materials for poetry are, but how those 
materials are culled from the real world, and how knowledge of them can be passed onto readers. 
For these poets, the turn away from the abstract ideal materials of didactic moral satire meant turning 
toward the material world, or, at least, abstraction given material form. Furthermore, “To a 
Gentleman” leaves off at a fairly superficial level but the later poems of William Collins and Thomas 
Warton explicitly discuss the value of gloomy, superstitious imagery. In each case, as we will see 
below, this value lies in its capacity for making knowledge about the material world, and in some 
cases about what we now call the natural environment.  
In this chapter, Collins and the Warton brothers have a great deal to say about an 
epistemology of environment, as counterintuitive as this may seem at first. Their poetry has often 
been read as a turn away from the world—particularly the world of social responsibility—toward 
inward aestheticism.7 And certainly from a twenty-first century perspective their works lack what we 
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would recognize as a realist or ecological understanding of the environment. In other words, their 
works seem ill-equipped to deal with questions of environmental knowledge because they seem to 
retreat both from abstract thought and from the real world about which knowledge can be made. 
But why, then, did the young Joseph Warton begin his opposition to the Popean program with a 
poem entitled The Enthusiast, or the Lover of Nature? Why does William Collins announce that his turn 
away from scholarship and formal learning is a turn toward “where Science sure is found, | From 
Nature as she lives around”? What would happen if we take these poets’ claims to “love nature” 
seriously? I will show that in doing so we begin to see the subtle shift in their definition of nature 
from human nature to the material world; their allegorized abstractions that roam the landscape 
become ambassadors between the human mind and the environment, and the overgrown abbeys 
and charnels of superstition become the very places where empirical inquiry into one’s surroundings 
can occur. While I am in no way suggesting that these poets exhibit an ecological understanding or 
conservationist approach to environment, or that they can even be read as “nature poets,” careful 
attention to their works will show us how their “natural” aesthetic focused on human nature 
prepared the ground for the naturalist/scientific strain of later poets like Charlotte Smith and John 
Clare. First, I will examine the early poems of Joseph Warton, particularly his blank-verse essay The 
Enthusiast, or, the Lover of Nature.  Then I will move to the Wartons’ close literary associate William 
Collins whose most important poems are hesitant and at times cynical explorations of the ability of 
poetry to reflect the material world, and which use allegory and superstition as a solution to this 
problem. Lastly, I will move to Thomas Warton’s later career and its mature, chastened, but still 
stubborn views on poetry, knowledge, and truth, which are made possible by crumbling Gothic 





Joseph Warton’s Nature 
 What did the rebellion against Popean moral satire look like? The famous advertisement of 
Joseph Warton’s Odes on Various Subjects (1746) serves as its most succinct, and perhaps the best, 
statement. In its entirety, the advertisement reads: 
The Public has been so much accustomed of late to didactic Poetry alone, and 
Essays on moral Subjects, that any work where the imagination is much indulged, 
will perhaps not be relished or regarded. The author therefore of these pieces is in 
some pain lest certain austere critics should think them too fanciful and descriptive. 
But as he is convinced that the fashion of moralizing in verse has been carried too 
far, and as he looks upon Invention and Imagination to be the chief faculties of the 
Poet, so he will be happy if the following Odes may be look'd upon as an attempt to 
bring back Poetry into its right channel.8 
 
The advertisement sets up the volume, not necessarily as a series of pieces to be relished and 
regarded, but as the demonstration of a new poetics. While Warton claims to fear the displeasure of 
fashionable critics, the advertisement as a whole shows what he is really at pains to convey: that the 
aesthetic decisions of the following pages are deliberate and in reaction to current fashions. That is, 
if the work is found lacking, what critics deem its faults result not from lack of skill but from their 
inability to understand Warton’s self-conscious acts of taste-making. Warton asks his readers not to 
relish and regard his poems, but to recognize in them what should be relished and regarded. But the 
poems themselves do not bear out the advertisement’s strictures very well. Odes on Various Subjects 
seems to check thought at the door, and after the ambitious program announced by the author, does 
little to deliver on its promise. The Odes are on conventional topics: Peace, Fancy, Health, Liberty, 
and so on. The opening of the first poem, “Ode to Fancy,” give an idea of Warton’s aims and style: 
O Parent of each lovely Muse, 
Thy spirit o’er my soul diffuse, 
O'er all my artless songs preside, 




Rather than bringing poetry back into its proper channel by displaying fancy and imagination, 
Warton tends to write directly about these qualities. Not surprisingly, he seemed to recognize that 
his talent was better suited for criticism and abandoned poetry by 1750.  
Whether in poetry or prose, however, Warton’s ideas about poetry’s proper materials 
remained remarkably consistent across his career. In his “Gathering Book,” the young Warton wrote 
a passage entitled “Subjects for a Picture” and “Similes,” which is a disjointed list of ideas, a few of 
which I quote here. 
The Solemn Silence of the Pyramids. The Dark gloomy Scenes in Mines. The Fall of 
the Nile. Distant Noises. Indian Brachmins wandering by their Rivers. Medea’s 
nightly Spells. Meteors in the Night. Griping of a Serpent or Crocodile. A Lamp in a 
lone Tow’r. Noises heard at Hell-Gates, that were shut. Extended prospects from 
Olym[p]us. The Flames of Ætna seen in a dark Night by Strangers. [. . .] Sailors Cries 
at Sea in a stormy Night. Traveller benighted. –Two strong Seas separated by an 
Isthmus—or two angry Lions by a wide river. The Priest bleeding: Old Men 
Slaughter’d[.] Loathsome as the twining of a Serpent round one’s Body [. . .]10 
 
Here we have a set of discrete images and ideas, some of which appeal to vision, some to touch, 
some to sound. It structure is paratactic, meaning that it places phrases side by side, instead of 
arranging them into syntactic structures. What we have here are materials, not ideas or arguments—
the same basic structure as “To a Gentleman.” This memorandum was probably written in 1739, 
when Warton would have been 17 and writing, or about to write his first published work, The 
Enthusiast; while Warton did not intend for this memorandum to be a work of art, both share a 
paratactic quality. While The Enthusiast does unfold an argument over the course of its 200-odd 
blank-verse lines, the poem uses chunks of images, and leads the reader through its argument by 
replacing one set of images with another.  
The poem describes the point of view of its speaker: the unnamed Enthusiast, or Lover of 
Nature. Its goal is to accomplish the articulation of an aesthetic mode—a “natural,” passionate, and 
“soft” primitivist view of landscape gardening, painting, and poetry. The speaker also writes at 
length about the fortunate “primitive” peoples whose lives are filled with pains but who are 
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uncorrupted by luxury, themes that he takes directly from Roman writers. The poem is in essence a 
definition of what “nature” means from an aesthetic standpoint, but Warton’s revisions to the poem 
show a shift in his definition over time. Robert Dodsley published The Enthusiast in 1744 and asked 
Warton to revise the poem to be included in his Collection of Poems by Several Hands in 1748. Warton 
took the opportunity to insert a few passages of descriptive imagery that convey a slightly different 
definition of “nature.”  
In the first edition, Warton’s definition of nature can be seen in passages like the following: 
Rich in her weeping country’s spoils Versailles 
May boast a thousand fountains, that can cast 
The tortur’d waters to the distant heav’ns; 
Yet let me choose some pine-top’d precipice 
Abrupt and shaggy, when a foamy stream, 
Like Anio, tumbling roars; or some bleak heath, 
Where straggling stand the mournful juniper, 
Or yew-trees scath’d; while in clear prospect round, 
From the grove’s bosom spires emerge, and smoak 
In bluish wreaths ascend, ripe harvests wave, 
Low, lonely cottages, and ruin’d tops 
Of Gothick battlements appear, and streams 
Beneath the sun-beams twinkle11 
 
Here we see that the difference between Versailles and the “natural” images that the speaker prefers 
have little to do with the distinction between human-made structures and environments versus non-
human environments. In both cases, whether at Versailles or on the pine-topped precipice, human 
environments are a part of the scene. The difference between the two lies in the ostentatious 
manipulation of waters at Versailles versus the tumbling and twinkling streams. In other words, 
“natural” in this passage is the opposite of “tortur’d”—waters that tumble down are natural, while 
human artifice and ingenuity are necessary to make waters rise instead of fall. Similarly, Gothic 
structures and cottages are suited to “natural” landscape likely because of the age of the former and 
the humility of the latter. Ostentatious Versailles, on the other hand, is an open display of wealth 
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and power which does not conceal the artifice and effort that went into creating it, leading Warton 
to make a quite hackneyed political point.12  
 In the passage here that describes a “natural” aesthetic, images tumble like the mountain 
stream. Warton does not set up a scene—he culls a variety of images that do not fit together into a 
coherent picture: smoke from cottages, battlements, ripe fields of grain, and streams are all 
mentioned. But Warton takes no time to arrange them, he simply includes them. Again, the focus in 
this passage is on the materials—Versailles and its tortured waters are inappropriate and simply need 
to be replaced with another set of images.  
 Warton’s largest addition to the 1748 edition of The Enthusiast pursues the same paratactic 
strategy, although the “nature” it refers to is different. While the original poem contains a number of 
comparisons—landscape gardens like Versailles and Stowe are compared to wilderness, a richly 
dressed woman to a country girl, and Shakespeare to Addison—Warton added a long passage, which 
I quote here in its entirety, and which declines using comparisons to make its point. Instead, the 
speaker deliberately conjures an overwhelming number of images that cannot be resolved or 
arranged into a landscape view. 
All-beauteous nature! by thy boundless charms 
Oppress’d, O where shall I begin thy praise, 
Where turn th’estatick eye, how ease my breast 
That pants with wild astonishment and love! 
Dark forest, and the opening lawn, refresh’d 
With ever-gushing brooks, hill, meadow, dale, 
The balmy bean-field, the gay-clover’d close, 
So sweetly interchang’d, the lowing ox, 
The playful lamb, the distant water-fall 
Now faintly heard, now swelling with the breeze, 
The sound of pastoral reed from hazel-bower, 
The choral birds, the neighing steed, that snuffs 
His dappled mate, stung with intense desire, 
The ripen’d orchard when the ruddy orbs 
Betwixt the green leaves blush, the azure skies, 
The cheerful sun that thro earth’s vitals pours 
Delight and health and heat; All, all conspire 
To raise, to sooth, to harmonize the mind, 
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To lift on wings of praise, to the great sire 
Of being and of beauty [. . .].13  
 
The passage trusts that all of these sounds and images conspire to form a larger picture of a 
benevolent creator, but their role in raising, soothing, and harmonizing the mind is far different 
from the role they played in giving rise to the speaker’s oppression with “wild astonishment and 
love.” These two sentiments that bookend the passage—nature as an overpowering and chaotic 
beauty vs. nature as harmonizing proof of God’s greatness—cannot easily exist together, and 
Warton makes no further attempts to reconcile them. Significantly, this is the only piece of natural 
description in the poem that is not compared to artful/human-made images; nor is it part of the 
speaker’s fantasies of primitive human life. In other words, these are the only images of landscape, 
plants, and animals that appear in the poem for their own sake, and it is telling that their presence 
proves unmanageable. This lengthy emendation shows that the “Nature” in the poem’s subtitle 
came to mean two things by 1748. The Enthusiast was originally written, not as a paean to non-man-
made environments, but to a natural, primitive aesthetic. The wildness of Shakespeare, the simplicity 
of the country girl in her homespun clothes, and “simple Indian swains” embody this aesthetic as 
much as the copses, precipices, and riverbanks that are also described. But by 1748, the long 
addition suggests that Warton was also thinking about nature, now, as a material thing, a landscape 
whose magnitude could not be registered with ease by the poet. Even Warton’s capacious paratactic 
sentences have a difficult time accommodating this new view of nature—nature as the non-human. 
 Warton’s view of nature in The Enthusiast did not completely change between 1744 and 1748, 
but it came to accommodate a wider range of meanings. “Nature” no longer only means that which 
does not seem artificial or contrived, but also that which cannot become artificial or contrived because 
it is not the site of human intervention. In the Chapter Two, we will see that in his criticism in the 
1750s, Warton began to consider the description of non-human-made environments for their own 
sakes to be a mark of imagination, perhaps finally of poetry brought back into its proper channel. 
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But next we will look at Warton’s Oxford friend, William Collins, whose poetry takes on the same 
problem, although for Collins the solution takes him away from non-human environments and 
directly to artifice and allegory. 
 
William Collins and the “Scene-full World” 
In December of 1746, Thomas Gray wrote to a friend about the peculiar publication of “two 
young authors, a Mr. Warton & a Mr. Collins, both Writers of Odes,” each of whom appeared to be 
“the half of a considerable Man, & one the very counterpart of the other.” 14 The works he refers to 
are Joseph Warton’s Odes on Various Subjects and William Collins’ Odes on Several Descriptive and 
Allegorical Subjects, which appeared at the same time. What Gray did not know was that Warton and 
Collins were friends at Oxford and had planned to jointly write a volume of odes but decided to 
publish separately. Collins’ poetry is indeed the counterpart of Warton’s, known for its complicated 
syntax, its sophisticated and often antiquated diction, and its use of allegory and abstract images. The 
resulting difficulties may stem from its self-consciousness, which is both pervasive and understated. 
While Collins’ body of work lacks programmatic prose statements like Joseph Warton’s, much of his 
poetry is also about the act of writing poetry and of the qualities and materials necessary to poetic 
expression. The figure of The Poet is Collins’ main concern, and like Warton’s Enthusiast, his 
concept of (human) Nature undergirds the Poet’s understanding of his task.15 But whereas Warton’s 
focus shifted slightly over time as Nature came to mean both lack of artifice and lack of human 
artifacts, Collins’ understanding of Nature at first glance is entirely anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric. Nowhere in his poetry does the material world exist apart from human figures. 
However, I argue that Collins’ anthropocentric allegory is in fact a product of his attempt to 
understand the material world and convey that understanding to his readers. The purpose of my 
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reading here, then, is to show how knowledge and nature function in Collins’ poetry through his 
highly literary, highly allegorized works.  
Collins’ poetic career began early with his Persian Eclogues, a set of Orientalist poetic 
dialogues, written when he was 19 and published two years later. After he graduated from Oxford in 
1744, he went to live the life of an author in London. Although he had a reputation among his peers 
for being indolent, Collins was committed to literature as a profession and was active in circulating 
his works among friends and publishers. He was, as the highly learned and allusive quality of his 
poems suggests, also an accomplished scholar of languages and literature. By the early 1750s, 
however, Collins was forced by mental and physical illness to withdraw from society and to stop 
writing altogether. The last of his literary friends to visit him was Joseph Warton in September of 
1754—a visit, as we will see, which was crucial in preserving parts of Collins’ small canon. Warton 
declared that Collins was very ill and living in almost total isolation under the care of his sister. He 
died in 1759.  
 It was during this last visit that Collins gave Warton copy of the Persian Eclogues annotated 
with changes. Warton saw these through the press a few years later, retitling the collection Oriental 
Eclogues. The amended title page contains changes that are telling. The first edition epigraph is from 
Cicero’s Pro Archia Poeta, which Roger Lonsdale translates as, “But let us for a moment waive these 
solid advantages; let us assume that entertainment is the sole end of reading; even so I think you 
would hold that no mental relaxation is so broadening to the sympathies or enlightening to the 
understanding.”16 On Collins’ annotated copy, this and the publisher’s information are rather 
vehemently scratched out and replaced with a quote from Virgil’s Georgics: “and when on us the 
rising sun first breathed with panting steeds.”17 The difference between the two epigraphs is striking. 
The first makes an argument about the volume that, in the context of Collins’ friendship with 
Joseph Warton, champions poetry for entertainment over the moral and didactic. The latter 
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epigraph, however, makes no argument but is instead a very Collinsian image—quasi-natural, quasi-
allegorical. It intensifies the sunrise by portraying it in allegorized form, fusing description of a real 
natural phenomenon and a human understanding of it into a single image. The change is emblematic 
of a tendency we see in Collins’ poetry to turn away from statements about what poetry should be 
and instead depict struggles of representation within poetry itself.  
With this fused image in mind, I want to turn to Collins’ Odes and the late fragmentary draft 
“Ode to a Friend on his Return &c.” eventually published as “An Ode on the Popular Superstitions 
of the Highlands of Scotland, Considered as the Subject of Poetry” in 1788. In these poems, Collins’ 
allegorical style displays his struggle to understand the place and meaning of the material world in 
poetry. While the exuberance of Joseph Warton’s Enthusiast implies that nature can be represented 
accurately through poetry, if difficult to arrange and control, Collins’ poems follow only but so far. 
As Richard Wendorf suggests, in Collins’ poetry “external nature is celebrated, [but] our ability to 
perceive that world in all its shapes and colors seriously questioned, and our reliance on the 
reflections of art intricately established.”18 For Joseph Warton, the overwhelming variety of natural 
scenes is a cause for ecstatic praise; for Collins it is a source of unease. In part, this has to do with 
the mechanics of Collins’ poetry and how they are related to its subject matter. As we saw above, 
Joseph Warton’s blank-verse lines and paratactic structure make it easy to insert descriptions at will, 
hence the changes from the 1744 to 1748 version of The Enthusiast: the solution to the problem of 
representing nature adequately is to simply add more. But Collins’ odic structure, his sinuous syntax, 
and sometimes complex rhyme schemes allowed for no easy insertion of imagery. Collins’ unease, as 
Wendorf suggests, also has its roots in his attempts to understand the relationship between the 
mind, the natural world, and the role of art as a mediator between the two. Representation and 
verisimilitude are far from straightforward for Collins, and like Virgil’s panting steeds of the sun, 
matters are further complicated by personal and cultural interpretations of real events.  
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 Collins’ Odes on Several Descriptive and Allegorical Subjects is, not surprisingly, a mixture of odes 
on abstract topics (Simplicity, Fear, Peace, etc.) as well as current historical events. The two that will 
be my focus are the “Ode to Evening” and “The Manners.” Both are not simply odes to their 
particular subjects, but frame themselves in pedagogical terms: the poet is learning how to portray 
his subject matter even as he writes about it. And although both are allegorical, I am less interested 
in an overall exploration of Collins’ allegory and more interested in two questions: what does 
allegory have to do with Nature, the ostensible subject of each poem, and what does it have to do 
with pedagogy or the transmission of knowledge?  
The “Ode to Evening” begins tentatively: “If ought of Oaten Stop, or Pastoral Song”—in 
the hesitant stutter of “ought of oaten” is a timid petition to Evening to teach the poet how to 
portray her. Given the overall thrust of the poem—the poet asks Evening to teach him to describe 
her even as he describes her—one would assume the Collins was indulging in false humility in order 
to display his mastery of the subject. But while the poem does display elegance and technical polish 
in its complex sentences, meter, and diction, one cannot help but note its failure to look at its 
subject matter for long. Unlike the profusion of Wartonian images, natural scenery in Collins’ poetry 
shifts from foot to foot, appearing in the form of one prospect before dissolving and forming into 
another. The poem begins outdoors but ends indoors and Evening herself seems to lose her 
allegorical status. After asking to be taught, the speaker says 
Then lead, calm Vot’ress, [Evening] where some sheety Lake  
Cheers the lone Heath, or some time-hallow’d Pile, 
     Or up-land Fallows grey 
     Reflect its last cool Gleam.19 
 
Not content with a generalized outdoor prospect, Collins moves the speaker quickly from the Lake 
to the Heath to the Pile to the Fallows before inclement weather moves him indoors to a “Hut [. . .] 
That from the Mountain’s side, | Views Wilds, and swelling Floods [. . .].”20 The quick pile-up of 
landscape imagery is similar to The Enthusiast. But whereas Warton’s images are meant to lead to the 
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cumulative effect of passion and religious devotion, imagery in “Ode to Evening” seems unsure of 
where to settle and ends up retreating from Evening altogether. Images are propelled, not only by 
the tension resulting from treating literal nature as an allegorical subject, but also from the tension 
between wanting some material place in nature from which to speak, but not knowing where that 
might be. 
The poem ends in the hut on a winter evening, where “Fancy, Friendship, Science, rose-lipped 
Health, | Thy gentlest Influence own, | And hymn thy [Evening’s] fav’rite Name!”21 At the end, in 
midst of the four allegorized figures, Evening herself disappears even as she is named.  Evening 
becomes an evening—an ambient container of time in which the other allegorical figures of Fancy, 
Friendship, Science, and Health exist. On one hand, the ode imagines a single consciousness moving 
its way through a set of tangibly imagined landscapes, but on the other it is ultimately a retreat from 
portraying those landscapes with fidelity. The poem not only abandons images of evening in its final 
stanzas, but it puts Evening’s (unnamed) “fav’rite Name” in the mouths of abstractions. The end of 
the poem might lead one to conclude that only the idea of Evening, and not the tangible reality of 
evening, matter to Collins. I would say, however, that knowledge of evening, understood through the 
figure of Evening, is what is at stake here. Why does the poem lead from allegory to natural imagery 
and back to allegory? Because it is through allegory that Collins understands nature. Notice that 
Fancy and Science—the producers of poetic imagery and knowledge—are two of the figures who 
hymn Evening’s name. For Collins, there is a close link between allegory and the production of 
knowledge, a topic that he addresses directly in “The Manners.” 
 “The Manners” begins with a farewell to academic study, although it was probably 
composed some time after Collins’ departure from Oxford.22 In the poem, he states his intention to 
leave one kind of learning—solitary scholarship focused on the book—and take up another: focused 
observation of human character. But none of these actual observations—let alone any real people—
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appear in the poem. Like the quartet of allegorical figures at the end of “Ode to Evening,” whose 
presence stands in for the people within the hut who are presumably embodying those traits, people 
in “The Manners” are also entirely replaced by their allegorical counterparts.  
 The poem begins with an explicit turning away from scholarship: 
Farewell, for clearer Ken design’d, 
The dim-discover’d Tracts of Mind: 
Truths which, from Action’s Paths retir’d, 
My silent Search in vain requir’d!23 
 
Collins is not creating a dichotomy between truth and falsehood. Truth can be discovered in places 
other than “Action’s Paths”—the movement of the real world—but he himself has failed to find it 
there. He does, however, suggest that the search for truth via scholarship is incompatible with 
creating knowledge poetically. The speaker’s vain search for truth is silent, and perhaps required to 
be. Collin’s is using “requir’d” in the old sense of “asked for,” but his convoluted syntax allows the 
word to hover over the entire line, so there is a shadow of meaning that his scholarly search is 
required to be silent. 
 Collins, then, is making an argument about how knowledge is gained and transmitted and 
what role poetry may or may not play. Again, it is not a dichotomy between truth and falsehood, but 
between “Tracts of Mind” gained through silent scholarship and knowledge gained on “Action’s 
Paths.” He is also specifically leaving behind, not simply scholarly knowledge, but knowledge based 
on Classical tradition: “Farewell the Porch, whose Roof is seen |Arch’d with th’ enlivening Olive’s 
green,” the portico of ancient Greece under which philosophers taught their students and debated 
one another. Note that the portico is decorated by the “enlivening” green of olive trees, but even 
this naturally defining feature cannot overcome the sense that artificiality reigns. It is this porch 
where 
Where Science, prank’d in tissued Vest, 
By Reason, Pride, and Fancy drest, 
Comes like a Bride so trim array’d, 
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To wed with Doubt in Plato’s shade! 24 
 
The figure of Science, or knowledge, appears here in “prank’d” (pleated) and “tissued” (woven with 
gold or silver) clothing, dressed by the unusual trio of Reason, Pride, and Fancy. The wedding 
between science and doubt could produce two outcomes: healthy skepticism or endless intellectual 
wrangling.  The fact that reason itself, along with pride (the pompousness of scholarship and 
academia) and fancy has dressed science in her fussy, antique outfit suggests the latter. Collins does 
not share in the enlightenment value of skepticism based on reason, although in a few lines he turns 
to what at first looks like empiricism. 
 Leaving scholarly knowledge behind at the ridiculous wedding ceremony, the speaker turns 
to another figure who holds out a more promising model for gathering and disseminating 
knowledge: 
Youth of the quick uncheated Sight, 
Thy Walks, Observance, more invite! 
O Thou, who lov’st that ampler Range, 
Where Life’s wide Prospects round thee change, 
[. . .] 
To me in Converse sweet impart, 
To read in Man the native Heart, 
To learn, where Science sure is found, 
From Nature as she lives around: 
And gazing oft her Mirror true, 
By turns each shifting Image view!25 
 
It is through Observance—an old variant on “observation” that Collins probably chose for metrical 
reasons—that Science can be found again, this time not gussied up by human foibles, but in Nature. 
Although the language suggests movement in a landscape—“thy Walks invite,” “Life’s wide 
prospects”—by the end of the poem it is clear that Collins has little interest in the physical 
environment, but Nature here means human nature. The line “Nature as she lives around” seems at 
first to do with environment, that which “lives around” us. But the line means human nature as it 
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exists in many different types of people.  At this point, one may ask: where is the Nature of Joseph 
Warton’s Enthusiast? 
  Yet, “The Manners” feels like a rebellion in that it deliberately leaves a mode of gathering 
and disseminating knowledge behind; it abandons the dusty for the fresh, the antique for the new, 
the artificial for the genuine, the difficult for the pleasurable. But Collins has found that 
overthrowing a regime of knowledge does not necessarily mean that a new one will spring up in its 
stead.  Just as “Ode to Evening” roves from place to place, trying to find a vantage point from 
which to view its subject and ends up not viewing it subject at all, “The Manners” is also a self-
conscious search for its true subject, its true materials. The poem never directly mentions any of the 
Manners that Collins may be thinking of, although he does name the two powers by which he can 
portray them: “Humour” with his “comic Sock” and “young-eyed healthful Wit.”26 Through these, 
Nature can be found: 
O Nature boon, from whom proceed 
Each forceful Thought, each prompted Deed; 
If but from Thee I hope to feel, 
On all my heart imprint thy Seal! 
Let some retreating Cynic find, 
Those oft-turn’d Scrolls I leave behind, 
The Sports and I this Hour agree, 
To rove thy Scene-full World with Thee!27 
 
How is Collins’ focus on the “Scene-full World” of human behavior different from moral didactic 
satire? One would conclude that Collins’ goal was to write poetry after the mode of the Comedy of 
Manners—that he is interested in literary portraiture and the delineation of character. However, his 
style in the Odes is so abstract that it has no place for real people or even stock characters. Collins 
never actually commenced the project of portraying the “Scene-full World” in his poetry. His poems 
in general have very little to do with specific observations of real people or things—even fairly 
abstract things such as character type. Instead of viewing this as a failure or defect of his poetry, 
however, we should consider whether Collins was trying to describe something that did not exist in 
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the literary language of the mid-18th century. Collins’ recourse to manners is a close but not entirely 
accurate version of allegorization that depends on real observation (‘Observance”) and seeks to 
make knowledge about the human and inanimate world. Observation of the real world seems to 
have no relevance here; Collins is uninterested in empiricism. But allegory and abstraction do, for 
Collins, make knowledge.  
In his last known poem, Collins found an unlikely replacement for allegory as a medium 
through which knowledge can be made: superstition. When Joseph Warton visited Collins in 1754, 
Collins showed him a manuscript entitled “Ode to a Friend on His Return &c.”28 This poem was 
written for the Scottish dramatist John Home, and may have been completely forgotten by the 
literary world, had not Warton mentioned it to his brother Thomas and to Samuel Johnson. The 
manuscript was incomplete, but is nonetheless often considered Collins’ masterpiece. It was written 
between late 1749 and early 1750, although considered lost for decades after Warton saw it and not 
published until 1788. Refurbished with lines to fill in the gaps, it was retitled “Ode on the Popular 
Superstitions of the Highlands of Scotland, Considered as the Subject of Poetry” for publication in 
the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Although Collins had never been to Scotland, the 
Royal Society’s interest in the poem was to help preserve the Highlands culture being destroyed by 
population clearances.29 Again, as in “Ode to Evening,” we see a poem about writing about the very 
thing the poem describes. In detailing the superstitions of the Highlands and the effects of their 
belief, Collins enters into his own indirect meditation on the relationship between credulity, 
materiality, and poetry. 
Like “Ode to Evening” and “The Manners,” the subject of this poem is writing poetry. The 
speaker bids his Scottish friend farewell, admonishing him to take inspiration from the Scottish 
landscape to which he returns. 
Fresh to that soil thou turn’st, whose ev’ry Vale 
     Shall prompt the Poet, and his Song demand: 
43 
 
To Thee thy copious Subjects ne’er shall fail; 
     Thou need’st but take the Pencil to thy Hand, 
And paint what all believe who own thy Genial Land.30 
 
The soil and vales here are again not important for their own sakes, but because they are host to 
“what all believe” who live there. What interests Collins are the superstitions that are bound to 
landscape—the giant Kelpie, a monster who drowns and eats travelers; the ghosts of three warring 
kings who have been buried together; the wizard of Skye, for instance. The people of the Highlands, 
according to Collins, believe that these figures roam the land.  
Near the end of the poem, after describing several scenes from Scottish lore (and hence 
rendering the project he encourages in Home unnecessary), the poem self-consciously mounts a 
defense of the poetical rendering of superstitions. “[. . .] Scenes like these which, daring to depart | 
From sober Truth, are still to Nature true,” the poet claims.31 He goes on to describe the experience 
of reading/listening to Edward Fairfax’s 1600 translation of Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberate.  
How have I sate, where pip’d the pensive Wind 
     To hear His harp by British Fairfax strung, 
Prevailing Poet, whose undoubting Mind 
     Believ’d the Magic Wonders which He sung!32  
 
The question raised here is: what constitutes belief in the magic wonders? As the lines at the 
beginning of the stanza suggest, Collins is not claiming that Tasso was of the opinion that the events 
he describes in the poem are historical fact. Rather, departing from “sober Truth,” they still require a 
kind of belief. It is this belief on Tasso’s part that translates the ultimate poetic effect:  
Hence at Each Sound Imagination glows,  
Hence his warm lay with softest Sweetness flows,   
     Melting it flows, pure, num’rous, strong and clear,  
And fills th’impassion’d heart, and lulls th’Harmonious Ear.33 
 
Collins was fascinated by the idea of a place where superstitions have literal and universal belief. In 
other words: a place where his allegorized figures are not necessary because people see their 
equivalents literally roaming the landscape. Superstition—literal belief—is Collins’ way of 
44 
 
reconciling physical environment with human perception. Allegorical figures and the figures of 
superstitions are the bridge the gap between nature and the human mind. Through them, knowledge 
of environment is made tangible and understandable. Unlike Collins, who has to create allegorical 
figures in order to reconcile the human mind with its material environment, Home is lucky enough 
to have contact with a culture in which such figures already exist. 
 So why does Collins begin “Ode to Evening” with a request to be able to describe evening 
itself, only to end up back in an artificial, allegorized environment? We get our first clue in “The 
Manners”: real knowledge is to be gained from observation of general principles and types let loose 
in the world. And it is with the Highlands Ode that Collins provides his most developed answer to 
the question. In considering the superstitions of Highlanders, Collins is imagining a place where 
allegorized figures are made real through belief. If Highlanders literally believe that ghosts, fairies, 
and monsters exist in the world, there is no need for allegory; it is built into the culture. One striking 
feature of the Highlands Ode is how little use it makes of allegory compared with Collins’ earlier 
poems. Here the figures of superstition render allegory unnecessary, serving as the tangible 
manifestation of human thought. This is why literal belief is so important for Collins, why he needs 
to believe that Tasso really possessed an “undoubting Mind [which] Believ’d the magic Wonders 
which He sung!”  
 So far, neither Joseph Warton nor William Collins have manifested much concern for 
portraying the actual, material environment in what we would recognize in an empirical way. 
Although their “natural” poetry is a reaction to the artificiality they saw in moral essays and satire, 
their works seem foreign—if not downright harmful—in this moment of conservationism.  But 
dismissing their poetry as simply not caring about nature or environment is also dangerous, because 
here we have poets working through the question, quite self-consciously: what are we looking at 
when we see “nature” in poetry? How do we know nature when we see it, and how does a poet let 
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others know what nature is? In the last section of this chapter, we turn to the poetry of Thomas 
Warton. His late poetry is much more recognizable to us when it comes to nature—for the first time 
we see empirical, recognizable descriptions of natural phenomena. But perhaps more importantly, 
we see Warton struggle with Enlightenment knowledge and its place in poetry. 
 
Thomas Warton: Gothic Afterlife and the Lonely Enlightenment 
Hence to some Convent's gloomy isles, 
     Where chearful day-light never smiles, 
Tyrant, from Albion haste, to slavish Rome; 
     There by dim tapers’ livid light, 
     At the still solemn hours of night, 
In pensive musings walk o'er many a sounding tomb.  
—Joseph Warton, “To Superstition”34 
Ignorance and superstition, so opposite to the real interest of human society, are the parents 
of imagination. The very devotion of the Gothic times was romantic. The catholic worship, 
besides that its numerous exteriour appendages were of a picturesque and even of a poetical 
nature, disposed the mind to a state of deception, and encouraged, or rather authorised, 
every species of credulity: its vision, miracles, and legends, propagated a general propensity 
to the Marvellous, and strengthened the belief of spectres, demons, witches, and 
incantations. 
—Thomas Warton, The History of English Poetry, 177835 
 
These quotations show that superstition meant something very different for the Wartons 
than it did for Collins—at least on the surface. Simply, the Warton brothers equated Gothic taste 
with Catholic worship, an association suffused with their anti-Catholicism. Joseph banishes 
Catholicism to Rome, where it lives out its existence among the dim tapers and tombs of graveyard 
poetry. But for Thomas, things are more complicated. While he equates Catholicism with Medieval 
antiquity and superstition and associates Anglicanism with modernity and Enlightenment, he is again 
and again troubled by the fact that the place of poetry in this scheme puts him on the wrong side of 
his own prejudice. The stakes here are high—much higher than for Collins, who as an Englishman 
had the privilege of using superstition to exoticize Scottish culture and landscape to make a point 
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about poetry. If Thomas Warton, on the other hand, wants to define superstition as Catholicism, he 
must be ready to sort out the great tangle that results: is superstition religion? is it simply related to 
the aesthetics surrounding religious worship? is it at all useful in an age of Enlightenment? And from 
his perspective, as an ultra-Anglican professor at Oxford who had a life-long obsession with 
Medieval literature and architecture, he must do everything to avoid the appearance of Catholic 
sympathy. 
For Thomas Warton, the Middle Ages are embedded in Gothic architecture. It was in 
monasteries and churches that knowledge was made and preserved, where superstition, scholarship, 
devotion, and imagination all flourished simultaneously. For Collins, superstition is a means of 
literalizing the relationship between the human mind and the world it explores. For Thomas Warton 
(“Warton” for the rest of this section) buildings raised during the reign of Medieval Catholic 
“superstition” provide literal frameworks for making knowledge—knowledge that, I argue, at once 
fails by the standards of Enlightenment skepticism even as it provides an alternate model for 
Enlightenment empiricism. Warton himself, embarrassed about dragging his feet into the modern 
era of knowledge-making, tried to disassociate himself from the Gothic in two of his most 
accomplished poems: “Ode Written at Vale-Royal Abbey in Cheshire” (1777) and his “Verses on Sir 
Joshua Reynolds’s Painted Window at New College, Oxford” (1782). In each, Warton ultimately 
belies his own claims for the advantages of the Enlightenment because try as he might, his poems 
portray the Gothic intimately, while the Enlightenment remains nearly unknowable. 
Warton, like his brother and like Collins, began writing and publishing as a teenager. His 
youthful poem Pleasures of Melancholy, modeled on Milton’s Il Penseroso, was published by Robert 
Dodsley in 1747. This blank verse poem, comparable in length to The Enthusiast, is also a defense of 
an aesthetic mode, but a gloomy Gothic one, rather than a natural one. In particular, Warton is 
concerned with the literal space that Gothic ruins provide for meditation and reflection: 
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Beneath yon ruin'd abbey's moss-grown pile 
Oft let me sit, at twilight hour of eve, 
Where thro' some western window the pale moon 
Pours her long-levell'd rule of streaming light; 
While sullen sacred silence reigns around, 
Save the lone screech-owl's note, who builds his bow'r 
Amid the mould'ring caverns dark and damp, 
Or the calm breeze, that rustles in the leaves 
Of flaunting ivy, that with mantle green 
Invests some wasted tow'r.36 
 
 Pleasures of Melancholy was one of the targets of “To a Gentleman” and an inspiration for Thomas 
Denton’s Immortality, but Warton matured far beyond either poem over the course of his lifetime.  
Since much of the next 30 years were taken up with his duties as Professor of Poetry at Oxford and 
then Poet Laureate, as well as with his History, Warton did not publish any collections of his own 
poetry until he reached middle age. Poems. A New Edition, appeared in 1777, a slim collection 
comprised of original pieces and occasional verses.37 After this collection, Warton also continued to 
write occasional verse until his death in 1790. Not surprisingly, Warton’s later works show a much 
greater degree of skill than The Pleasures of Melancholy. However, there are some remarkable 
continuities between Warton’s poetic materials and priorities as a poet across the 30 or more years 
that intervened between them. Warton’s preference for natural settings and Gothic ruins only 
intensifies in the latter poems. 
 Warton’s later poems are far better intellectually equipped to discuss the problems of 
knowledge and aesthetics that appeared in his early work. The Pleasures of Melancholy capitalizes on the 
early Miltonic mode, as well as the fashion of “graveyard” poetry, but does not convey a sense of 
why melancholic and Gothic imagery are important. In two later poems, however, Warton wrestles 
with the implications of a lifelong taste for the Gothic and antiquated—that is, a taste for a non-
functional aesthetic. His and Joseph’s bold rejections of classical taste in the 1740s looked, by the 
1770s and ‘80s, like puerile rejections of truth and order. But these poems are not a repudiation of 
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Warton’s tastes, merely an explanation. The ground Warton gives over is that truth, as classically 
conceived, is at odds with his enthusiastic taste. 
 Poems is a slim volume with fewer than thirty pieces. It opens with several inscriptions and 
occasional poems to various royal and aristocratic figures, but the two latter sections, Odes and 
Sonnets, contain its most innovative poetry. In these pieces, it is evident that there has been a great 
change in Warton’s natural subjects and his methods of description.  The ode “The First of April” is  
an almost entirely descriptive poem, enumerating the effects of oncoming spring on the landscape. 
Among the many signs of spring in the woods and cultivated countryside appear the freshly-sown 
seedlings in the fields: 
     Scant along the ridgy land 
The beans their new-born ranks expand: 
The fresh-turn’d soil with tender blades 
Thinly the sprouting barley shades38 
 
The minuteness and detail of description here is unprecedented in Thomas Warton’s poetry. While 
the syntax is stilted (it takes a moment to figure out that the blades of barley are thinly shading the 
soil, not the other way around) we see here for the first time a description of something that is not 
an idealized or generalized part of the environment, but that feels empirically real. The difference lies 
not just in the appearance of bean and barley sprouts as a fit subject for poetry, but here we sense 
the tender blade of attention being used for different aims than in Warton’s earlier works. 
 For the rest of this chapter, I want to turn to two poems in which Warton trains this 
heightened attention onto Gothic buildings. The early Warton’s preference for ruined abbeys might 
seem like a moody teenage obsession, but as Warton moved into maturity his preoccupation with 
Gothic architecture—both in real life and as poetic material—became a site of intense intellectual 
engagement. He often spent his summers travelling the countryside, visiting and taking notes on 
various medieval buildings for a projected history of Gothic architecture. The history never 
materialized, but the many notes, letters, and poems he left behind on the subject show how he 
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turned the raw materials of Gothic ruins into meditations on modernity, social structures, and the 
creation of knowledge. One place he visited, whose ruins are now entirely gone, was Vale Royal 
Abbey in Cheshire, which inspired an ode. Like the beginning of Pleasures of Melancholy, we sense a 
lone figure walking pensively among the ruins of the abbey, but the latter poem is both local and 
detailed in a way that Pleasures of Melancholy is not. It begins with an evening scene like Gray’s or 
Collins’, but moves quickly to detailed description of the ruins of the abbey itself, with 
                       every battlement o’ergrown 
With knotted thorns and the tall sapling’s shade. 
 
The prickly thistle sheds its plumy crest, 
And matted nettles shade the crumbling mass [. . .]39 
 
These botanical images, compared to those in Pleasures of Melancholy or even Joseph’s Enthusiast, are 
most striking when Warton is describing the cheerful daytime scenes that serve as a foil to gloomy 
contemplation.  
 After the detailed description of what the abbey looks like now—and what, through 
Warton’s antiquarian expertise, we know it lacks—the speaker draws attention to himself for the 
first time and immediately questions his own aesthetic response to the abbey, the response we now 
realize was embodied in the detailed description of the ruins. 
 
Ev’n now, amid the wavering ivy-wreaths, 
(While kindred thoughts the pensive sounds inspire) 
As the weak breeze in many a whisper breathes, 
I seem to listen to the chanting quire. — 
 
As o’er these shatter’d towers intent I muse, 
Though rear’d by Charity’s misguided zeal, 
Yet can my breast soft Pity’s sigh refuse, 
Or conscious Candour’s modest plea conceal?40  
 
Importantly, the speaker links his thoughts with his environment in the same moment that he 
questions the wisdom of indulging in the aesthetic pleasures of such a place. As the abbey draws him 
in completely—so much so that in the imaginary sounds of the choir the days of English 
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Catholicism seem to rise once more—he gains a keen sense of the compromising position he is in. 
Therefore he must call upon Christian and enlightened virtues—pity and candor—to explain his 
attraction to this place. The poem seems to imagine that there are only two alternatives—to identify 
with the Gothic/Catholic, or to side with Enlightenment and Anglicanism. However, it enacts a 
third alternative—the construction of the Gothic space, not as a historical or Catholic one, but a 
space where thought, attention, and emotion can range freely without the interference of intellectual 
programs. But having in some sense already made the best argument for partiality to Gothic ruins 
through the descriptive passages, the poem proceeds to continue its dualistic argument. 
The next two stanzas state, in a tone of concession, that the abbey had been the place of 
Warton’s standby, “Superstition blind” (41), but the poem goes on to enumerate the virtues of an 
abbey: shelter for travelers, the preservation of learning and the arts, among others. 41 After the 
digression on the virtues of the abbey, the speaker is brought back to the present among the ruins: 
Thus sings the Muse, all pensive and alone; 
Nor scorns, within the deep fane’s inmost cell, 
To pluck the grey moss from the mantled stone, 
Some holy founder’s mouldering name to spell. 
 
Thus sings the Muse:--yet partial as she sings, 
With fond regret surveys these ruin’d piles: 
And with fair images of antient things 
The captive bard’s obsequious mind beguiles.42 
 
The Muse’s knowledge is partial in both senses of the word. She favors the knowledge to be found 
within the inmost cells of the abbey even as that knowledge itself—only the name of one of the 
abbey’s founders—is trivial. The knowledge gathered in this place is not part of the project of 
universal Enlightenment; it is confined to the footnotes of history and the gratification of personal 
curiosity. And yet—the muse who plucks moss from a stone to read a name is gathering knowledge 
through direct and in this case intimate experience. Like “partial,” “obsequious” also has a double 
meaning here. The poet’s mind is pliant and obedient, sensitive to the play between memory, 
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imagination, and environment, but it is also performing rites for the dead—the obsequies of Gothic 
architecture.  
The poet pardons the Muse who has bewitched his own mind, but ultimately his eccentric 
tastes, so contrary to the good of human society, must give way to the good of the whole. Thus the 
poem ends quite abruptly with the consolations of Enlightenment: 
But much we pardon to th’ingenious Muse; 
Her fairy shapes are trick’d by Fancy’s pen: 
Severer Reason forms far other views, 
And scans the scene with philosophic ken. 
 
From these deserted domes, new glories rise; 
More useful institutes, adorning man, 
Manners enlarg’d, and new civilities, 
On fresh foundations build the social plan. 
 
Science, on ampler plume, a bolder flight  
Essay, escap’d from Superstition’s shrine: 
While freed Religion, like primeval light 
Bursting from chaos spreads her warmth divine.43 
 
The poet’s indulgences are countered with Reason’s double-meaning words of visual knowledge. 
Reason forms “far other views”—that is, not only entirely different ideas, but also a far different 
visual perspective on the abbey than the partial Muse who gathers knowledge by plucking moss 
from stones. From this far different view, Reason “scans the scene with philosophic ken.” That is, 
Reason scans the scene visually, but it also carries the connotation of scanning lines of verse and to 
judge. Likewise, her philosophic ken consists both of what she can see and what she knows—“ken” 
encompassing both of these meanings.  The move from the partial Muse to Reason, then, is the 
move from local knowledge to knowledge on a grand scale. From Reason, social institutions arise, 
and Science and Religion burst forth from the ruins of Catholicism. These are the consolations of 
the loss of the Gothic: institutional knowledge and large-scale social improvements divested of 
superstition. Indeed, Religion’s emergence from the abbey is a second Genesis, with the triumph of 
light over chaos. 
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 Warton acknowledges that, rationally, there is no case to be made for partiality to Gothic 
ruins. But the structure of the poem tells a different story. In the last three stanzas, the reader is 
quickly hustled into Enlightenment and all particulars are pushed aside in favor of abstraction and 
generalization. While the first part of the poem lovingly dwells on the nettles, saplings, ivy, moss, 
and crumbling stone of the abbey, there is no room for such detail or intimate knowledge in the 
actions of Reason, Science, and Religion. With a sudden dynamism that borders on violence, they 
triumph over what the abbey had previously stood for. But by abandoning the abbey and casting its 
lot with Enlightenment, the poem has nowhere left to go. Attention to detail, direct bodily 
encounter, and the direct acquisition of knowledge—even though these seem to be Enlightenment 
scientific values—have no place in the institutional schemes of Reason and Science. 
 It is abstraction, not particulars, that allows Warton the pat ending and the quick closure of 
the Vale Royal Ode.44 Here we have Collins reversed, as abstraction means for the first time 
alienation from the landscape rather than contact with it. As the Ode’s hurried conclusion suggests, 
however, Warton had not fully worked through the problem of Gothic versus Enlightenment modes 
of knowledge. His most explicit undertaking of that theme would come five years later with his 
“Verses on Sir Joshua Reynolds’s Painted Window at New-College, Oxford.” The series of windows 
the poem refers to were installed in the 14th-century chapel of New College, Oxford in 1782-83. Sir 
Joshua Reynolds drew the designs for the windows, which featured several female figures in classical 
dress who represent various virtues. The installation of these neo-classical figures in a Gothic chapel 
provided Warton with a more public opportunity to meditate on the implications of his taste for the 
Gothic. The poem was printed as a pamphlet in 1782 and came out in a second edition in 1783 after 
the final installations had been finished. 
Like the Ode at Vale Royal Abbey, “Verses” concedes Gothic taste to the importance of 
neoclassicism and Enlightened tastes and knowledge. Its tone is more light and humorous than the 
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meditative Vale Royal Ode, although this humor tends to mask Warton’s reservations about 
Enlightenment knowledge. The humor is also playfully defensive, as it finally locates the taste for the 
Gothic not in the Muse of the Vale Royal Ode but in Warton himself, equating Gothic taste with 
personal eccentricity.  
“Ah,” the poem begins, 
stay thy treacherous hand, forbear to trace 
Those faultless forms of elegance and grace! 
[. . .]  
Nor steal, by strokes of art with truth combin’d, 
The fond illusions of my wayward mind!45 
 
The speaker jokingly equates grace and elegance with treachery, and prefers his wayward mind over 
truth. As friendly and light-hearted as the tone is, a real sense of pain and alienation lurks under it. 
Reynolds himself picked up on this in his short letter of thanks to Warton after the first edition 
publication: 
It is a bijoux, it is a beautiful little thing, and I should have equally admired it, if I had 
not been so much interested in it as I certainly am; I owe you the greatest obligations 
for the Sacrifice which you have made, or pretend to have made, to modern Art, I 
say pretend, for tho’ it be allowed that you have like a true Poet feigned marvelously 
well, and have opposed the two different stiles with the skill of a Connoiseur, yet I 
have no great confidence in the recantation of such an older offender; 
It is short, but it is a complete composition; it is a whole, the struggle is I think 
eminently beautifull  
–From bliss long felt unwillingly we part 
Ah spare the weakness of a lovers heart! 
It is not much to say that your Verses are by far the best that ever my name was 
concernd in. I am sorry therefore my name was not hitch’d in in the body of the 
Poem, if the title page should be lost it will appear to be addressd to Mr Jervais46 
 
“Mr. Jervais” was Thomas Jervais, the Irish glass painter who painted Reynolds’ designs on the 
windows, and whose enamel technique was quite popular in the 1770s and ‘80s. Jervais was a well-
known artist in his own right, and the New College Chapel windows are said to be the finest 
example of his art. Reynolds’ concern is with the last verse-paragraph of the poem, which in the first 
edition of 1782 began, “ARTIST, tis thine, from the broad window’s height | To add new lustre to 
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religious light.”47 At Reynolds’ prompting, Warton changed it to “REYNOLDS, tis thine” for the 
second edition in 1783. Reynolds’ comment seems to be a response to the fact that the final lines of 
the poem mostly abandon considerations of form (that is, Reynolds’ contribution to the windows) 
to fixate on considerations of color and light. Neo-classicism and modern art, as both Warton and 
Reynolds see them, are embodied in the forms of the women, but despite the poem’s deliberate 
evocation of the struggle between Gothic and Classic, it is ultimately window-making technology 
that concerns Warton here.  
The last lines of the poem show its vexed relationship with light, and by extension, 
metaphors of Enlightenment. As much as Warton tries, as he did in “Vale Royal” to associate 
modern neo-classical knowledge with modernity and Enlightenment, he was confronted with the 
contradiction that the brilliant, jewel-like colors of Medieval stained glass allow more light and are 
far more permanent than the Reynolds/Jervais windows’ milky translucent enamel. Warton knew 
well the differences between Jervais’ technique and those of Medieval craftsmen. He was interested 
in preserving bits and pieces from Medieval ruins, particularly what he called painted glass. Medieval 
painted glass as Warton knew it was different from Jervais’ method, which involved coating the glass 
with a translucent enamel glaze that was then baked on. Medieval painted glass, by contrast, was 
made by processes that stained the glass throughout. In some cases, this meant melting sand with 
various minerals that would tint the final product, or by coating the glass with a transparent paint 
made of metallic oxides and ground glass. To produce yellows and oranges, a silver stain was applied 
to the back of the glass which then penetrated and stained the glass as it was fired.48 Medieval 
painted glass, then, was not only more transparent, but its color was far more durable than enameled 
glass. Indeed, the Reynolds/Jervais window is said to be “much deteriorated” in the present.49 In 
attempting to praise the enameled glass, Warton is unable to disguise the brilliance of stained glass: 
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“Ye Colours, that th’unwary sight amaze, |And only dazzle in the noontide blaze!,” which he 
contrasts with  
Those tints, that steal no glories from the day, 
Nor ask the sun to lend his streaming ray; 
The doubtful radiance of contending dies, 
That faintly mingle, yet distinctly rise; 
Twixt light and shade the transitory strife; 
The feature blooming with immortal life:50 
 
An advantage of enameled glass is that its colors can be seen no matter the light outside, whereas 
stained glass is dark unless illuminated from without. Even so, the stained glass amazes and dazzles 
the sight even as it depends on the sun’s rays—perhaps like divine inspiration—to do so. The 
dependable and consistent enameled glass is of “doubtful radiance,” whose colors “faintly mingle” 
even as they are distinctly clear at all times. As in the Vale Royal Ode, the Gothic is a place to see 
detail, brightly and clearly, if less reliably. Thus Warton, even though embarrassed by the 
subjectivism of his Gothic taste, struggles with metaphors of light and Enlightenment. In the case of 
this real-life clash of Gothic and neo-classical, he cannot ignore the evidence of his eyes. 
Considerations of light and color aside, it is clear that correct attribution was not Reynolds’ 
only concern. The poem, as flattered and pleased with it as Reynolds was, did not leave him 
convinced of the sincerity of Warton’s “conversion” to neo-classical tastes. As the poem states and 
Reynolds suggests, old habits of mind and feeling are difficult to change. Thus Reynolds’ reading of 
the poem is as perceptive as it is self-interested. His playful remarks about Warton’s false conversion 
are followed by a semicolon and paragraph break, and then begin anew—almost as if after a re-
perusal of the poem.  Significantly, the lines that he quotes, “From bliss long felt unwillingly we part: 
| Ah, spare the weakness of a lover’s heart!” and those that portray the struggle he refers to occur 
immediately before the speaker’s conversion—or rather, surrender—to a modern aesthetic. 
Chase not the phantoms of my fairy dream, 
Phantoms that shrink at Reason’s painful gleam! 
That softer touch, insidious artist, stay, 
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Nor to new joys my struggling breast betray!51  
 
In the end, he concedes victory to Reynolds, however: 
Thy powerful hand has broke the Gothic chain, 
And brought my bosom back to truth again: 
To truth, by not peculiar taste confined, 
Whose universal pattern strikes mankind; 
To truth, whose bold and unresisted aim 
Checks frail caprice, and fashion’s fickle claim; 
To truth, whose charms deception’s magic quell, 
And bind coy Fancy in a stronger spell.52  
 
As in the Vale Royal Ode, truth and enlightened knowledge are dynamic, powerful, and violent. 
Fancies flee before Reason’s “painful” gleam. However—is the enameled glass window actually 
powerful enough to provide such a gleam? We have little time to question—Reynolds’ painterly 
hand “has broke” Warton’s Gothic tastes, truth itself “strikes” mankind and is “bold and unresisted” 
in checking, quelling, and binding alternative tastes and modes of knowledge. The price of 
Enlightenment is heavy for Warton, despite his attempts to include his poetry within its program.  
 
Conclusion 
While Joseph Warton most explicitly explored the question of what Nature means in poetry, 
it was Collins and Thomas Warton who struggled longest trying to understand the relationship 
between the material world and human knowledge. Collins’ career as a poet ended before he could 
fully articulate his vision of how allegory and superstitions, even though they are abstractions, allow 
us to understand the concrete. Thomas Warton, on the other hand, was unwilling to persist in his 
defense of the Gothic, even as his poetry shows—against his own will—that Gothic taste creates a 
space for environmental knowledge that Enlightenment destroys. The anonymous poet of “To a 
Gentleman,” then, was both right and wrong: superstitious and Gothic materials may not have 
constituted proper materials for poetry in themselves, but they were useful to Collins and Warton as 
each poet struggled toward an understanding of the relationship between poetry, its materials, and 
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the material world. In the next chapter, we will see two poets, Charlotte Smith and John Clare, take 
up this question where Collins and the Wartons left off. While Collins and the Wartons did not 
entirely succeed in their quest for a new set of materials, the work of these enthusiasts shows us how 
poetry that can look the directly at the material world came into existence between the mid- and late 
eighteenth century. 
By 1784, the publication of Smith’s first collection Elegiac Sonnets, “nature” had come to 
mean what it colloquially means now: the material world that exists apart from human creation. In 
the subsequent works treated in this dissertation, we will encounter little of the ambiguity 
surrounding the meaning of nature that appears in The Enthusiast. The purpose of this chapter, then, 
has been to demonstrate that the transition in literature from the mid- to late-eighteenth century 
from nature-as-natural (not “tortur’d”) to nature-as-material was bound together with questions 
about how to make knowledge about it.53 I began with these poets, not because we can see our later 
understanding of nature in their works, but because in their poetry we see first the evolution of the 
concept of Nature as material for poetry and second their varying attempts to come to terms with 
the implications of their new materials. The following chapters will deal with nature as material 
environment quite literally—in the meticulous natural history writing of Smith and Clare, the 
autobiographical testimony of scientific agricultural writing, and in l’effet de réel of Jane Austen’s 
landscapes in Mansfield Park.54 
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Charlotte Smith, John Clare, and the World as If They Had Witnessed It 
Despite William Collins’ ambivalence, documented in the previous chapter, about whether 
or not poetry can represent the material world, it would be a mistake to assume that he had no 
interest in knowing the material environment in a literal way. Among the many scholarly footnotes 
included in his 1746 Odes, one points to the borrowing of ideas not from other pieces of literature, 
but from history and science. Reflecting on the relationship between Great Britain and France in the 
“Ode to Liberty,” the speaker begins not with the political relations between the two nations, but 
with their geographical proximity and the geological theory behind it: 
Beyond the Measure vast of Thought, 
The Works, the Wizzard Time has wrought! 
     The Gaul, ‘tis held of antique Story, 
Saw Britain link’d to his now adverse Strand ‡,  
     No Sea between, nor Cliff sublime and hoary, 
He pass’d with unwet Feet thro’ all our Land. 
 
‡ This Tradition is mention’d by several of our old Historians. Some Naturalists too 
have endeavour’d to support the Probability of the Fact, by Arguments drawn from 
the correspondent Disposition of the two opposite Coasts. I don’t remember that 
any Poetical Use has hitherto been made of it.1 
 
Although concerned with what would become the science of geology, Collins’ note does not seem 
much like a part of scientific discourse—he does not even mention the names of the historians and 
naturalists who have posited the theory that the island of Britain was once a part of the Continent. 
What interests me most, however, is that Collins is aware that he is using this information in an 
entirely new way. The theory of Britain’s pre-historical attachment to the Continent, whether true or 
false, whether it belongs to the historians or the naturalists, is of interest to him because it has never 
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been part of “Poetical Usage.” In this stanza, Collins deliberately creates new poetic materials out of 
disciplines that create facts about material existence, but the reader can only recognize that he is 
doing so because of his note. 
 Sixty years later, another poet would return to the same geological conjecture, this 
time after geology emerged as a modern scientific discipline: Charlotte Smith in her posthumously 
published masterpiece “Beachy Head.”2 Smith glosses the lines imaginatively describing the “vast 
Concussion; when the Omnipotent | stretched forth his arm, and rent the solid hills” of the land 
dividing England and France with the following note: 
 Alluding to an Idea that this Island was once joined to the Continent of Europe, and 
torn from it by some convulsion of Nature. I confess I never could trace the 
resemblance between the two countries. Yet the cliffs about Dieppe, resemble the 
chalk cliffs on the Southern coast. But Normandy has no likeness whatever to the 
part of England opposite to it.3 
 
There are two significant differences between Collins’ and Smith’s notes. The first is that Smith 
explicitly attributes the separation of Britain and France to “Nature,” a nature that is strictly material. 
The nature that Collins had wanted to observe in “The Manners” is nowhere to be seen here. The 
second is that, while Collins contents himself with citing, but not naming other authors, Smith cites 
in the same way but downplays the works of others in order to speak from the authority of her own 
experience. “An idea” about England and France exists in the abstract, but Smith says “I confess I 
never could” trace the resemblance, implying that she had examined the coasts of England and 
Normandy, despite the fact that she did find a resemblance in the part of Normandy near Dieppe. 
Even though the “Idea” does in fact corroborate her own experience, she manages to make her 
experience the final word on the subject. 
However, in spite of the differences between the notes themselves, neither poet was unique 
in writing them. By 1806, the year of Smith’s death, notes to poetry involving historical and scientific 
facts had become commonplace. The scholarly note, which points out the poet’s literary references 
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and thus also points to the poem’s creation from other texts, came to share space with notes 
directed toward other disciplines of knowledge production. The reading public was ambivalent 
about the value of notes themselves, but the seeming ubiquity of poems with notes speaks of a great 
shift in thinking about the relationship between poetic materials and the material world that 
happened between the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Poetry became accountable to 
systems of knowledge for disseminating facts about the material world. And as Smith’s note shows, 
authority by this time consisted of not only citing texts or the ideas of others, but citing one’s own 
experience.   
This aspect of poetic authority—the poet’s claims of having directly witnessed what he or 
she writes about—is the focus of this  chapter; and my analysis will center not only on  Smith but 
also another poet who employed a similar rigor in his natural history poetry: John Clare. Both are 
known for their attentiveness toward their environments, although they used different methods for 
bearing witness to their experience. While Smith’s notes allowed her to step out from behind her 
poetic persona to more explicitly attest to her experience, Clare’s pervasive descriptions seem to 
directly transcribe the objects of his senses first-hand. Both poets, however, understand the 
limitations of poetic representation, and use claims to direct experience as a way to mitigate these 
limitations. Smith and Clare are thus connected to the debate about “naturalness” in poetry which 
began with the poets we saw in Chapter One. In this chapter, I want to think about Smith and 
Clare’s work alongside the critical literature on this topic, particularly Joseph Warton’s Essay on the 
Writings and Genius of Pope (1756) and John Aikin’s Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry 
(1777).  I begin with the natural history notes appended to Charlotte Smith’s poetry, which may be 
one end result of eighteenth century debates about the relationship between science and literature 
and afterward, I will turn to Warton and Aikin’s works to see how debate about the use of natural 
history in poetry arose and how Smith may have responded to it. Finally, I will consider the practices 
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of description, both as an aesthetic effect and a method for conveying knowledge, in John Clare’s 
poetry of the 1820s and 30s. My concern here is not to prove that Smith or Clare observed 
environmental phenomena more closely than other poets, but that their aesthetics of “naturalness” 
and verisimilitude is based upon the particular theories of knowledge to which they subscribed. To 
these poets, I argue, actually witnessing phenomena was only important insofar as it allowed one to 
write about things as if one had witnessed them.  
Whereas in the last chapter we saw poets working through the implications of representing 
one’s material environment in poetry, the poets and critics featured in this chapter take for granted 
that poetry can and should represent and make knowledge about the environment. In thinking about 
the reasons for this shift, I will make recourse to both the history of science and literary history. In 
particular, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s concept of epistemic virtues undergirds my analysis 
of the writers featured in the next two chapters. Epistemic virtues, which Daston and Galison apply 
to visual rather than written practices of making scientific knowledge, are the “ideals and [. . .] 
historically specific ways of investigating and picturing nature” in the scientific culture of a given 
time. 4 Daston and Galison use this term to chart the rise and fall of objectivity across the history of 
science, making the case that scientific practices have never been inherently objective, but rather that 
objectivity arose in the mid-nineteenth century in response to ideological shifts across Europe. 
While the argument that scientific ideals and practices emerge from culture is nothing new, the idea 
of epistemic virtues is particularly useful for understanding why some writers of both scientific and 
non-scientific literature in this period feel the need to base their knowledge on certain principles.5 
The period of time covered by this dissertation ends in the mid-1830s before the conclusive 
enshrining of objectivity as an epistemic virtue and therefore what we will find will only sometimes 
be recognizable as science. My goal is to understand through both published works and private 
commentary which epistemic virtues were held by the poets and critics concerned with making 
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poetry an instrument of natural history. For these two different groups of writers, however, their 
goals are different although they share the same epistemic virtues. Warton and Aikin—both 
indifferent poets themselves who often failed to take their own advice—advocated a return to 
accurate description and correct use of natural history, improving the problem of bad poetry on a 
larger social scale. Smith and Clare, however, were more motivated by the integrity of their art in a 
less than sympathetic world. Both poets had little else to lay claim to but their experiences. For 
them, faithful accounting of what has happened is one of the few ways to affirm one’s existence. 
 
Charlotte Smith’s “Beachy Head” 
Charlotte Smith died on October 28th, 1806 after a difficult life and long illness. Publisher 
Joseph Johnson issued her last, unfinished volume Beachy Head with Other Poems in the following 
January. Accordingly, the reviews of it that appeared served as both criticism and obituary. In the 
British Critic, the reviewer lavished praise both on Smith’s long poetic career and on the individual 
Beachy Head volume. Smith’s poetry in general was characterized by “a most vivid fancy, refined 
taste, and extraordinary sensibility.”6 However, he claims,  
We could not, indeed, always accord with her in sentiment. With respect to some 
subjects beyond her line of experience, reading, and indeed talent, she was 
unfortunately wayward and preposterous; but her poetic feeling and ability have 
rarely been surpassed by any individual of her sex.7  
 
The reviewer never states what these wayward subjects are, or how they led her to misguided 
sentiment. Is he referring to her displays of scientific knowledge? Her radical politics? Her often 
self-pitying rehearsals of her life story? However, with the criteria of “experience” and “reading,” he 
suggests that her “preposterousness” stems from a lack of correct knowledge. With no further 
explanation, he praises the poems in the Beachy Head volume without exception, and then ends his 
account by noting that, “—Notes are added to all the poems, but of no material value.”8 The 
meaning behind a lack of “material value” is also unclear. Does it mean that the knowledge the notes 
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communicate is worthless? If Smith’s notes were of no help to the reader—and helping the reader is, 
after all, one of the ostensible purposes of notes—then what value would they have? The question is 
all the more urgent given that notes always accompanied Smith’s poetry. 
Twenty-two years earlier, Smith had made her debut in the literary world with Elegiac Sonnets 
(1784 ): ten sonnets and a single, modest footnote. As she wrote, revised, and published more 
poetry, Smith expanded her notes in size and purpose, and just as her poetry ranged from the elegiac 
and expressive to the political and descriptive, so her notes ranged from the personal to the 
argumentative to the pedantic. From her popular Elegiac Sonnets, to long poems The Emigrants and 
“Beachy Head,” and in her short poems on natural history, Smith’s notes speak in different voices 
and to different purposes. In Smith’s poetry, notes live a dual life, filling in gaps in the reader’s 
knowledge as it relates to the poem while at the same time standing alone as tenuously connected 
texts. Since her poetic manuscripts have not survived, we will never know precisely what role notes 
played in her process of composition—although letters to her publisher suggest that Smith may have 
written the poems with notes in mind, but composed the notes separately.9  
From the very first, Smith’s notes do not justify their existence to readers.  Her first 
published footnote appeared in the second edition of Elegiac Sonnets appended to the following lines 
of Sonnet II, “Written at the Close of Spring”:  
The garland’s fade that Spring so lately wove, 
      Each simple flower which she had nurs’d in dew, 
*Anemonies, that spangled every grove 
The primrose wan, and hare-bell mildly blue.10  
 
At the bottom of the page, the note reads: “*Anemony Nemoroso, the wood anemony.” Although 
the poem mentions five flowers in total (the violet [line 5] and purple orchis [line 6] in addition to 
the anemone, primrose, and hare-bell quoted here) only the anemone has a note. The poem, then, is 
not interested in a complete catalogue of flower species—Smith neither cut nor added more notes to 
this poem throughout all subsequent editions of Elegiac Sonnets. This note highlights two ambiguities 
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in Smith’s practice of annotation: the text’s anticipation of ignorance in the reader, and the obscurity 
of the note’s purpose. Why does this wood anemone require a note? The reader who stands to gain 
most from the it—someone who is unfamiliar with the wood anemone entirely—will be the least 
helped, since the common and taxonomic names of a plant rarely help one visualize it, or 
understand where it grows. Smith’s readers would have found the note helpful only if they were 
willing or able to consult an expensive botanical dictionary with colored plates. By its very existence, 
the anemone note suggests an unlikely but ideal reader: someone familiar enough with botany to 
imagine several species of anemone in the moment of reading the line, but who would then demand 
more accuracy than the poem itself could supply. With the help of the footnote that narrows the 
flower down to a single species, this reader would be able to thereafter properly imagine the sight 
invoked by the poem. The scientific name corrects the deficiency: it is a packet of knowledge 
pointing out the flower’s minute features that distinguish it from other species of anemone, and also 
suggesting the conditions and region in which it grows. It is capable of a kind of precision that 
cannot fit easily into poetry. Because Smith’s aim is not to compose a systematic treatise on botany 
or supply her readers with detailed information about real-world flowers, the note is unbound by 
certain conventions of science—such as exhaustive cataloguing and consistency—and does not need 
to justify its purpose.  
With its roots in glosses on Biblical and classical texts, the note has long been a favorite 
expression of pedantry. In his study on the historical footnote, Anthony Grafton shows how the 
foot/endnote evolved from a supplemental source of evidence and commentary in the Middle Ages 
to a powerful and understated tool of argumentation by the eighteenth century. And, as Grafton 
shows, changes to note writing practices over time were responses to both changes in scholarly 
practices and philosophical ideas.11 But as for the note’s literary use, Grafton confines himself to its 
better-known use in eighteenth century satire, where it functions much as “as the hockey-masked 
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villain in an American horror film uses a chain saw.”12 However, Smith’s natural history notes serve 
a different purpose, not forwarding an argument, satirical or otherwise, but instead displaying what 
the author knows precisely when there is no legitimate reason to include that information in the main 
text. In the face of Smith’s copious scientific notes, two explanations seem to make sense. The first 
is that, as Ann K. Mellor claims, they establish Smith’s “credentials as a naturalist” before Smith 
goes on to question male-dominated accounts of natural history. 13 For Jacqueline Labbe, Smith 
“used notational space to enlarge her creative space.”14 They allow room for political critique, 
particularly in establishing an authorial persona that would be rejected if it were part of the main 
text, but slips in, undetected through the notes. While neither of these claims is untrue, they account 
for neither the selectiveness nor the near-uselessness of many of the natural history notes. Mellor 
sees the notes as a means to an end (scientific authority), while Labbe has isolated the most 
interesting and politically significant of Smith’s notes to make her point. Neither reading accounts 
for the rote, mundane, and pedantic notes—whether they simply give the Latin name of a species, 
reel off a textbook description of a historical event, or cite literary allusions. My surmise as to why 
Smith’s notes seem so opaque in their purpose, and why they seem so recalcitrant to being fitted 
into larger arguments about significance, is that Smith is guided by certain epistemic virtues that she 
does not make explicit. The anemone note, however, is too slender of a clue to go on. If we begin 
looking at more apparatus—not simply Smith’s notes, but her letters—things will become clearer.  
The first and most fundamental belief behind Smith’s natural history poetry is that the real, 
material environment exists outside of poetry and can be portrayed by it. While her natural history 
poems are often abstract in the sense that their purpose is to end with morals, rather than portray 
nature for its own sake, Smith never resorts to the kinds of allegorical abstractions that were so 
common with the poets at mid-century. (In particular, see the discussion of William Collins in 
Chapter One.)  In the following note, which introduces the natural history fables in the Beachy Head 
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volume, she avoids a potential charge of plagiarism by attributing a chance coincidence of phrase to 
an unerring fact of physical existence: 
There is nothing I am more desirous of avoiding, even in a trifle like this, than the 
charge of plagiarism. I must in the present instance defend myself by stating that so 
long since as April 1805, Mr. Johnson was in possession of the MS. copy of this 
Fable. In July 1806, a friend brought with her from London, a volume called “The 
Birds of Scotland, with other Poems,” in which I read, what, if my fable had been 
first published, I might perhaps have thought very like an imitation. My lines of the 
Lark are: 
“[. . .] That even the shepherd lad upon the hill, 
Hearing his matin note so shrill, 
With shaded eyes against the luster bright, 
Scares sees him twinkling in a flood of light—” 
Mr. Graham, in a more lengthened description, says of the Lark: 
“[. . .] the ploughman at his furrow end, 
                       [. . .]       with rais’d hand 
Shadows his half-shut eyes, striving to scan 
The songster melting in the flood of light—” 
 The extreme resemblance of these passages may be accounted for, however, by the 
observation very justly made, that natural objects being equally visible to all, it its 
very probably that descriptions of such objects will often be alike.15 
 
“Mr. Graham” is James Grahame, a Scottish clergyman known for his popular descriptive poem The 
Sabbath. Grahame published The Birds of Scotland, with Other Poems in 1806, while Smith was still 
working on the manuscript of Beachy Head with Other Poems. Smith’s defense is only partly successful. 
She saves herself from the charge of plagiarism, but at the cost of bringing attention to her use of 
the tired phrase “flood of light.” This phrase occurs not only in Grahame’s poem, but in other well 
known poems and collections throughout the eighteenth century: Dodsley’s Miscellany, the popular 
Elegant Extracts, Pope’s “Satire V. On Women,” and Night Seven of Edward Young’s The Complaint, 
for instance. The problem here is not that Smith and Grahame have seen the same thing (a plowman 
or shepherd shielding his eyes to look for the singing Skylark) but that they have read and absorbed 
the same phrases. On the surface, this would seem to be the same kind of failure that “To a 
Gentleman” had outlined in 1755, in which the failure to find original poetic materials is a failure of 
phraseology that has nothing to do with the material world. However, Smith’s reasoning here 
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suggests otherwise. Perhaps to deflect the embarrassing coincidence of phrase, she turns the reader’s 
attention instead to the natural environment, which she explicitly locates outside both poems. Her 
understanding of the relationship between poetry and environment is unambiguous: “natural 
objects” exist objectively and have an existence separate from any human consciousness. It is 
possible, then, that two poets could see the same thing in the world and write about it in similar 
ways.  
If the first of Smith’s epistemological assumptions is that different people can share the same 
view of the material world, for her the virtue is to be found in going against the grain by relying on 
one’s own view above others. While putting together the text of the fifth edition of Elegiac Sonnets in 
early 1797, Smith wrote to Cadell and Davies, saying that the main text was finished and ready, but 
the notes “will take at least three days, As I will not be told as I was before (by Dr Darwin & 
another judge) that I was deficient in correctness of natural History.”16 Presumably, Smith means 
here that her labors in writing the notes will be longer because she will have to make reference to 
books, rather than relying on a person to give her precise corrections. Later in the same letter, Smith 
discusses the three poems by her friend living in Portugal, Henrietta O’Neill, which were to be 
included. However, Smith was doubtful about one of the poems that described plants and natural 
scenery around Lisbon, which, because of O’Neill’s “want of being accustomed to study such 
objects, are I am sure represented by wrong names & in other respects incorrect.” For Smith, even 
though O’Neill’s poem is otherwise “beautiful,” it cannot go to press while it contains natural 
historical inaccuracies. “Nothing is more easy to correct without injury to the Poetry or Spirit, but I 
have not been able to obtain any history of Portugal to enable me to do this, & am afraid I must 
omit the Poem on that account.”17 From this letter we can see that accuracy in matters of natural 
history was a great concern for Smith. The error that led her to put cypress swamps in the 
northeastern United States in her novel The Old Manor House (1793) was the exception, rather than 
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the rule.18 But we also see here that while Smith relied on texts and on other people for her natural 
historical information, she clearly had a great amount of unease in doing so. For a cash-strapped 
woman attempting to use her writing to support her children, buying expensive volumes on natural 
history was impossible, and borrowing them meant lost time and perhaps lost dignity. And Smith 
would only trust her own eyes or the text of an expert, as we see by her omission of Henrietta 
O’Neill’s poem. Although O’Neill was the one of the two women who had actually lived in Lisbon, 
her experience was not a suitable substitute for Smith’s own. 
Having established Smith’s general approach to the relationship between poetry and 
environment, I will focus for the rest of this section on the Beachy Head volume. “Beachy Head” is 
Smith’s most ambitious work.  While focusing on its namesake cliff on the coast of Sussex, the 
poem contemplates natural and human history, both on a grand scale (creation of the cliffs when 
they were rent from mainland Europe, invasions of England over the course of centuries) and a 
local one (plants and animals that live on the cliff, the lives of smugglers who live near the shore). 
About a dozen shorter poems follow, most of which center on topics of natural history, either in a 
fanciful or didactic fashion. In accordance with the more scientific subject matter, the notes to the 
Beachy Head volume have a greater bulk and scope than the notes to the Elegiac Sonnets. These notes 
also require a different kind of labor from the reader: since there are no callouts, the reader must 
both anticipate which words and phrases will be noted and then find the note in the back of the 
volume if it exists. The reader has three choices, then: to flip back and forth constantly between the 
text of the poems and the end notes to look for any notes that might be there, to ignore the notes 
entirely, or to read the notes on their own as a separate work. The notes are loosely tethered to the 
main poetic text, discrete chunks of information that may or may not have any kind of necessary 
relationship to the poem. They provide us with leverage for thinking about how knowledge works in 
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Smith’s poetry precisely because of their explicit engagement (or non-engagement) with public and 
private knowledge-making: natural history, national history, local history, and memory. 
I should be clear, however, that Smith did not have the final say in how the notes were 
printed. As a posthumous volume, it has the feel of a work lacking the polish of authorial control. It 
begins with a short preface by Johnson stating that Smith has died, leaving the title poem unfinished; 
the volume lacks a table of contents. Because Smith intended the Beachy Head volume to match the 
two volumes of Elegiac Sonnets, it looks as though the entire volume was to be published under the 
heading “MISCELLANEOUS POEMS,” which precedes the title of “Beachy Head” on the first 
page and is never followed by another such heading. Following Smith’s wishes as stated in her July 
1806 letter, Johnson printed the notes as endnotes, but omitted callouts she requested and failed to 
advertise the notes on the title page. As a result, it would be possible to read through all the poetry 
of the Beachy Head volume before realizing that one-third of the book consists of notes. 
Because of the lack of note callouts, Beachy Head: with other Poems does not so much direct its 
readers’ attention, but allows it to range freely inside the volume. The reader is far less likely to look 
at the notes in conjunction with the text because she would not even anticipate the need for them. 
Instead, she is presented with knowledge that she did not even know she needed. For instance, 
Smith annotates these lines that describe boys chasing a plover away from her nest in order to steal 
the eggs: 
And often, from her nest, among the swamps, 
Where the gemm’d sun-dew grows, or fring’d buck-bean, 






As with the wood anemone note, the need for these notes is not immediately obvious, since they 
could at best serve a small set of readers, well-versed enough in botany and ornithology to know or 
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have access to information about these specific species. Rather, they display a self-sufficient 
superfluity, a flouting of utility. They exist in loose association with the poem; they neither support 
nor depend upon it. Rendered on the page like poetry, they are pleasures of aesthetics and mastery, 
as well as displays of knowledge. 
However, as the notes progress, they begin to betray a body of knowledge tied, not to public 
sources, but an individual subjectivity. In “Beachy Head,” the relationship between Smith and the 
poem’s speaker is murky. Over the course of her published works, Smith cultivated a public persona 
through her prefaces, mainly by rehearsing the details of her life story—her disastrous early 
marriage, financial difficulties, and the deaths of her children—in the prefaces to the successive 
editions of Elegiac Sonnets. She may have intended on continuing this persona in the Beachy Head 
volume, but the lack of a preface leaves the possibility in doubt. Even more doubtful is whether the 
persona in Smith’s prefaces is the same as the persona in her poetry, and whether either of those are 
the same one as in her notes. In any case, both the poem and the notes hint at a personal history 
similar to Smith’s biography. About 250 lines into “Beachy Head,” the speaker reveals that, although 
she knows and speaks of this landscape intimately, she is not currently in it. Referring to her life 
story of being married off very young, and taken from her family’s country estate to London, she 
reveals that the downs and cliffs around Beachy Head are “Haunts of my youth! / Scenes of fond 
day dreams, I behold ye yet!,”21 but in imagination only. In reality, Smith lived her last years in 
Tilford, Surrey, about 50 miles from Beachy Head.22  
In the notes, then, we see that many of the natural history insights are neither the products 
of immediate observation nor of book knowledge but of long memory, cherished over a lifetime of 
misery and hardship. For instance, in responding to the poem’s description of strange shell-like 
fossils in the chalk cliffs, the note puts these discoveries in personal context:  
Among the crumbling chalk I have often found shells, some quite in fossil state and 
hardly distinguishable from chalk. [. . .] It is now many years since I made these 
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observations. The appearance of sea-shells so far from the sea excited my surprise, 
though I then knew nothing of natural history. I have never read any of the late 
theories of the earth, nor was I ever satisfied with the attempts to explain many of 
the phenomena which call forth conjecture in the books I happened to have access 
to on this subject.23 
 
As with the theory about the French and English coasts, Smith refuses to allow book knowledge to 
take precedent over her own experience, even if her experience is decades old. She first discovered 
these forms when she was very young, but her knowledge of them has remained the same despite 
her wide reading in natural history over time. In a twist on this theme, Smith uses “Beachy Head” as 
an opportunity to revise a natural history fact from an earlier poem while not losing ground to 
another authority. For instance, the Nightjar—a relative of the better known Whip-poor-will—
appearing in the main text of the poem, she footnotes it thus: 
It was this bird that was intended to be described in the Forty-second Sonnet 
(Smith’s Sonnets). I was mistaken in supposing it as visible in November; it is a 
migrant, and leaves this country in August. I had often seen and heard it, but I did 
not then know its name or history.24 
 
Correcting her earlier work, Smith once again makes natural description personally significant. While 
the shorter natural history notes may display ease and mastery, reading the notes from beginning to 
end makes the reader aware that the taxonomic names are the product of a few short years’ 
cherished memories and a lifetime of scientific knowledge acquired to sharpen those memories as 
they inevitably faded.  
In Smith’s poetry, notes account for information which, for whatever reason, does not fit 
into the main text: that which is too technical, bulky, personal, pedantic, or detailed to be 
accommodated by poetic argument and the rules of versification. In other words, notes provide not 
only the “creative space” that Labbe speaks of, but a space in which Smith is not accountable to 
readers for utility or aesthetic merit, and which allows her to uphold her epistemic virtues by 
displaying a personal catalogue of hard-won knowledge and closely-defended personal memory that 
may or may not be of interest to anyone else.  Joseph Johnson’s downplaying of the notes may be an 
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tacit acknowledgement of this fact. Perhaps he did not make the notes easily accessible because he 
recognized that they might not have been written for the benefit of readers. In any case, Smith wrote 
her natural history notes because they were the firm foundation for the knowledge portrayed in her 
poetry. They allowed her space, not simply to display her knowledge, but to attest, whatever the 
cost, that her knowledge was based on her own experience. 
 
Poetry of the “Present and Real”: Joseph Warton and John Aikin 
Despite Smith’s unambiguous epistemic beliefs and virtues, it is still unclear how these 
virtues and their application to poetry arose in the years between Collins’ time and her own. Given 
the vagueness and generality which characterized the verse of Joseph Warton, William Collins, and 
Thomas Warton’s early works, how have we arrived at the publication of Beachy Head: with Other 
Poems in 1807? How did it become possible for a poet like Smith, not only to incorporate her 
personal knowledge of natural history matters into poetry, but to discuss natural history with such 
precision in the first place? One part of the answer can be found in an unlikely place: Joseph 
Warton’s prose. In the last chapter, we saw Joseph Warton’s definition of Nature change over the 
course of his short-lived poetic career. But Warton continued to think about nature—by now with a 
lower-case n—in his criticism, particularly his most well-known work, Essay on the Writings and Genius 
of Pope (1756). Warton’s main argument is, not surprisingly, that imagination and passion, not 
didacticism and morality, are the chief poetical powers (which had the somewhat controversial effect 
of making Pope into a good, if second-rate, poet.) The Essay does, however, have much to say about 
description in Pope’s Pastorals and “Windsor Forest.” For Warton, both of these early poems, 
despite their other virtues, are marked with deficiency and impropriety in their too-generalized and 
often-borrowed images. Rather than simply pointing out how the passages of description in these 
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pieces are inadequate, however, Warton praises the description of both the ancient poets and James 
Thomson’s Seasons at Pope’s expense.  
Speaking of the third century Sicilian poet Theocritus’ pastorals, which Pope imitates in his 
own, Warton describes the gulf he sees between the former’s imagery—drawn from direct 
experience—and the latter’s. Theocritus, says Warton, 
described what he saw and felt: and had not need to have recourse to those artificial 
assemblages of pleasing objects, which are not to be found in nature. [. . .] [T]he 
beauties of that luxurious landscape so richly and circumstantially delineated in the 
close of the seventh idyllium, where all things smelt of summer and smelt of autumn 
[. . .] were present and real.25 
 
An important shift has taken place since we read The Enthusiast. It is safe to say that very few of the 
images in that poem were “present and real” to Warton, but rather, they were, as Warton says of 
Pope, “Rural beauty in general, and not the peculiar beauties” of any place.26 But Warton’s new 
concern here is historical and environmental verisimilitude. Theocritus’ images are unequalled by 
Pope, or anyone else, because he described what was “present and real” to his senses. Warton adds 
that “We can never completely relish, or adequately understand any author, especially any Ancient, 
except we constantly keep in our eye his climate, his country, and his age.”27 
Warton then begins his discussion of Pope’s “Windsor Forest” by noting that “Descriptive 
Poetry was by no means the shining talent of Pope.”28 Rather than dwelling on too many of 
“Windsor Forest”’s defects, Warton makes a long digression in which he discusses the merits of 
what he considers to be perhaps the most successful British descriptive poem: James Thomson’s The 
Seasons. Thomson’s Seasons is a series of four long blank-verse poems, each describing a season in a 
free and desultory style, mixing description, fiction, and exposition. Composed in the late 1720s, The 
Seasons was one of the most well-known and widely read British poems of the eighteenth century. In 
praising Thomson, Warton dwells, not necessarily on Thomson’s strengths as a writer, but his 
strengths as an observer: 
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Thomson [. . .] hath enriched poetry with a variety of new and original images, which 
he painted from nature itself, and from his own actual observations: his descriptions 
have therefore a distinctness and truth, which are utterly wanting to those, of poets 
who have only copied from each other, and have never looked abroad on the objects 
themselves. Thomson was accustomed to wander away into the country for days and 
for weeks, attentive to, ‘each rural sight, each rural sound;’ while many a poet who 
has dwelt for years in the Strand, has attempted to describe fields and rivers, and 
generally succeeded accordingly. Hence that nauseous repetition of the same 
circumstances; hence that disgusting impropriety of introducing what may be called a 
set of hereditary images, without proper regard to the age, or climate, or occasion, in 
which they were formerly used.29 
 
The criterion for originality is not the creation of things sui generis from the mind, but bodily 
witnessing environmental phenomena and transcribing them closely.30 While Warton is not solely 
concerned with “nature” or environment—he criticized Pope for bringing Greek customs into 
Windsor Forest as well as Greek plants, animals, and landscapes—close observation of 
environmental details is a sign of genuine artistry. For Warton, poems that portray the material 
environment should do so with fidelity and draw upon lived experience, rather than other poets. 
Warton’s insistence on “present and real” things as the basis for original poetry in 1756 
would look different twenty years later. John Aikin’s Essay on the Application of Natural History to Poetry 
(1777), was itself published by Joseph Johnson exactly 30 years before Beachy Head: with Other Poems. 
Smith cites Aikin twice in her notes, once as a source of inspiration for her descriptive poetic style, 
and again as a source of natural historical material. Aikin, the brother of the widely read poet Anna 
Laetitia Barbauld, was a physician who published on many subjects and, as Jeffrey Plank argues in 
“Aikin on Science and Poetry,” assumed that “literature, like medicine, is a social institution and that 
change involves rejection of some and adaptation of other literary techniques.”31 Aikin's practical 
and systematic approach encourages poets to use the most recent findings of natural history—as 
well as their own senses—instead of repeating the wearied images of earlier writers. 
No literary complaint is more frequent and general than that of the insipidity of 
Modern Poetry. While the votary of science is continually gratified with new objects 
opening to his view, the lover of poetry is wearied and disgusted with the perpetual 




The problem with modern poetry lies with its images—that is, descriptive passages that bring sights 
to the mind’s eye. As we will see, Aikin believes that poetic images can serve as replacements for real 
images, but only if handled precisely. The problem with modern images is that poets take their 
images from other poets, which are by then worn out and inaccurate. The problem is not lack of 
genius, but lack of imagery drawn from the poet’s own senses. The result is that poetry becomes a 
transcription of other poets’ poetry, rather than a description of real life: 
descriptive poetry has degenerated into a kind of phraseology, consisting of 
combinations of words which have been so long coupled together, that, like the hero 
and his epithet in Homer, they are become inseparable companions.33 
 
Aikin cites examples like the use of the droning or humming beetle as a symbol of the evening, 
which recurs even in good poetry such as Macbeth, Milton’s “Lycidas,” Gray’s “Elegy Written in a 
Country Church-Yard,” and William Collins’ “Ode to Evening.” The image itself is not a problem, 
but its “successive adoption by so many different writers sufficiently evinces [. . . ] a real want of 
variety in poetical imagery, proceeding from a scarcity of original observations of nature.”34  Plank 
notes that, “Like other eighteenth-century critics and philosophers, Aikin assumes that poetry makes 
statements about reality”35—and so it follows that the main criterion for judging the merits of a 
descriptive poem is, perhaps not its fidelity to reality, but its use of imagery personally witnessed by 
the person writing. “Even in poets of a higher order,” Aikin claims, “the hand of a copyist may be 
seen much oftener than the strokes of an observer.”36 In other words, the problem is that the poetry 
gives the impression that the images have come from the medium of text, rather than personal, first-
hand experience. For the rest of the Essay, Aikin both outlines the mistakes of other writers and 
dwells upon what he sees as the most effective images in the poetic tradition.  
Like Smith, Aikin believes that poetry is able to directly represent material things and that 
the only problem lies in poets not taking advantage of this fact. However, this does not mean that 
either Warton or Aikin believed that the purpose of nature poetry was to provide a transcript of the 
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environment. The poetry they recommend, like the loco-descriptive poems of Thomson or the later 
poet Richard Jago, always mix morality with natural history description. Warton and Aikin do, 
however, think it is possible to transcribe reality. Smith and Clare also implicitly attested to this 
belief, but their poetry is proof that they knew that representation is more complicated than it 
seems. Hence Smith’s resorting to notes when poetry itself failed to render the environment.  To say 
that Clare and Smith took Warton’s and Aikin’s advice is not to say that Warton or Aikin offered a 
compelling reason for basing images on direct experience. For Smith and Clare, the stakes were 
higher than simply creating poetry devoid of tedious images and inaccurate descriptions. 
 
John Clare and the Epistemology of Poesy 
Clare was, in a sense, the poet who took the ability of poetry to reproduce the environment 
with fidelity the furthest. Many of his poems are nothing but unvarnished description, and he was 
known in his own day, as he is known how, for his ability to minutely describe his environment and 
the details of human, plant, and animal life. However, this does not mean that Clare was 
unselfconscious about his role as a descriptive poet. As many scholars have pointed out, Clare’s self-
image as a nature poet was carefully crafted in his relationships with his fellow writers and the 
reading public.37 But my interest here is in the way that Clare articulated a philosophy of 
representation for himself—how he expressed his own epistemic virtues. First we will look at the 
influence of Aikin’s ideas on Clare’s work, and the poetic canon of naturalists that Clare constructed 
for himself, and then we will see how these values play out in his own poetry. 
 While Clare’s attempts to publish natural history prose were never successful, he was a 
learned and experienced natural historian and wrote much on the subject in manuscript. In one of 
several natural history letters he wrote to his publishers Taylor and Hessey, he meditates on poets 
who have not relied on the work of other poets when writing their natural descriptions, but who 
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write descriptions from accurate, supposedly first-hand observation. Clare claims that he does not 
want to be so forward as to “direct” the reading of Taylor and Hessey, but he does produce a list, at 
times very specific, of poets whose works have natural images, in Aikin’s words, “deduced from the 
author’s observation”: 
your favorite Chaucer is one  Passages in Spencer  Cowleys grasshopper and Swallow  
passages in Shakspear  Miltons Allegro & Penseroso & Parts of Comus the 
Elizabethian Poets of glorious memory Gays Shepherds week Greens Spleen 
Thomsons Seasons Collins Ode to Evening Dyers Grongar hill & Fleece Shenstones 
Schoolmistress Greys Ode to Spring T. Wartons April Summer Hamlet & Ode to a 
friend Cowpers Task Wordsworth Logans Ode to the Cuckoo Langhorns Fables of 
Flora Jagos Blackbirds Bloomfields Witchwood Forest Shooters hill &c with 
Hurdis’s Evening Walk in the village Curate & many others that may have slipt my 
memry38 
 
At the end of the letter, he adds: “In my catalogue of poets I forgot Charlotte Smith whose poetry is 
full of pleasing images from nature.”39 Here we see the lineage that I began to trace in Chapter 1 
come to its conclusion. Like Collins and the Wartons, Clare emphasizes Spenser and Milton and 
skips from the mid-seventeenth century to Thomson’s Seasons, omitting late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth satiric and didactic verse. Collins and Thomas Warton are included here, and Joseph 
Warton is an absent presence—for here is poetry brought back to its “proper channel,” although in 
a way Warton had not anticipated. Through Clare, we can see that Joseph’s attempts to revise 
literary history were a success. And at the very end of the lineage comes Charlotte Smith herself. 
But unlike Smith, Clare wrote no notes and precious little in the way of prefaces. It is her 
images that he values, and the lack of framing in his own poetry means that Clare’s images have 
always given sympathetic readers a sense of being honed down to the thing itself, no more, no less. 
In many cases, Clare’s description is so focused that there does not even seem to be room for the 
movement of thought. It is this latter characteristic that Clare’s unsympathetic readers have found 
limiting. However, what if, for Clare and many of his readers, description is a kind of thought? Just 
as Smith’s notes forwarded an implicit theory of knowledge and its place in poetry, so, too, does 
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Clare’s poetry provide us with alternatives for understanding what kinds of knowledge can be 
conveyed through writing. This is why, even though Smith’s and Clare’s methods are so radically 
different, I find it useful to look at them together: they share the same epistemic virtues: that 
knowledge about the environment can be made in poetry and that the basis for doing so is the 
poet’s own experience. 
In 1820, when Clare published Poems Descriptive, it was widely discussed, both publicly in the 
press as well as privately by Clare’s friends and patrons. While the merit of the poetry itself was up 
for debate, there was at least a consensus among readers about two things: that Clare was an 
example of primitive or natural intelligence, and that he showed a talent for describing nature 
accurately. These truisms persisted throughout the main period of Clare’s public reception—the 
fifteen years between Poems Descriptive and his last volume, The Rural Muse in 1835—and have 
continued, in some form or another, to the present day. For many of Clare’s earliest readers, he had 
an unusual ability to act as a medium or conduit for the impressions of nature, to almost literally 
translate the countryside into verse. An unsigned review appearing in the Eclectic Review of January of 
1822 claims that 
These poems breathe of Nature in every line. They are [. . .] not studies from nature, 
but transcripts of her works: his cattle, his birds, his trees and bushes are all portraits. 
There is a literal fidelity in the sketches [. . .]. The best substitute for a walk in the 
country [. . .] would be, so far as the mind is concerned, the perusal of some of the 
poems of John Clare.40 
 
Another reviewer goes even farther, claiming that Clare’s poetry is so true to reality that it can nearly 
replace the embodied experience of walking in the countryside: “he has described things as they 
exist, with the fidelity to the original, that we cannot separate the reality from the description.”41 
Reading Clare is like holding an open book in front of one’s face and confusing its black marks with 
natural phenomena. Description, as represented in these reviews, has an extraordinary amount of 
power—which, for some, can cause a kind of pleasing epistemic confusion. This kind of evaluation 
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is strange because it clearly untrue—no one actually confuses a book of Clare’s poetry with the 
natural environment. And yet, it has come up so consistently over the history of the reception of his 
works that I am inclined to take it seriously. 
Virtually everywhere Clare’s works were reviewed, his descriptions of nature were praised; 
the only question was whether or not description is desirable on its own terms. The ecstatic praise of 
magazines like the Eclectic Review was matched by skepticism elsewhere. The most famous expression 
of doubt about Clare’s poetry comes to us from John Keats, by way of their shared publisher, John 
Taylor:  
I think he wishes to say to you that your Images from Nature are too much 
introduced without being called for by a particular sentiment. . .his Remark is only 
applicable now & then when he feels as if the Description overlaid & stifled that 
which ought to be the prevailing Idea.42 
 
If, to Keats, description stifled thought and sentiment, there were doubts by others as to whether 
description is decorous enough for poetry at all. As one skeptical review of Clare’s first two volumes 
put it: “We do not conceive that [. . .] accurate delineations of mere exterior objects, can atone for a 
general deficiency of poetical language.”43 The battle over Clare’s poetry has always been the battle 
over the value of representation—of “mere description”—itself. Observation and description are 
enough to transport the reader, embodied and whole, into another place—but they go no further. 
Clare delineates the landscape but does not help us think about it; his observation comes at the 
expense of real thought and knowledge and cannot be an appropriate foundation for poetry.  
The assumption that “accurate delineations of mere exterior objects” equals thoughtlessness 
ignores the problems of knowledge that Clare worked through in his poetry. In the evolution of his 
poetry, we can see Clare working out these problems for himself, as well as reading about them in 
the works of others. While I have found no proof that Clare had ever read either of Aikin’s essays 
(although it is not out of the realm of possibility, for his literary friends often lent him books that 
they thought would be of interest to him) he did own a copy of Aikin’s edited volume, Select Works of 
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the British Poets, which includes notes and biographical introductions to each by Aikin.44 In his 
introduction to Thomson, Aikin claims that The Seasons is, “the first long composition, perhaps, of 
which natural description was made the staple, and certainly the most fertile of grand and beautiful 
delineations, in great measure deduced from the author's own observation.”45 Whether or not Aikin 
was Clare’s only source for this idea is beside the point, but as Clare matures as a reader of poetry, 
we see that his main criterion of quality in nature poetry is exactly that. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will explore Clare’s tentative and unsystematic epistemology of poetic description—that is, 
his understanding of how the poet both receives and produces knowledge about nature through 
observation and description—and how it relates to natural history. We will see that Clare’s 
description is precise enough at times to be used for species identification, but it does not pretend to 
be a transcript of reality—unlike what many of his readers have thought. First I want to look at how 
Clare understood the process of writing poetry about nature in his poem “Pastoral Poesy” (c. 1831-
2) and then see how this works in one of his most minutely descriptive poems, “The 
Yellowhammers Nest” (c. 1825.) 
 Like most of Clare's poetry, “Pastoral Poesy” has a paratactic, rather than syntactic 
argument. Instead of building up to a claim through carefully ordered steps Clare assays the same 
ideas over and over again, trying them out in different imagined scenarios until the poem reaches an 
acceptable conclusion. In “Pastoral Poesy,” the poet-speaker, who is sensitive to the beauties of 
nature, portrays a cow boy playing and working in the field, a shepherd, and an old man whittling in 
his doorway as they react to a summer storm and other natural phenomena. Although on the face of 
it, the poem seems to be advocating an anti-intellectual attitude toward nature poetry, at a closer 
look it proves to be a philosophic assay—albeit unsystematic—of the relationship between mind, 
sensory phenomena, and language. The poem begins with the poet’s thesis: 
True poesy is not in words 
But images that thoughts express 
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By which the simplest hearts are stirred 
To elevated happiness (emphasis mine)46 
 
It is easiest to read this as a leveling poem which argues for a rich life of the mind in even the lowest 
classes, but doing so can lead to ignoring the poem’s theory of knowledge. The first two lines show 
that, despite its easygoing leveling tone, “Pastoral Poesy” is also quite technical. Clare is not making 
the case that natural scenery, or true poesy, is simply and uncomplicatedly taken into the mind. 
Rather, he is suggesting an epistemology of poesy—a system by which sensory input is taken and 
used by the mind, a system which may or may not bypass the use of language. Just as in thinkers like 
Locke, Hume, Berkeley, in which simple words like “idea,” “impression,” or “sensation” turn out to 
have incredibly specific technical meanings, we get the sense that Clare, too, is working out a theory 
of mind, even if his is less systematic or clearly defined. 
Nevertheless, what Clare means by saying that poesy is not in words, but in images that are 
expressed by thoughts is unclear at first. Is poesy, then, input or output? Does it exist inside the 
human brain as a product of sensory input and the mind’s workings, or is it the expression of those 
things? The description of a shepherd and the speaker weathering a storm together gives more clues: 
Is music aye and more indeed  
To those of musing mind 
Who through the yellow woods proceed 
And listen to the wind 
 
The poet in his fitful glee  
And fancy’s many moods 
Meets it as some strange melody 
And poem of the woods 
 
It sings and whistles in his mind 
And then it talks aloud 
While by some leaning tree reclined 
He shuns the coming cloud47 
 
Both the shepherd and the poet take shelter from the storm, but the shepherd’s reaction is based on 
physical needs only. The speaker takes shelter so as to “meet” the storm with his mind by 
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“shunning” the inconvenience of the rain. The shepherd’s and poet’s reactions differ by the way 
they take in information at the sensory level: the poet experiences the storm as an aesthetic object—
as “music aye and more indeed”—in the first moment of perception. His mind processes the “song” 
of the storm, first on its own terms (“it sings and whistles”), and then by transmuting it into 
language: “And then it talks aloud.” While this may be a leveling poem in terms of social class, it is 
not a leveling poem entirely—Clare makes clear the distinction between minds that are able to 
perceive and create aesthetic beauty and minds that are more or less bounded by practical concerns. 
When we read the poem in this way, we see that Clare by no means saw an easy equivalence between 
poetry and language. His thought might have been unsystematic and obscure to us, but it is also 
clear that along with Clare’s attempts to defend his subject matter and his poetic style, he took it 
upon himself to define a philosophy of poetic expression.   
Not only did Clare’s poetic practices differ from mainstream Romantic poets, but his poetic 
theorization challenges them. His famous critique of Keats’ allusiveness, is as follows: 
In spite of all this his [that is, Keats’] descriptions of scenery are often very fine but 
as it is the case with other inhabitants of great cities he often described nature as she 
appeared to his fancies & not as he would have described her had he witnessed the 
things he describes48  
 
I want to push hard on Clare’s wording here, and I think it can withstand the pressure. Clare is not 
necessarily charging Keats with a failure to describe things as they are, but his wording suggests that 
he is charging Keats with a failure to describe things as if he had witnessed them. The difference between 
these two charges is a great one. It means that Keats is not necessarily being inaccurate or ignorant, 
but rather, he is not coding his poetry with the kinds of truth claims that Clare finds compelling. By 
allowing myth and allusion to do descriptive work for him, Keats does not uphold Clare’s epistemic 
virtues. What matters to Clare is not descriptive transparency or accuracy itself, but writing in a way 
that gives the impression of such transparency and accuracy. His writing makes claims to authenticity by 
making a show of reproducing images from nature. 
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I will end with a reading of one of Clare’s most well-known poems, “The Yellowhammers 
Nest,” which was published in his last volume The Rural Muse (1835.) Writing in the second person, 
Clare never provides complete context for the poems, but begins in medias res, walking through the 
woods with a friend looking for birds’ nests—not as boys do, to abduct the eggs, but to observe the 
nests as naturalists. “The Yellowhammers Nest” begins with a jolt—the narrator’s utterance 
prompted by the sight of a bird leaving her nest: 
Just by the wooden brig a bird flew up 
Frit by the cowboy as he scrambled down 
To reach the misty dewberry—let us stoop 
And seek its nest—49  
 
The speaker beckons to his companion to follow where he saw the bird emerge from, and they find 
the nest quickly: 
—Aye here it is stuck close beside the bank 
Beneath the bunch of grass that spindles rank 
Its husk seeds tall and high—tis rudely planned 
Of bleached stubbles and the withered fare  
That last years harvest left upon the land 
Lined thinly with the horses sable hair 
—Five eggs pen-scribbled over lilac shells 
Resembling writing scrawls which fancy reads 
As natures poesy and pastoral spells 
They are the yellow hammers and she dwells 
A poet-like—50 
 
Here, the parataxis of experience mixes with minute detail focused on particulars. We cannot find 
the Yellowhammer’s nest unless we understand where it is found and marked by a bunch of grass. 
Likewise, we cannot look at the nest without understanding where its elements came from, and 
thinking of last year’s harvest and the stubble fields of autumn. All of this is true, there is no 
denying. But “The Yellowhammers Nest” quickly begins its departure from pure experience and 
description into moralizing. Once the speaker sees the eggs—notice the precision with which he can 
use them to identify the bird—he quickly enters the realm of fancy. It is as if the moment which 
might have been footnoted by Smith is instead used as a starting point for another phase in the 
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poem.  The sight of the eggs is inextricable with their identification, and once the Yellowhammer is 
identified simultaneously as the bird in nature and the “poet-like,” the poem takes a turn for the 
surreal, and the moral. 
                                                      […]she dwells 
A poet-like—where brooks and flowery weeds 
As sweet as Castaly to fancy seems 
And that old molehill like as parnass hill 
On which her partner haply sits and dreams 
Oer all his joy of song—51 
 
Suddenly we are taken out of the minute description of the earlier lines and shown the same 
landscape implied by the first part of the poem, this time overlaid with a mythical landscape 
including the Castalian spring and Mount Parnassus. 
                                       —so leave it still 
A happy home of sunshine flowers and streams 
Yet in the sweetest places cometh ill 
A noisome weed that burthens every soil 
For snakes are known with chill and deadly coil 
To watch such nests and seize the helpless young 
And like as though the plague became a guest 
Leaving a houseless-home a ruined nest 
And mournful hath the little warblers sung 
When such like woes hath rent its little breast52 
 
Like Smith’s personal ruminations in the notes to “Beachy Head,” “The Yellowhammers Nest” 
turns back onto the poet rather unambiguously. The Yellowhammer dwells a “poet-like” on her little 
Parnassus, but ultimately the snake invades her nest and destroys her family and work.53 The other 
birds’ nest poems written in this style have a similar hinge, either where the realistic and minutely 
described landscape becomes fanciful, or where awareness of death and danger creep in as the 
speaker contemplates the nest in front of him. Clare’s detailed descriptions are not only 
phenomenological—that is, not only focused on outward particulars—but they moves when he 
moves, see when he sees, and think when he thinks; they are personal in a literal sense. Clare does 
not dispense with the realm of the metaphorical, the “illusions or allusions” that he finds so suspect 
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in Keats’ poetry, rather, he just uses them differently. In part, it is his complex understanding of the 
relationship between natural phenomena, the mind, and written work that makes “The 
Yellowhammers Nest,” and many poems like it, such a strange hybrid of fact and fancy. For Clare, it 
is the moment of scientific certainty that allows the poet’s subjective fancies to creep in. Thus his 
poetry is often no less “illusive or allusive” than Keats’, but the imaginative parts work in 
conjunction with the representations. It is the world as if he had seen it that opens up a space for the 
things he can only imagine he has seen. 
 
Conclusion: A Note on Notes, Science, and Poetry 
But let us not be so hard on poor John Keats for the sake of John Clare. I have just shown 
that Clare’s “delineations of mere exterior objects,” which have a long history of dismissal by critics, 
have their basis in Clare’s philosophy, if never systematically defined, of the relationship between 
environment and the mind of the poet. But Keats, who according to Clare merely “described nature 
as she appeared to his fancies” had his own defender nearly sixty years ago in Cleanth Brooks. In 
1944, Brooks took it upon himself to rehabilitate the final lines of Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn” 
and their famous notion that truth is beauty and beauty, truth, in the wake of skepticism by critics 
like T.S. Eliot and John Middleton Murry. Looking at the urn as Keats does, as a “sylvan historian” 
of its Bacchanalian scene, Brooks wonders, what kind of history might this be, and what truth might 
it represent? 
[T]he “truth” which the sylvan historian gives is the only kind of truth which we are 
likely to get on this earth, and furthermore, it is the only kind that we have to have. 
The names, dates, and special circumstances, the wealth of data—these the sylvan 
historian quietly ignores. But we shall never get all the facts anyway—there is no end 
to the accumulation of facts. Moreover, mere accumulations of facts—a point our 
own generation is beginning to realize—are meaningless. The sylvan historian does 
better than that: it takes a few details and so orders them that we have not only 
beauty but insight into essential truth. Its “history,” in short, is a history without 
footnotes. It has the validity of myth—not myth as a pretty but irrelevant make-




For Brooks, “Ode on a Grecian Urn”—and by extension, all poetry—is more valuable than history 
with footnotes, that mucky detritus of facts which clings to a text. So whereas Clare faulted Keats for 
not writing his poetry in a way that seems to arise from lived, factual experience, according to 
Brooks’ reading of Keats, Keats faulted Clare for relying on the world of facts to create his poetry, 
rather than creating his own truth through imagination. 
In thinking about this impasse of epistemic virtues, I cannot help but ask: why is the history 
of the “Grecian Urn,” as Brooks sees it, a history without footnotes? Why not a history without 
archives or testimonies or just plain facts? What is it about the footnote that encapsulates anti-
poeticism for Brooks? Before moving on to Chapter Three and the staunchly factual genre of 
agricultural prose, I want to pause and consider more fully the history that Cleanth Brooks leaves 
out of his account of poetry vs. footnotes—namely, the amply documented practice of writing 
poetry with footnotes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Brooks uses the footnote as a 
wedge to split poetic knowledge from the knowledge that stems from more fact-oriented disciplines 
like history and the sciences, but the reality is that, as we saw in Smith’s poetry, writing poetry and 
making facts were intertwined.  
From Smith herself we have little in the way of commentary on the value of notes 
themselves, although her letters to her publishers on the subject imply the great value they had for 
her in terms of outfitting her work with scientific accuracy that satisfied her in placing it before the 
public. As the nearly non-existent comments from her readers suggest, however, readers themselves 
cared little for notes. This is made clearer by James Grahame, the poet whose description of a 
skylark came dangerously close to Smith’s, and who also wrote extensive notes to his poetry. In the 
preface to his 1809 volume British Georgics, Grahame says 
On the abuse of Notes much has of late been said, and justly said, both by critics and 
readers. With respect to the notes, which compose the concluding part of this 
volume, I can safely say, that, in adding them, I have been induced, by a firm 
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conviction that they would form a useful supplement to the poetical part of the 
work. In a composition partly didactic, it is often impossible to reconcile minuteness 
and precision with poetry. And even with regard to those topics, on which I have 
somewhat enlarged, explanation appeared not to be superfluous. My deficiency, too, 
of professional authority, seemed to require a frequent reference to authors, who 
united practical to theoretical knowledge. 55 
 
Grahame’s preface attempts to forestall doubts about the enterprise of writing poetry about 
scientific subjects and appending explanatory notes. Such a project requires disavowal of knowledge, 
authority, and purpose. Despite the erudition of the endnotes to British Georgics, as well as to Birds of 
Scotland, Grahame’s strategy for presenting them to readers is to deny their worth as contributions to 
public knowledge, implying that poetry can only educate indirectly by inspiring a desire to learn. 
Grahame stubbornly, if sheepishly, presents works to the public whose value he claims is 
doubtful, but in doing so, he is not alone. His works are similar to Smith’s in that they present 
themselves first and foremost as aesthetic works. But perhaps the most famous examples of poetry-
with-notes from this period are Erasmus Darwin’s Botanic Garden, which contained the long poem 
“The Loves of Plants, with Philosophical Notes” and William Gilpin’s “On Landscape Painting,” 
appended to his Three Essays on the Picturesque. Both works are attended by copious footnotes or 
endnotes, whose purpose is as much to defend as to explain or defend the content of the poems 
themselves.  
William Gilpin was a clergyman and amateur artist most well known for popularizing the 
notion of the picturesque. His illustrated journals of travels around Great Britain, published in the 
1780s, were widely read and were partially responsible for the fad of picturesque tourism and 
amateur outdoor sketching. In the early 1790s, Gilpin published Three Essays on the Picturesque, which 
systematized his definition of the picturesque, as well as his thoughts about sketching landscape and 
picturesque tourism and includes at the end of the volume a long blank-verse didactic poem called 
“On Landscape Painting.” In his preface to Three Essays, Gilpin makes a long apology for the 
existence of “On Landscape Painting,” which, while it makes no reference to the poem’s footnotes 
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(which take up a considerable bulk—twenty-one pages of notes to twenty-three pages of poetry) 
gives us a sense of genre anxiety around technical and scientific terms and their place in poetry. 
Gilpin tells how he wrote some verses about landscape painting and sent them to a friend, who liked 
the content of the poem, but not the versification. Several years later, he was criticized by another 
friend—William Mason, best known for his own didactic poem on gardening and a contemporary of 
the Warton brothers—for writing too poetically in his picturesque descriptions of the Lake District. 
Here, 
I told him the fate of my fragment; lamenting the hardship of my case——when I 
wrote verse, one friend called it prose; when I wrote prose, another friend called it 
verse. In this next letter, he desired to see my verses; and being pleased with the 
subject, he offered, if I would finish with my poem (however carelessly as to metrical 
exactness) he would adjust the versification. But he found he had engaged in a more 
arduous affair, than he expected. My rules, and tecnical terms were stubborn, and 
would not easily glide into verse; and I was as stubborn, as they, and would not 
relinquish the scientific part for the poetry.56 
 
Gilpin’s genteel defensiveness is somewhat justified: “On Landscape Painting” is a wretched poem, 
aesthetically speaking, but more because of Gilpin’s poor ear for poetry than his occasional use of 
technical terms. There is something amusing and perverse in this story—particularly Gilpin’s 
willingness to hang onto the poetry manuscripts after a number of years, his eagerness to share the 
poem with his friends and then the public, despite his friends’ ambivalent responses. The value of 
the endeavor to write poetry about a non-poetic topic has a strong, even irrational draw. 
Intellectually, there is no good reason for “On Landscape Painting” to exist, except perhaps its 
staging of the difficulty of making verse and science compatible. The “scientific part” and “the 
poetry” are in constant tension, and there is a stubbornness about technical, scientific terms that 
does not allow for euphemisms or synonyms, but demands that aesthetic rules are suffered to be 
broken. 
The manuscript copy of “On Landscape” that resides in the Bodleian Library tells an even 
more interesting story about Gilpin’s attitude toward his work, and whether or not it should be 
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considered poetry. The friend who finally helped him with the versification was William Mason, 
poet and landscape gardener. The MS that Gilpin sent to him was a fair copy made by Catherine 
Brisco, which was already titled “On Landscape Painting, a Poem Enscribed to William Locke Esq.” 
Mason’s first order of business was to suggest a title more appropriate for such a work. His 
suggestions appear on the blank page before the start of the MS and are as follows: 
The Principles of 
Landscape Painting 
a Poetical Essay 
Addressed to [                  ] 
or 
An Essay 
On the Principles of Landscape [Painting] 
In blank Verse 
or 
On Landscape Painting 
[A Poetical? Essay] 
An Essay in Metre57 
 
The three suggested titles, “The Principles of Landscape Painting: A Poetical Essay,” “An Essay on 
the Principles of Landscape Painting in Blank Verse,” and “On Landscape Painting: An Essay in 
Metre” show the lengths to which Mason went in order to avoid calling this manuscript a poem. A 
“poetical essay” was as close to the word “poem” as he would allow it to get. Generally, Gilpin took 
most of Mason’s suggestions, and when he disagreed, he would often give reasons why. However, 
Mason’s three title suggestions were summarily, and silently, ignored and the work went to press 
retaining its original title. 
Gilpin’s footnotes themselves go further to show the inadequacies of poetry to explain 
scientific concepts in the way that that he intends. Most often, the footnotes are long glosses on 
terms or techniques—asides that are not possible within the structure of verse. However, in Gilpin’s 
footnotes it is unclear whether it is the scientific or poetic that needs to be defended. Directing his 
readers’ attention to the effects of light and texture in natural landscapes, he tells them to 
                                        Trace then with care 
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Her [Nature’s] varied walks; observe how she upheaves 
The mountain’s tow’ring brow; on its rough sides 
How broad the shadow falls, what different hues 
Invest its glimm’ring surface. (30-35) 
 
The un-called endnote for this passage reads: 
Some perhaps may object to the word glimmering; but whoever has observed the 
playing lights, and colours, which often invest the summits of mountains, will not 
think the epithet improper.58 
 
Is Gilpin defending his technical principles, or aesthetic choices? Is “glimmering” a scientific term?  
If a kind of irrational impulse to write poetry brought this work into being at any cost, then the 
notes overcorrect this impulse. They are detailed, overlytechnical, and, when necessary, defensive.  
The counterpart to Gilpin’s defensiveness about introducing scientific and technical terms 
into poetry is Erasmus Darwin’s exuberance about introducing poetry into scientific discourse. 
Darwin’s botanical treatise “The Loves of Plants,” part of his longer poem The Botanic Garden (1789),  
describes the need for such a poem in warm, enthusiastic language: 
The general design of the following sheets is to inlist Imagination under the banner 
of Science; and to lead her votaries from the looser analogies, which dress out the 
imagery of poetry, to the stricter ones, which form the ratiocination of philosophy. 
While their particular design is to induce the ingenious to cultivate the knowledge of 
Botany, to introduce them to the vestibule of that delightful science, and 
recommending to their attention the immortal works of the celebrated Swedish 
naturalist, LINNEUS.59 
 
The “while” in the middle paragraph anticipates a balancing clause that never comes, but instead the 
passage keeps ascending in its excitement, ending in adoration of Linnaeus. Nevertheless, the notes 
which occur on almost every page of the poem pull against the imaginative quality of the poem, 
which anthropomorphizes the sexual parts of flowers. For instance,  the passage about the 
nasturtium, 
The chaste Tropaeo leaves her secret bed; 
A faint-like glory trembles round her head; 
Eight watchful swains along the lawns of night 




is accompanied by a long footnote explaining that nasturtium flowers  really do “emit sparks or 
flashes in the mornings before sun-rise” but “Nor is this more wonderful” than other natural 
electrical phenomena, like eels (148-49). As if that were the only part of the passage that needed 
rational explanation! (N.B.: None of the nasturtiums in the hanging basket on my deck have emitted 
sparks to date.) Darwin’s note is less of an adequate explanation for the passages, than a correction 
of imagination. 
As aesthetic works, “The Loves of Plants” and “On Landscape Painting” are all but 
unreadable for modern audiences. Furthermore, they still raise an obvious question that neither 
Gilpin nor Darwin could satisfactorily answer: why write verse when something may more clearly be 
explained in prose, as the necessity of footnotes suggests? Why do Grahame, Gilpin, and Darwin 
insist on aesthetic mediation of empirical information?  
In looking at poetry-with-notes, particularly as it relates to scientific subjects, the counter-
intuitive is the obvious: notes do not contribute to greater knowledge, technical expertise, or realism. 
They are the place where, instead, problems of knowledge, personal messiness, and irrational 
attitudes toward the text and its knowledge begin to leak out. The ambiguous relationship between 
notes and empirical fact make notes seem like unnecessary complications for conveying even basic 
delineation of ideas and forms in poetry, rather than helpful, clarifying apparatus. Going further, not 
only do notes get in the way of conveying knowledge, they actually interfere with that process. This 
leads to a paradox: notes grant poetry entrance into scientific and technical discourse because they 
can handle technical terminology in a way that poetry cannot, but at the same time, the notes 
become the justification for writing about technical or scientific subjects in poetry at all. The larger 
point I want to make here before moving on to Chapter Three is that although epistemic virtues 
cross genres, writing techniques are their tangible manifestations. Smith’s notes and Clare’s 
descriptions are each poet’s method of conveying those virtues, while the notes of Grahame, Gilpin, 
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and Darwin attest to ambiguity behind the presentation of scientific ideas in the literary genre of 
poetry. As we leap into the non-literary world of agricultural prose, we will see a complementary 
phenomenon: agricultural writers’ use of the literary genre of memoir to bolster the scientific validity 
of their work. Spanning works of literature and science, as well as these two chapters, the same set 
of epistemic virtues persists as we step into an adjoining field of the world as if one had witnessed it.  
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“ACTUAL OBSERVATION and SELF-PRACTICE”: 
 The Subjective Science of Agricultural Prose, 1760-1830 
 
 
Our meditations on poetry as a representational genre now give way to meditations on 
narrative. Just as we answered the question: what are poetry’s proper materials? in Chapter One and 
how should poetry represent the environment? in Chapter Two, the next two chapters will answer 
the questions of what narrative is for when we make environmental knowledge and how narrative 
works to transmit that knowledge. Because I have put poetry first and narrative last, it may seem that 
there is a progression, sanctioned by either historical developments or logical induction, from the 
one to the other. However, this is not the case. The poems in Chapter One showed us how it 
became possible to create environmental verisimilitude in British literature starting in the mid-
eighteenth century, but the works of Chapters Two, Three, and Four stand beside each other in 
chronological time and are different manifestations of the same set of epistemological problems. In 
Chapter Three, we will retreat from Clare’s poetry of the mid-1830s back to the agricultural prose of 
the 1760s and following it forward again to William Cobbett’s Rural Rides of the 1820s, published in 
1830. The narratives in this chapter exist in the margins—they are to be found in prefaces and notes, 
tucked away out of sight of the “real” business of agricultural writing: facts, charts, tables. These 
narratives are the life stories of agricultural writers, and if these men wrote autobiographical details 
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on the margins of their texts, it is because such details act as frames for the information contained 
therein.  
 
The Book Speaks 
In 1776, Scottish enlightenment thinker Henry Home, Lord Kames published The Gentleman 
Farmer: Being An Attempt to improve Agriculture, By subjecting it to the Test of Rational Principles, a treatise on 
both practical and theoretical agriculture. The book’s epigraph, taken from Juvenal’s Satires, reads: 
Semper ego auditor tantum?, which can be roughly translated as, “Must I always be only a listener?”—or 
in this case, a reader? Beginning at its title page, then, The Gentleman Farmer voices the impatience out 
of which it was created: impatience to cease being a passive consumer of knowledge and start 
producing knowledge. By the same token, it hints at discomfort with those who have already been 
speaking—that is, the new wave of books on British and European agriculture that were already 
circulating by the time Kames’ book entered the market.   
 The Gentleman Farmer, which by all appearances was as widely-read and well-respected as any 
book on agriculture could hope to be1, is also a perfect specimen of British agricultural discourse’s 
anxieties. While Kames dedicated the book to Sir John Pringle—then president of the Royal 
Society—as a scientific work of national significance, his own scientific principles led him to 
mistrust other works in his field. In fact, he begins the preface by staging the book’s encounter with 
its own potential buyer, who is equally mistrustful of all books on the same subject: 
Behold! another volume on  husbandry! exclaims a peevish man on seeing the title 
page: how long shall we be pestered with such trite stuff? “As long, sweet Sir, as you 
are willing to pay for it: hold out your purse, and wares will never be wanting.”2  
 
Kames carefully anticipates and guards against book-buyers’ exasperation at what must have seemed 
like a market being flooded with new and reprinted books of agricultural prose. The peevish man’s 
interlocutor, perhaps the book itself, confirms the view that for the most part books on agriculture 
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are mere business propositions.  They will be written and sold as long as they turn a profit, whether 
or not there is new material to fill them. Or so it would seem. Stepping out from behind the persona 
of the eager-to-be-consumed book as the preface continues, Kames reveals that he shares the same 
peevishness with new books on agriculture. He admits that most of the “new” agricultural texts 
actually contain nothing new, but are simply “bookseller’s production[s]”: made up of passages 
literally cut out of old texts and pasted together.3 Those looking for information about agriculture 
are particularly vulnerable to these practices because “every thing is made welcome on that subject; 
and provided the title be new, it is to the bookseller of no great importance, how threadbare the 
contents be.”4  
 Given what seemed like the alarming number of books on all aspects of agriculture 
published in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (see below), with not a few of them 
smacking of intellectual charlatanism, each new book on agriculture created a small epistemological 
crisis for both its author and its readers. By its very appearance each book raised these questions 
anew: given the ever-expanding amount of agricultural data, experiments, and theories crowding the 
shelves of a bookseller’s shop, which authors are honest? which methods are valid? and how can the 
reader tell?  For Kames, the answers to these questions center less on scientific method and more on 
the situation of the author himself5: 
Writers on agriculture, very few excepted, deliver their precepts from a study lined 
with books, without even pretending to experience. Principles and propositions are 
assumed on the authority of former writers: opinions pass current from generation 
to generation; and no person enquires whether they wear the livery of truth.6 
 
Like Joseph Warton’s poets who, having “dwelt for years in the Strand, [. . .] attempted to describe 
fields and rivers, and generally succeeded accordingly,” the inaccuracies bred by agricultural writers 
have to do with the embodied situation of the writers themselves. Sitting in a study to write about 
agriculture and drawing on knowledge taken from books, rather than direct experience with farming, 
makes for nothing more than old misleading information, deceptively repackaged and sold for 
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profit. If it truly is the case that most writers on agriculture follow this practice, it is no wonder that 
the sight of “another volume on husbandry” is enough to make a man peevish. 
Having made the case against his fellow writers, Kames begins to build a case for himself by 
asserting that his book is the product of lived, practical experience: 
So much I will vouch for myself, that I have not mentioned a single article as certain, 
but what I have practiced many years with success: the instructions contained in this 
book are founded on repeated experiments and diligent observation. In short, it will 
soon be perceived, that this is not a bookseller’s production.7 
 
But it is not enough to assert the validity of his own experience. Rather, Kames has had to reinvent 
personal experience: 
Agriculture is a very ancient art. It has been practised everywhere without 
intermission; but with very little attention to principles. In studying the principles laid 
down by writers, I found myself in a sort of labyrinth, carried to and fro without any 
certain direction. After a long course of reading, where there was nothing but 
darkness and discrepance, I laid aside my books, took heart, and like Des Cartes, 
commenced my inquiries with doubting of everything.8 
 
These claims implicitly attest to the uniqueness of The Gentleman Farmer and its contents. Unlike 
most books on agriculture, this is neither a “bookseller’s production” nor delivered “from a study 
lined with books,” bolstered by “the authority of former writers.” Instead, it is the result of Kames’ 
own practice, experimentation, and observation—experience that cannot be replaced or reproduced, 
and derives from the deliberate exclusion of all prior written knowledge. While Kames might have 
been right to treat many of his fellow authors’ works with suspicion, his drastic Cartesian method 
also links agricultural knowledge to the very basic unit of personal identity. Instead of “I think, 
therefore I am” it is “I farm, therefore I am”—empiricism, the belief that valid scientific knowledge 
can only be conveyed through proper attention to one’s subjective experience. 
Kames’ claims for the authority of his personal experience, taken by themselves, are 
convincing enough, since the reader is reassured that he or she is receiving the product of one man’s 
life and work. However, set in the context of eighteenth century British agricultural literature, both 
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Kames’ preface and the booksellers’ productions seem rather threadbare. Impatience with 
multiplying works on agriculture, fantasies of laying aside all agricultural writing to start from 
scratch, and paranoia about authors who write from their studies instead of their fields were 
standard features of discussions about agricultural prose long before and after the publication of The 
Gentleman Farmer. In fact, I chose to open this chapter with The Gentleman Farmer because its preface 
is a wonderfully articulate and well-written example of these clichés. 
Significantly, complaints like Kames’ about the validity of agricultural prose were not merely 
public shows for the sake of selling books, but also pervaded private conversation. For instance, in 
1765, minister and agricultural author Walter Harte wrote to 24-year-old Arthur Young about a 
gargantuan collection of agricultural letters and essays which had just been published, the Museum 
Rusticum et Commerciale: 
As to the Museum Rusticum (your writings in it excepted) I know nothing of the 
authors, but look upon it [. . .] as a blue-paper job. Books in this age are a 
manufacture as much as hats or pins. The bookseller chooses a subject and the 
author writers at 10s. a sheet. It is probable that one man in a garret, who does not 
know a blade of wheat from a blade of barley, writes half the letters from the 
‘Kentish man,’ ‘Yorkshire man,’ ‘Glocester man,’ &c. And perhaps the same hand, in 
the notes, signs with all the letters in the alphabet.9 
 
Like Kames’ imagined authors who write from studies lined with books, the specter of Harte’s man 
in a garret haunts each encounter with agricultural writing. It may also be no surprise that the editors 
and correspondents of Museum Rusticum, members of Society for the Encouragement of Arts, 
Manufactures, and Commerce, anticipated Harte’s criticisms from the very title page of their 
publication, which reads: Museum Rusticum et Commericiale: OR, SELECT PAPERS ON AGRICULTURE, 
COMMERCE, ARTS, AND MANUFACTURES, DRAWN FROM EXPERIENCE and Communicated by 
GENTLEMEN engaged in these Pursuits (emphasis mine).10 
In some sense, Kames’ and Harte’s anxieties were well-founded. Until 1793, when the Board 
of Agriculture and Internal Improvement was established, there was no centralized body for 
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collecting and distributing agricultural knowledge in Britain. And even after that, the Board was 
notoriously incompetent in its attempts to disseminate and standardize nationwide knowledge of 
agricultural techniques. There was no standard language for talking about soil, no breed standards 
for livestock, and the practices of farming varied greatly from one region of the country to another. 
Likewise, writers lacked standard methods for agricultural experimentation and recording their 
results. Consequently, they put a great amount of emphasis on what I call “hard subjectivity”11: first-
hand witnessing, conscious experimentation, and meticulous record-keeping. (See figures 1-5.) An 
author’s worth depended on the internal consistency of his own system, his records of dates, 
weights, prices, and acreage. The surest proof of his intelligence and honesty was in his arithmetic. 
But hard subjectivity is never an impersonal set of data; its validity depends on the fact that it was 
produced by a single person. In other words, to agricultural prose writers, data does not make sense 
unless it is grounded within the memory and narrative of a single life. The man in the garret is so 
unsettling not because what he says is necessarily wrong, but because he literally sits in a London 
garret while claiming to be on a farm in Kent. In other words, the author’s own life gives structure 
to thought and memory, orders facts and makes them meaningful.  
While Kames gave The Gentleman Farmer philosophical legitimacy by drawing upon Descartes 
to articulate his approach, other agricultural writers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries were unable or disinclined to think about their own methods in such lofty terms. 
Nonetheless, with the exception of the mythical man in the garret, agricultural writers starting in the 
mid-eighteenth century shared the same commitment to personal experience and record-keeping to 
combat inaccuracy and unreliability of information. Also like Kames, they preface their works with a 
disavowal of all, or almost all, previous agricultural writing, often accompanied by a fantasy of laying 
aside, ignoring, or even destroying the entire canon of British agricultural literature. In the place of 
this mass of supposedly useless books, each author offers his own, along with the assurance that it 
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derives from practical experience alone. However, claiming to write from experience alone did not 
protect any writer from having the charge of inexperience and bookishness leveled at him by others. 
The result is that agricultural prose became a discourse in which most interlocutors refuse to 
acknowledge one another. More important than the individual disavowals, however, is the fact that 
these writers show a commitment to the same scientific values of direct experience and hard 
subjectivity, even as that commitment caused them to mistrust one another’s work. These scientific 
values, which Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison call “epistemic virtues,” and their influence on 
how agricultural writers viewed themselves in relation to their works are the subject of this chapter.12 
 In this chapter, then, I am less concerned with the contents of books of agricultural prose 
than with the places where authors discuss their lives as the surest proof of their works: dedications, 
title pages, prefaces, and appendices, as well as private correspondence. Almost always, the periphery 
of the text is where they theorize knowledge-production and manage encounters with readers. 
Ultimately, I argue, the epistemic virtues of agricultural writing obliquely and directly theorized in 
these works are based in writers’ understanding of subjectivity. The main subjects of this chapter will 
be three of the most prolific agricultural writers of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: 
Arthur Young, William Marshall, and William Cobbett, along with the authors they admire and 
condemn. In all the works examined here, subjective experience as recorded in journals, data tables, 
descriptions, and diagrams is the touchstone of valid knowledge. Young, Marshall, and Cobbett 
published dozens of books each over their decades-long careers, and their claims about their 
personal experience became a vehicle for theorizing knowledge and its relationship to self. However, 
for these three men, starting over like Descartes was simply not possible. As much as they insisted 
on the uniqueness of their own experiences, they nevertheless found themselves using other 




The Body of Agricultural Writing 1760-1830 
The period between 1760 and 1830 is what economic historian Joel Mokyr terms the 
“Agricultural Enlightenment”—a sharp rise of interest in “progressive” or scientific farming 
practices, beginning in the mid-18th century, which aimed to make Britain’s agricultural output as 
efficient as possible in the face of wars with France and the United States, Britain’s growing 
population, and several years of bad harvests nation-wide.13 While the actual economic impact of 
this movement is still being debated by historians, one of its most visible legacies is the number of 
books, pamphlets, and periodicals that flooded the marketplace. Although British agricultural writing 
in its modern form had emerged in the 17th century, influenced by Baconian scientific method, the 
number of publications on agriculture only made a noticeable upswing in the mid-eighteenth 
century. Historian Pamela Horn estimates that in the entire decade of the 1740s, only three to six 
books on agriculture were published in Britain. By the 1760s, that figure rises to 22-26 per decade, 
and to 90-100 by the end of the century. These figures do not include periodicals, reprinted editions, 
or multiple books by prolific authors, like Marshall and Young, who regularly published several 
books in a year.14 Diversity of genres also increased along with the number of texts. Agricultural 
prose in this period can be divided into: records of experimentation, especially concerning the 
produce of a single farm; county or regional reports on existing farming practices and economic 
conditions, often written in the form of tours; general how-to manuals on complete farm 
management; how-to manuals on specific subjects; and total farming systems based on theories of 
soil and plants.  
One genre missing from this tally is georgic, which also enjoyed some popularity in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This chapter, however, sets georgic aside because it is on 
the whole not preoccupied by the same epistemological problems that worried agricultural prose 
writers. Although georgic is a didactic genre, georgic poets do not seem to agonize about the truth 
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of their own or others’ works. For instance, John Dyer’s book length poem on sheep farming, The 
Fleece (1757), is accompanied with no preface and few notes; it provides instructions, but betrays no 
self-consciousness about their validity. The poet who comes closest to the mode of the agricultural 
prose writer is James Grahame in the preface to his long poem British Georgics (1809).15 Grahame 
carefully grooms his readers’ expectations, claiming that his aim is “not so much to instruct as to 
amuse; not to teach a science, but to recommend the study of it.”16 This claim is somewhat belied by 
Grahame’s inclusion of a hundred pages of endnotes, many of which go into great detail about 
agricultural method. In the end, he positions himself on the line between adorning agriculture and 
acting as an authority on it. 
That I am not a practical farmer, is a circumstance which must, no doubt, derogate 
from my authority as a writer on agriculture, and may even perhaps draw on my 
present attempt the imputation of presumption. In my justification, I would observe, 
that though I have never practised the business, I have studied it, both by much 
actual observation, and some reading. From my infancy, I have in general passed 
near the half, sometimes a greater portion of the year, in the country.17  
 
As we will see from the writings of more irascible agriculturalists like Thomas Brace Stone, merely 
living a half a year in the country would indeed be a poor basis of authority for agricultural prose. 
But Grahame has more leeway than prose writers, as well: writing under the heading of georgic he 
can have his didacticism, but swear it off as mere amusement if challenged. It is important to note 
that Grahame, writing in 1809, comes after most of the works discussed in this chapter. Unlike Dyer 
writing in 1757, whose text is silent about issues of credibility or utility, Grahame seems to have 
projected the mistrust of agricultural writers like Kames and Harte onto his own works. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, poets of this period could and did hold themselves to rigorous 
standards for making knowledge in their poetry. However, the important distinction between 
Charlotte Smith and John Clare on the one hand and agricultural writers on the other is that the 
poets held themselves to higher standards than their readers demanded, while agricultural writers 
demanded that each other rise to those standards. Even in Warton and Aikin’s criticism of inaccurate 
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poetry, the stakes are no higher than preventing bad poems from being written. The lengths to 
which Smith and Clare went to in order to include scientific accuracy in their poems seemed to be 
unappreciated by most of their readers—Smith’s notes were, after all, of “no material value,” while 
Clare’s descriptions were simply the “delineation of mere exterior objects.” Therefore, my 
distinction between georgic like Dyer’s and Grahame’s versus prose like Kames’ is based largely in 
these works’ self-perceptions of their and others’ utility, rather than the distinction between poetry 
and prose per se.  
I say “self-perceptions” because even though agricultural prose generally aimed to instruct 
farmers and estate owners, its influence on farming practices is still in doubt, let alone the question 
of its contribution to national progress in farming. Historians of agriculture and economics are still 
unsure about whether these texts reached an audience capable of putting them to good use, and, if 
so, whether the contents were of any help to farmers.18 They were, perhaps, more of an outcome of 
scientific agriculture than a cause. Despite these doubts, as Mokyr points out, one thing is clear: 
however useful or useless the texts themselves were, there was a growing market for them—
someone found them interesting, worth buying, and worth reading.19 Therefore, I start from the 
assumption that it is not only worthwhile, but also necessary, to read agricultural prose by way of 
literary analysis. I do not say this because agriculturalists necessarily thought of themselves as literary 
writers, but rather, because scholars cannot mine these texts for historical data on agriculture and 
economics without understanding the texts’ own struggles with knowledge, method, and the 
meaning of authorship. If nothing else, we cannot understand the knowledge that these texts make if 
we do not understand how they make it.  
However, I do not want to suggest that agricultural writing and agricultural writers were 
completely separate from the realm of what is more traditionally thought of as literature. William 
Cobbett’s influence on the press, his place as both a satirist and an object of satire, and his efforts to 
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bring literacy and knowledge of the rules of grammar (long restricted to those wealthy enough to 
attend a grammar school) to the poor have long earned him the attention of literary scholars. Arthur 
Young, Charles Burney’s brother-in-law and Frances Burney’s step-uncle, was a lover of the arts, 
particularly literature and music, and was a welcome member of intellectual circles prior to his 
Evangelical conversion at the age of 56. William Marshall’s first book, Minutes of Agriculture, was 
published by none other than Robert Dodsley’s younger brother James, who took the shop over 
upon Dodsley’s retirement, and because of the Dodsley connection Marshall solicited and received 
pre-publication criticism about the book from Samuel Johnson. And Marshall also waded into the 
Picturesque Controversy of 1794-6 over the relationship between landscape painting and landscape 
gardening, devoting a book-length response to the squabbles of Uvedale Price, Richard Payne 
Knight, and Humphry Repton.20 In practice, none of these men were divorced from literature or the 
arts, and as much attention has been given in recent decades to literary authors’ interest in science in 
the decades preceding and following the turn of the nineteenth century, so too should we pay 
attention to the literary side of these works of scientific agriculture. 
 
Between Modern Knowledge and Objective Methods 
To understand the nature of agricultural knowledge as it was made in the texts I will discuss 
here, let us return to Kames’ preface, and his undertaking of Cartesian method in doing away with 
everything already supposedly known about agriculture. Importantly, he prefaces the announcement 
of his method with the observation that “Agriculture is a very ancient art. It has been practised 
everywhere without intermission; but with very little attention to principles.” Kames’ frustration 
with existing agricultural literature, although aimed at his competitors in the book market, has its 
source in the nature of agricultural knowledge itself—the fact that it comes from an ancient practice 
and cannot readily be made into a new discipline. Unlike in newer experimental sciences, the 
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proponent of scientific agriculture was tasked with making knowledge about practices already deeply 
embedded in everyday life into a discipline. In other words, knowledge about agriculture must not 
be made anew, but made, to use Michael McKeon’s term, modern. For modern knowledge, 
McKeon claims, is “Disembedded from the matrix of experience it seeks to explain, [and is] defined 
precisely by its explanatory ambition to separate itself from its object of knowledge sufficiently to 
fulfill the epistemological demand that what is known must be divided from the process by which it 
is known.”21 The act of making agricultural knowledge by passing it down through generations of 
custom and practice is no longer viable in the eyes of writers like Kames—agricultural knowledge 
must be equipped with its own standards and methods for transmission, standards and methods 
which in themselves have nothing to do with farming, and which must be legible to people other 
than farmers. 
It would seem at this moment—the transition from farming by tradition and custom to the 
written transmission of knowledge—would also be the moment when the standards of objectivity 
and the scientific method would first be applied to agricultural prose. But a read through Kames’ 
work does not turn up any call for objectivity—that is, a call for agriculturalists to remove their 
subjective prejudices and experiences from agricultural experimentation. On the contrary, Kames’ 
goal is to transform the reader’s self by creating a new type of personal identity: the gentleman 
farmer. Likewise, in the dozens of agricultural works in the decades preceding and following 
Kames’, we find systematic appeals to subjective experience, but no calls for increased objectivity. 
Rather, each author calls for the right kind of subjective experience—spent on the farm, not in the 
study or garret. These authors’ repeated appeals to subjective experience as the basis for scientific 
method may be jarring to readers who have been taught to equate science with objectivity, and the 
temptation may be to see these works simply as science done badly. However, historians of science 
like Jan Golinski, Stuart Strickland, Lorraine Daston, and Peter Galison have shown that scientific 
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practices of this time were deeply involved with the making of the self. 22 Daston and Galison claim 
that in post-Cartesian eighteenth century philosophy, which split knowledge from the knower, 
“continuity of consciousness and memory came to replace the soul as the definition and expression 
of the self, introspection seemed to reveal fluid, tattered, and even contradictory identities.”23 As a 
result the self of the scientist became a collection of thoughts, memories, and images brought 
together more or less by chance, and thus a cause for great concern. 
This scientific self, then, was so precarious that even living among the wrong sensory 
phenomena and engaging in the wrong kinds of habits could warp one’s ability to practice a science 
correctly. According to Thomas Brace Stone, a land surveyor and perhaps Arthur Young’s harshest 
contemporary critic, Young’s skills compare unfavorably with his own because Young had been 
apprenticed to a wine merchant as a teenager before taking up farming in his early twenties, while 
Stone had been apprenticed to a farmer from the beginning: 
With deference to Mr. Young's judgment, I presume it must be one who, after 
having received an education best suited to agricultural pursuits, possesses taste for 
attaining perfection in the science, one who has been placed for four or five years, at 
that period of life in which you were apprenticed to a wine merchant, with a farmer 
of experience in some county were the art of tillage has made the greatest progress. 
At this time, the mind, not yet trained to professional habits of any kind, or involved 
with the cares of life, receives with readiness whatever instruction is conveyed to it; 
and, first impressions being the strongest, the seeds of knowledge take then the 
deepest root in the understanding, and mark the future direction of the man.24  
 
In other words, Young’s ability to practice agriculture has been hindered for the rest of his life 
because he did not receive the right impressions and instructions at the right time in his life. While 
we should take this argument with a grain of salt (Stone’s friend William Marshall also criticized 
Young and had also been apprenticed to a merchant before returning to farming in his early 
twenties), it also shows how deeply this tenuous notion of the self had influenced practical writers.25 
The effect of seeing the self as a compendium of thoughts, images, and memories at the 
mercy of circumstances made scientific work an act of exerting, rather than suppressing, the self. In 
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the late-eighteenth century view of the self, according to Daston and Galison, “it is memory that 
safeguards the unity of the self.”26 A scientist had to muster all of his or her powers of observation, 
memory, and record-keeping in order to sort through data and isolate what was meaningful. But 
while the correct upbringing or apprenticeship might have formed an agriculturalist’s understanding 
correctly, record-keeping was the key to successful knowledge-production. In this view, memory and 
record-keeping are more deeply important than convenience or efficiency; they get to the root of 
what it means to be sound as a person and agriculturalist: “Just as moral responsibility for one’s past 
actions depended on remembering them—connecting past and present selves—scientific 
responsibility for one’s observations depended on recording and synthesizing them.”27 I argue, then, 
that from the 1760s to the 1830s, agricultural writing became a medium for making the self: in some 
cases, an alternate form of life-writing. Only afterwards, in the mid to late nineteenth century did 
thinkers across Europe and America come to view the self as a unified identity whose will could 
interfere with the sanctity of data. Objectivity then came to prominence as a scientific virtue, and 
agricultural writing began a new phase. 
 However, the distinction between pre-objective assertions of self and objective suppression 
of self is not always as tidy as I have outlined here. A good example of a mixture of objectivity and 
hard subjectivity can be found in the introduction to one of Arthur Young’s earliest books on 
agriculture: A Course of Experimental Agriculture (1770). Near the beginning of the introduction, Young 
states that  
My attention to form a register minutely genuine has been so great, that some 
experiments are inserted, from which scarce any conclusions can be drawn; owing to 
unlucky accidents, or other causes. I did not reject them, that my book might be the 
real transcript of my practice, and not the partial representation of experiments 
picked and culled to serve the purposes of a favorite idea, or upon which to found a 
brilliant hypothesis.28 
 
Young’s insistence on not tampering with his records to the point of not removing any looks like 
objectivity carried almost to madness. The deliberate inclusion of useless information proves the 
112 
 
point that Young’s willful subjectivity is not interfering with the conclusions that may be drawn as a 
whole. Young’s reason for doing so is that he saw “a too common delusion, [ . . .] the adopting of a 
favourite notion, and forming experiments with an eye to confirm it” in the works of other writers.29 
On the other hand, while Young does not want his willful self to intrude, he finds his identity crucial 
to the work’s credibility: 
it is very necessary, in works of this nature, for the author to set his name to his 
labours, with that of the place where his experiments were made, that all who think it 
proper may make any inquiries as they please into the truth of his assertions; and 
though the degrees of his accuracy cannot be thus discovered, yet the world has at 
least the satisfaction of knowing that they read the composition of one who is a real 
farmer, and who made great numbers of experiments. It is upon this account that I 
prefix my name to these sheets, and very far from any vanity of being known as an 
author.30 
 
In “setting his name to his labors,” Young does not believe that his readers will necessarily travel to 
his farm to verify his claims. However, they are able to imagine the author as a real person, and it is 
this idea—experiments performed and recorded by a unified self—that offers satisfaction of 
accuracy. In both of these cases, Young takes nothing for granted—he must justify both his 
objective and non-objective stances, perhaps because it is not clear which stance the reader will 
require. For the rest of this chapter, I will turn my attention from general epistemic virtues of 
agricultural discourse to the ways they manifested in the writings of Young, Cobbett, and Marshall. 
Although these writers insisted on the primacy of personal experience, they could never wipe away 
all knowledge and start over again. They found, despite themselves, that text is a kind of experience; 
discourse is a kind of life. What follows is a record of their attempts to reconcile their individual 
experiences with their places in the larger discourse. 
 
Arthur Young’s Shame: Epistemologies of Agriculture and Evangelicalism 
Arthur Young was born in 1741, the second son of a gentry family which moved in 
aristocratic and literary London circles. Since he could not inherit the family estate under the laws of 
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primogeniture, there was some difficulty in selecting a profession that was suitable for him. When he 
was 22, after a failed attempt by his family to make him a wine merchant, his mother offered Young 
an inherited piece of land to farm. It was here that Young began a course of reading on agriculture 
and published his first agricultural essays in the Museum Rusticum. In 1767, Young married Martha 
Allen, Charles Burney’s sister-in-law, and domestic strife between his mother and new wife forced 
him to leave home and rent a new farm. Around this time, he published his first successful book, A 
Six Weeks Tour through the Southern Counties of England and Wales (1768). Pressured by financial failures 
of his farms, he published several more tours in the following years, as well as experiments, essays, 
and books on economic policies relating to agriculture, in addition to founding the Annals of 
Agriculture in 1784, which ran until 1815. By the 1790s, Young had built up a reputation as Britain’s 
foremost writer on agricultural experiment and practice. He made his experience as an agriculturalist 
into a well-paid career when he was elected the Secretary of the Board of Agriculture upon its 
creation in 1793 for £500 per annum. Young held this post until his last years, and died in 1820.31 
Even among his contemporaries, Young had perhaps the most visible career of any 
agriculturalist in Britain. He was 67 years old in 1808, when London publisher John Joseph 
Stockdale the younger published Pursuits of Agriculture, a poetic satire on the foibles of the Norfolk 
Agricultural Society modeled on Thomas James Mathias’ popular satiric poem, The Pursuits of 
Literature. In an extended footnote, the author—perhaps Stockdale himself—recounts a recent 
experiment of the Society’s, in which they interplanted turnips and radishes in equal measure, hoping 
to use the radishes as a trap crop to lure insect pests away from the turnips. Subscribers who 
financially backed the experiment contended that the idea was “good as new”—“and I dare say, so it 
was,” the note quips, for it turned out to be neither good nor new.32 After the experiment failed, 
It so chanced, that somebody fond of poring in obsolete and forgotten books, found 
the very same thing at page 239 of a Six Weeks Tour, published some forty years ago. 
I have heard the author of that tour (who was present at the subscription, if not 
himself a subscriber), a good deal laughed at for having forgotten it—very unfairly 
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indeed, in my opinion. It is surely as unreasonable to expect that a man is to 
remember the nonsense he wrote about turneps and radishes forty years ago, as that 
his palate is to retain at present, a distinct impression of the flavour of the turneps 
and radishes he ate in the same summer. Surely the one must be as fugitive as the 
other.33 
 
By G.E. Fussell’s estimate, Young published around 250 volumes over the course of his life and 
travelled thousands of miles around Britain and Europe for the purposes of writing agricultural 
tours.34 Of course he had written and seen more than the human mind could remember at any given 
time—a fact of human life which was nevertheless emphasized by the fact that his writings and tours 
were public knowledge. Any reader “fond of poring in obsolete and forgotten books” could unearth 
one of Young’s long-forgotten memories, beliefs, or identities. The awkward turnip and radish 
experiment at the Norfolk Agricultural Society—67-year-old Young awaiting the results of an 
experiment that 27-year-old Young had written about—exemplifies the tenuousness of Young’s 
scientific identity. His physical and print selves, both present in the same place at once, are still 
separated as if they were two different people—a kind of folding over of the forty years until the 
edges meet, like a piece of paper. The author of Pursuits puts his finger on the dilemma of the 
scientist and the limits of even the most meticulous record-keeping. Whether fairly or unfairly, the 
burden was upon Young to unify his career—to remember what he had written about turnips and 
radishes.35 But if this was the scientific ideal expected by the members of the Norfolk Agricultural 
Society, Stockdale realizes that it butts up against the limits of hard subjectivity. Even written record, 
like taste, is a fugitive impression.  
In private, Young did in fact make an attempt to trace his own career by writing reams of 
journals and, near the end of his life, an autobiography. These were later edited and published as The 
Autobiography of Arthur Young in 1898 by the novelist and writer of agricultural tours Matilda Betham-
Edwards. Aside from letters and journal entries, most of the text was written in the mid-eighteen 
teens, a few years before Young’s death. Most significantly, Young decided to undertake this task 
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after an Evangelical conversion brought on by the death of his favorite daughter, a 14-year-old girl 
the family called Bobbin, from tuberculosis in 1797. Young blamed himself for Bobbin’s death 
because he had put her in a London school against her will, where she contracted the disease. 
Bobbin’s death created an existential crisis for Young; in the following months he withdrew from 
society and began a course of obsessive religious reading, finally coming across William 
Wilberforce’s A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Professed Christians, which had been 
published earlier that year. A chance letter from Wilberforce—then a total stranger—applying to 
Young for advice on agricultural matters prompted Young to correspond with Wilberforce on 
religious ones. Eventually, Young converted to Wilberforce’s brand of Evangelicalism which came 
to be the prevailing force in Young’s inner life for the next twenty-three years until his death. 
Betham-Edwards sees the Autobiography as a document compromised by “religious 
melancholia of [Young’s] later years.”36 For her, the despondent tone of much of the writing, in 
addition the dogmatic, religious interjections of the later Young, seem disappointingly out of place in 
an account of a life so full of interest and action. Contrary to Betham-Edwards, I do not take 
Young’s “religious melancholia” to mean that he was compromised at an intellectual level. 
Evangelicalism, taken as an ideology of knowledge, has much the same requirements for valid 
knowledge that Young himself brought to his agricultural texts. A true conversion must be an 
authentic, personal experience, usually also documented with the apparatus of hard subjectivity: 
first-hand witness and written record. While Young’s early life is extensively documented in his 
letters to others, he only began to systematically apply hard subjectivity to his personal life when he 
began a journal during Bobbin’s final illness. His religious fanaticism is, from an epistemological 
standpoint, much in keeping with his concerns about his public works. Perusing the journal in 1817, 
20 years after Bobbin’s death, Young inserted a note among these first entries: 
Throughout many of the succeeding notes, several expressions occur not all 
consistent with true evangelical religion; but I would not afterwards alter them, 
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because I wished to ascertain, on the re-perusal of these papers, what was at the 
moment of my affliction the state of my mind and of my faith.37 
 
Like his decision to include inconclusive data in the Course of Experimental Agriculture, Young looks 
back on his life with the same kind of melancholy objectivity. This objective record of facts, 
however, is necessary to his understanding of his life story, which by 1817 hinged on his conversion. 
Aside from the influences of Wilberforce and Bobbin’s death, Betham-Edwards also 
speculates that this melancholia can be traced to “exaggerated condemnation for foibles of his 
youth”—a condemnation that can be difficult to explain.38 Young’s retrospective treatment of his 
earlier works—which veers between inflated self-importance and self-abnegating shame—is my 
focus here. For instance, in recollecting the publication of the Six Weeks Tour, Young claims it was 
the first account of a tour ever published to focus exclusively on agriculture. Young recognizes the 
publication of the Six Weeks Tour as a significant moment in agricultural history because, whether for 
better or worse, the tour became one of the most important genres of agricultural literature. He 
makes his claim for the importance of this new invention by displacing his attitude toward other 
texts onto an anecdote: 
When a Lord Chancellor of England, amusing himself with husbandry, read the 
English works on that subject for information, and burnt them as affording him 
nothing but contradictions, without doubt he complained that these writers did not 
describe the common management of the farmers, and on that management 
founding their propositions of improvement. But the fact was, and it must be, in the 
nature of things, writers confined to their closets, or, at most, to a single farm, could 
not describe what it was impossible for them to know39 
 
Without citing his source, Young refers to an infamous anecdote about Sir Francis Bacon that Jethro 
Tull had published in his first edition of The Horse-Hoeing Hubandry: 
Scarcely any Subject has more of the Ornaments of Learning bestowed upon it, than 
Agriculture has, by antient and modern Writers. But a late Great Man, who was the 
Cicero of the Age, having perused all their Books of Husbandry, ordered them, not 
withstanding their Eloquence, to be carried upon a Hand-Barrow out of his Study, 
and thrown in the Fire. [. . .] He declared, that he could not, for his life, guess what 
those Authors would be at; for they treated of an Art wherein they formed no 




 Hastily and without good cause, Young ascribes Bacon’s frustration to the fact that earlier authors 
had not toured. But in fact, Bacon’s frustration was with writers’ lack of general principles, not with 
whether or not they had seen the farms of others. The discrepancy between the two passages, which 
must have been intentional on Young’s part, shows how his epistemic virtues differ from Bacon’s 
(or, at least, Bacon’s according to Tull.) Valid knowledge, for Young, comes from the direct, 
embodied experience of travel alone, not through reading or even in working the same plot of land 
day-to-day.  For Young, the new method of touring invalidates the entire canon of agricultural 
writing, although Young allows Bacon to do the dirty work of actually throwing the books on the 
fire. 
Young’s satisfaction with the Six Weeks Tour does not carry over to his other works, 
however. The Course of Experimental Agriculture, which we encountered above, troubled Young 
throughout his life. While in its preface, he expounds upon the necessity of signing his name to 
work in order to give his readers proof that these are real experiments carried out by a real man, 
Young’s identity carries more weight than just that of an experimenter: “In numerous incidences, I 
have been a very bad farmer, and acted contrary to the dictates of good husbandry; but my faults are 
registered, and I hope condemned impartially.”41 This confession shows that, at least for Young, a 
transcript of pure experience was far more important than a book about good agriculture. He 
confesses his inadequacies as if they were sins, and suggests that faults of knowledge accompany, or 
perhaps result from, faults of character. Most of the rest of the preface is a survey of other 
agricultural works, in which he turns the same destructive lens on them.  
In the Autobiography, looking back from a distance of roughly 45 years, Young’s confessional 




And the circumstance which perhaps of all others in my life I most deeply regretted  
and considered as a sin of the blackest dye, was the publishing the result of my 
experience during these four-years; which speaking as a farmer, was nothing but 
ignorance, folly, presumption, and rascality.42 
 
How could publishing a perhaps less-than-useful book on agriculture be the greatest sin and regret 
of one’s life? There is a gap here, between text and life, which is difficult to parse. Young represents 
the Six Weeks Tour in retrospect to be more unique or revolutionary than it actually was, but I do not 
think it is mere bragging. Nor do I think that his regret over the Course of Experimental Agriculture is 
unfounded. Rather, there is an emotional and moral dimension to agricultural writing that goes 
beyond the knowledge that is factually represented on the page.  
Young’s guilt over publishing the Course of Experimental Agriculture ran deep and was not a 
matter of public show. Late in his life he compiled a work—essentially an enormous commonplace 
book of agricultural quotations—called The Elements and Practice of Agriculture, which Young began 
nearly twenty years before his conversion.43 In his introduction, he makes it clear that part of the 
reason for publishing such a work was to repent for the Course. 
I felt it as a case of conscience, to make whatever reparation I could to the publication for 
the former publication of a work, purporting to be experimental; and containing what I 
called experiments, but published at a time in which real ignorance was to assume the place 
which should have been occupied by knowledge, the result of experience. 1[May God forgive 
me the deep offence of such a work, and relative to which the only possible comfort I can 
draw, is, the neglect into which it fell. Long after the publication, and where I was in a 
measure, I trust, come to myself I made the requisite enquiries into the loss which might 
have been sustained by the publisher, meaning to repair it, but I found that none had been 
suffered; and I have not omitted the means of preventing any future revival of [that] [^those 
crude notions ideas], which from the bottom of my soul, I wish had never received 
existence.]44 
The manuscript from which this passage was taken is in fair hand, suggesting that Young decided to 
omit this public repentance fairly late in the writing process. Whether he omitted it because it was 
                                                          
1 In the manuscript, the text in brackets is crossed out with a large loopy X that precisely denotes the 
beginning and end words of the canceled passage. I have done my best to render Young’s 
corrections and cancelations, which become most intense as he deprecates the Course as, not just a 
failed work of science, but a sin. 
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too personal, or because he had doubts about the level of repentance the Course required is unclear. 
But in either case, here we have the surest, saddest proof that in Young’s old age sins against God 
and sins against science were indistinguishable. For Young, the surest means of penance became, 
not simply destroying copies of the Course (although he did do that) but compiling works from other 
authors to replace it. His scientific sins could not be washed away by his knowledge alone, but could 
perhaps be washed away with the words and knowledge of others.  
Young’s life is the story of evangelism and Evangelicalism: zeal for agricultural improvement 
during the first half, mixed with zeal for Christianity in the second. While Young began farming and 
touring out of financial necessity, his early agricultural writings became the record of his life, both 
for himself and others, like the members of the Norfolk Agricultural Society. When he was an 
agricultural evangelist, the written record of his tours and experiments sufficed as documents and it 
was only during his existential crisis and subsequent conversion that he supplemented these records 
with a journal. In the next section, we will see William Cobbett using agricultural writings as 
testament to his personal life only beginning in his 50s, but he makes up for this lost time by 
appropriating the writings and careers of Jethro Tull and Young for himself. 
 
William Cobbett: The New Tull and Young-with-a-Difference 
 William Cobbett did not have an agonized relationship with his own works on agriculture 
like Young did, but he did have a complex relationship with both Young, who began publishing 
around the time Cobbett was born, and Tull, who died the year Young was born. While Cobbett was 
not sparing in his condemnation of most works of agriculture, his relationship with them is different 
from Kames’ or Young’s. Instead of silencing other authors in order to emphasize his own 
experience, Cobbett appropriates others’ works for his own use, sometimes explicitly and sometimes 
implicitly. Cobbett accuses Young of not founding his claims upon personal experience, but remakes 
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silently his own career as an agriculturalist in the image of Young’s. Likewise, Cobbett quietly hacks 
and mangles Tull’s Horse-Hoeing Husbandry in order to make it conform to his own sense of epistemic 
virtues while giving Tull the credit for all the original ideas contained therein. Through Young and 
Tull, Cobbett deliberately constructs a lineage of agricultural ideas and methods. But he does so, I 
argue, because of his own late-start career, and his anxieties about the end of life. With the specters 
of the old, blind religious fanatic Young and the isolated, castigated Tull in front of him, Cobbett 
cautiously enters into a career as an agriculturalist. Through the careful refashioning of their works, 
he justifies his choice to come to agricultural writing late in life. 
Cobbett was born a generation later than Young, in 1763, and to a much lower station in life. 
His father was an inn-keeper and small farmer in Surrey. At the age of 20, Cobbett ran away to 
London. His adventures led him into the army, and then into a career as first a conservative and 
then radical writer, and finally as an MP in the House of Commons before his death in 1835. 
Cobbett was credited by his contemporaries as single-handedly founding the cheap press in Britain, 
making it possible for printed material to be distributed to people of all social classes.45 But it was 
not until later in his life that Cobbett’s writing took an explicitly didactic turn, with a view to helping 
the poor educate themselves, grow their own food, and manage their households more 
economically. In the last fifteen years of his life, Cobbett published several books on agriculture: A 
Year’s Residence in the United States of America (1819), The Woodlands (1825), The English Gardener (1829), 
and Rural Rides (1830). While the works of Kames, Young, and most other agricultural writers are by 
and large addressed to owners of large estates who had enough disposable cash to conduct 
agricultural experiments, Cobbett’s works take a bottom-up approach. Cobbett looks to reform 
British agriculture household by household, giving families an understanding of how to use their 
small plots of land the most efficiently. His books, then, are about gardening, rather than agriculture, 
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although this is a difference of scale only: as a writer, he compares his works to books of agricultural 
discourse. 
Cobbett’s first book solely devoted to farming was the Year’s Residence, partly a journal of his 
time spent on a small farm in New York and partly instruction for British farmers on how to benefit 
from American farming techniques. In the introduction, Cobbett states that though he had always 
practiced farming (“from the age of six years, when I climbed the side of a steep sandrock, and there 
scooped me out a plot four feet square to make me a garden”), it was not until his time in Newgate 
prison as a political prisoner from 1810-1812 that he began to read and write about agriculture.46 
Nevertheless, his authority comes from, not simply his life experience, but his meticulous recording 
and recounting of it. In order to effectively instruct others, “one of the best modes, if not the very 
best, is, to give them, in detail, an account of what one has done oneself in that same situation.”47 
Cobbett makes himself the measure of agricultural experience for his readers: “The account, which I 
shall give,” he says, “shall be that of actual experience. I will say what I know and what I have seen and 
what I have done.”48 The journal portion of the Residence, then, contains much detail that falls outside 
of the topic of agriculture. For instance, on June 16th, 1817, Cobbett writes: “Fine, beautiful day. 
Never saw such fine weather. Not a morsel of dirt. The ground sucks up all. I walk about and work 
in the land in shoes made of deer-skin. They are dressed white, like breeches-leather. I began to leave 
off my coat to day, and to not expect to put it on again till October. My hat is a white chip, with broad 
brims. Never better health.” Again, on July 8th he writes: “Fine hot day. Wear no waistcoat now, 
except in the morning and evening.”49 The many intimate details like this, which fill a great deal of 
the journal, show his commitment to portraying agricultural work (and writing) as a rounded, 
complete, fully lived and embodied experience. 
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 Given Cobbett’s emphasis on direct experience, it is not surprising that he is skeptical about 
other agricultural texts. As we will see again in the writings of William Marshall, perhaps the most 
telling evidence of Cobbett’s authority is not his reading, but his ability to reject most of what he read: 
During my whole life I have been a gardener. There is no part of the business, which, 
first or last, I have not performed with my own hands. And, as to it I owe very little 
to books, except that of TULL; for I never read a good one in my life, except a French 
book, called the Manuel du Jardinier.50 
 
This is after, he claims, having read “all of our English books on these matters.”51 The Manuel du 
Jardinier (perhaps the 1765 book by Agostino Mandirola?) is never mentioned again, but we soon 
find that Jethro Tull’s The Horse-Hoeing Husbandry has become one the most important books in 
Cobbett’s life. Does this mean that Cobbett overcame his mistrust of other texts? I would suggest 
that Tull’s book makes it into Cobbett’s canon, not necessarily because of the information it 
contains, but because it fits into Cobbett’s life narrative in a way that others do not—Tull was a 
turning point, perhaps Cobbett’s own conversion to the writing of agricultural prose. After his 
course of reading in prison, Cobbett says,  
I then, for the first time, read that Book of all Books on husbandry, the work of 
JETHRO TULL, to the principles of whom I owe more than to all my other readings 
and all my experience.52 
 
Cobbett’s enthusiasm for Tull’s ideas does not release him from the problem of other texts, given 
his strident rejection of all books (“I never read a good one in my life.”) Rather, I think Cobbett has 
made his reading of Tull a form of direct personal experience, comparable to touring or farming 
one’s own land. 
Tull (1674-1741) was an isolated Berkshire gentleman who was credited by the British with 
having invented the horse-drawn seed drill, which allowed seed to be sown precisely in rows. The 
principle behind Tull’s system of agriculture was, as Cobbett described it,  
that Tillage will supply the place of manure; and that his [Tull’s] own experience shows, 
that, a good crop of wheat, for any number of years, may be grown, every year, upon 




This system, although Young condemned it as dangerous (and from my limited knowledge, I 
agree—it sounds like a recipe for soil depletion and disease), was attractive to Cobbett, not only 
because of what he learned from it, but because of what it retroactively confirmed in his own 
experience. In 1822, Cobbett republished The Horse-Hoeing Husbandry with a long preface that 
amounted to an account of his own experiments with the Tullian method in 1813-14. The 
experiments are less than conclusive, but Cobbett, as with the Year’s Residence, apparently felt that the 
best way of conveying knowledge about Tull’s system was to re-write it as a life narrative.  
 But Cobbett’s motivations for republishing The Horse-Hoeing Husbandry surpass the simple 
wish for the diffusion of agricultural knowledge: 
I have derived so much pleasure, and so much real advantage from the reading of 
this work, that I cannot help wishing to see it in the hands of others. I was born and 
bred amongst affairs of gardening and farming. I had read a great deal too about 
them; but, till I read TULL, I knew nothing of the principles. But what struck me 
most forcibly, when I came to read TULL, was, that all that I had read before, that 
had any thing like principle in it, had been stolen from him; shockingly disfigured 
indeed; but still, whatever there was of good was his.54 
 
Here we find an appeal to direct experience motivated by an unexpected bond of sympathy. Cobbett 
wishes to see the ideas of Tull treated fairly and honestly—to make his “shockingly disfigured” 
knowledge, the only knowledge that Cobbett had ever gathered from other texts, whole again. 
Cobbett claims Tull as a predecessor by appropriating Tull’s works and making them a literal part of 
his own experience. But this also requires defending him from detractors and plagiarizers. While 
Cobbett actually cut much of Tull’s original text that would seem incorrect or useless to his 
contemporary readers, he included all of Tull’s notes and letters refuting criticisms and charges of 
plagiarism by Tull’s contemporaries. Reprinting The Horse Hoeing Husbandry and spreading Tull’s 
ideas, then, were just as much about the ideas themselves as saving Tull’s personal reputation. One 
can see that Cobbett is anxious to champion Tull, and as we will see with Cobbett’s reactions to 
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Arthur Young’s works, this is probably because Cobbett worried about whether he, too, would have 
a champion after his own death. 
 In her chapter on Cobbett in Rural Scenes and National Representation, Elizabeth Helsinger 
discusses Cobbett’s relationship to Young’s earlier texts. By 1819, a year before Young’s death, 
Cobbett published his first agricultural work, A Year’s Residence in the United States of America, and, 
Helsinger claims, began to deliberately shape his career as “Young-with-a-difference.”55 Cobbett 
began agricultural tours in 1822, as Young had done nearly 70 years before; he switched the focus of 
his long-running newspaper, The Political Register, to mainly agricultural and rural affairs (Young was 
known for his own long-running periodical, The Annals of Agriculture); and Cobbett published his 
own Cottage Economy (1822) to match Young’s Rural Oeconomy (1774), with the difference being that 
Cobbett’s didacticism was aimed at the cottager, rather than gentleman farmer. 
 But what was the purpose of Cobbett’s more or less replacing Young’s publications with his 
own? For Helsinger, the answer lies in thinking about the two authors in a national, political 
framework. Young, in his role as the Secretary of the Board of Agriculture, advocated protective 
tariffs on imports and exports. He also published books about the state of agriculture on the 
Continent and the United States, in order to show how Britain’s agriculture might be improved. 
Cobbett also, as Helsinger proves, directly links agricultural practices to politics.56 And, of course, it 
was not until later in his career, when he was also publishing agriculturally, that he ran for, and 
finally won, a seat in the House of Commons. For Helsinger, Cobbett’s Young-with-a-difference 
publications “[describe] a country that cannot be read for its national meanings according to 
Young’s assumptions.”57 That is, Cobbett produces an England whose rural injustice and suffering 
cannot be downplayed, as Young often did; it cannot be alleviated by indirect means such as the 
protective tariffs Young proposed, but rather needed to be addressed directly through curbing 
inflated rents and making landowners share more of their agricultural profits with laborers. 58 
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 While I agree with Helsinger about the similarity of Young and Cobbett’s careers, and the 
certain political motivations behind Cobbett’s appropriation of Young’s publications for his own 
means, I want to suggest that Cobbett does not see himself as Young-with-a-difference in political 
terms only. I want to return to a long passage in the remarkable chapter on “Ruta Baga Culture” in 
A Year’s Residence, which Helsinger reads in order to begin thinking about Young and Cobbett’s 
literary-agricultural relationship, as Cobbett saw it. The mention of Young comes during a digression 
on the Board of Agriculture.  
The Board has for its Secretary Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG, a man of great talents, bribed 
from his good principles by this place of five-hundred pounds a year. But Mr. 
YOUNG, though a most able man, is not always to be trusted. He is a bold asserter, 
and very few of his statements proceed upon actual experiments.59 
Young has been co-opted politically, but Cobbett’s syntax suggests (“he has been bribed, but he is 
not always to be trusted”) that the co-optation is not the reason why readers should mistrust him. 
Rather, it is Young’s tendency to assert agricultural truths in his writing without founding them upon 
experimentation that makes his knowledge so suspect.  
 Cobbett then proceeds from Young’s personal writings to those of the Board: 
And, as to what the Board has published, at the public expense, under the name of 
Communications, I defy the world to match it as a mass of illiterate, unintelligible, 
useless trash. The only paper, published by this Board, I ever thought worth keeping, 
was an account of the produce from a single cow, communicated by Mr. CRAMP, the 
jail-keeper of the County of Sussex; which contained very interesting and wonderful 
facts, properly authenticated and stated in a clear manner.60 
 
Cobbett’s gleefully satirical tone here may not provide the best reflection of his true thoughts on the 
Board and its publications, but this passage does begin to get at Cobbett’s own criteria for 
trustworthy agricultural writing. Facts, even if they are interesting and wonderful, must be “properly” 
authenticated and “clearly” stated, although what Cobbett means by this is not entirely clear. Ten 
pages later, another digression introduces the topic of Mr. Cramp’s cow again. This time, we find 
that the proper authentication includes meticulous records of the milk his cow produced over a five 
year period, as well as of the costs of keeping her.(See figure 5.)61  
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 Despite the violence of Cobbett’s rhetoric about the Board, and his antagonistic views 
toward Young, there exists nevertheless an imaginative sympathetic interest on Cobbett’s side of the 
relationship. After his rant about the Board, Cobbett continues: 
Arthur Young is blind, and never attends the Board. Indeed, sorrowful to relate, he is 
become a religious fanatic, and this in so desperate a degree as to leave no hope of any 
possible cure. In the pride of our health and strength of mind, as well as body, we 
little dream of the chances and changes of old age. Who can read the “Travels in 
France, Spain, and Italy,” and reflect on the present state of the admirable writer’s 
mind, without feeling some diffidence as to what may happen to himself!62 
 
While Cobbett distances Young’s conversion by treating it as if were a type of physical (blindness) or 
mental (dementia) health condition—in which the patient has no choice—he is still unable to 
consider it disinterestedly. Being Young-with-a-difference carries the risk of becoming Young-the-
same. Cobbett has established a link of sympathy by reading and writing agricultural texts; and if he 
attempts both to violently discredit the Board’s publications under Young, and to even replace 
Young’s texts with his own, he does so at the cost of being unable to disentangle himself from the 
writings of others. 
 If Cobbett needed to retroactively claim the experience of Tull in order to justify coming to 
agricultural writing so late in life, then the chilling prospect of replicating Arthur Young’s old age 
seemed to goad him into writing more. Even if one’s agricultural writing is free from defect, will that 
save one from blindness, isolation, and sad religious fanaticism? Will it save one’s work from being 
plagiarized and disfigured after death? The anxieties that Cobbett’s relationships with Tull and 
Young raise are so dismal in part because they are so personal. But as we look to the works of 
William Marshall, we will see if a wider scope of sympathy and appropriation can be more effective. 
 
William Marshall and the Self-Practice of Agriculture 
 William Marshall was without doubt Arthur Young’s greatest rival agriculturalist. Despite the 
fact that he is only read by specialists today, history seems to have come down on Marshall’s side. 
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Young and his method of touring came under criticism in its own time. According to his 
contemporaries, Young would traverse each county very quickly, getting most of his information 
from local farmers and laborers, some of whom deliberately misled him.63 The publications of the 
Board issued under Young’s tenure—particularly the agricultural surveys of every county in England 
and Scotland, each called A General View of the Agriculture of that country—were also considered 
suspect documents, Cobbett’s virulent rhetoric aside. The tours that the General Views were based 
upon were undertaken in just a few weeks, often by men who had no actual experience with 
farming.64 Not all of the blame is to be laid at the feet of Young, however: although he may have 
invented the genre of the agricultural tour, it was mostly Sir John Sinclair who pushed it to this 
extreme. However, both Young and the Board found one of their most vocal opponents in 
Marshall. In general, county reports were suspect to Marshall, despite the fact that he had produced 
a few of his own. He saw no point in reporting on agriculture as if weather and soil were beholden 
to the arbitrary political boundaries of counties. While he was deeply interested in how the political 
economy of each county worked, he saw no use in touring a single county as if it provided a 
complete view of the conditions of agriculture in that part of the country. By the 1790s, he had 
come to the conclusion that reports should be undertaken by regions of climate and landscape, not 
political boundaries. His methods, as a result, are seen as more correct in the eyes of agricultural 
historians. Marshall’s version of agricultural writing is closer to what we would consider a sound and 
thoroughgoing scientific investigation, whereas Young, by contrast, is usually viewed as a somewhat 
flighty improver whose main interest was in “progress” and who did not have the patience for the 
day to day business of farming.65  
Marshall was born in 1745 to an old family of yeoman farmers, in the Vale of Sinnington, 
Yorkshire. After trying out various trades as a teenager and young man, he returned home upon his 
father’s death and made the decision to devote the rest of his life to the theory and practice of 
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agriculture. Marshall was forthright, stubborn, and often difficult to work with. Although his 
opinions about agriculture, landscape design, and estate stewardship were well-respected and highly 
sought-after, he usually had strained relations with colleagues, employers, and employees, even to 
the point of blows.66 Marshall’s writing has more in common with Cobbett’s rhetorical style than 
perhaps any other agricultural writer—boldly convoluted, cantankerous, and peppered with 
aggressive italics and capitalized words. Marshall’s entrance into the world of agricultural publishing 
was no exception to his combativeness.  
Beginning with his first publication, the Minutes of Agriculture, Marshall differed with Young 
about methods for gathering agricultural knowledge. However, despite Marshall’s emphasis on 
comprehensive knowledge that is gathered first hand, he still considered life-writing the appropriate 
place to begin, since anything by an agricultural writer, he claims, “will be credited or discredited in 
proportion to his education, his character, and connexions in life.”67 The “minutes” (that is, small 
memoranda) that form the first half of the book are both a form of life-writing and the basis for the 
more general conclusions that Marshall draws in the second part of the work, the “digest” of the 
minutes. (There is no evidence that Cobbett had read Marshall, but this structure is very similar to 
that of A Year’s Residence.) This is why, after briefly recounting his life story, Marshall claims: 
It may be necessary to observe, that this long story has not been to introduced to give 
the Writer an opportunity of talking of himself, but of telling the Reader that the 
HEAD of this DIGEST are taken from that Sketch; [. . .] and that this DIGEST 
comprehends the whole (be it much or little) of the Author’s agricultural knowledge.68  
 
In other words, since Marshall’s autobiography and his knowledge of farming are inseparable, it is 
necessary for the reader to know both. As a whole, Marshall presents the Minutes as one of the few 
authentic pieces of agricultural writing because they are the product of personal experience and 
observation, situated within the larger context of his life. 
Even more revealing is Marshall’s opinion on the usefulness of touring. For Young, the act 
of leaving one’s closet or farm and transiently observing the practices of others constitutes sufficient 
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personal experience for gathering agricultural knowledge. Marshall, on the other hand, has a much 
more rigorous definition of what counts as personal experience: 
How very little of that which is USEFUL, is to be acquired by Touring! I have rode on 
horseback four or five hundred miles; and, not withstanding I have been incessantly 
observant, and frequently inquisitive, I have not picked up more than four or five 
ideas worth bringing home. 
 The real state and present practice of ENGLISH AGRICULTURE is devoutly to be 
wished-for.—But it is not driving post thro’ any particular district; nor even riding in 
an open chaise twenty or thirty miles a-day, tho’ ever so inquisitive among “spirited 
Farmers,” masters of inns, hostlers, and boot-catchers; that will gain the 
AGRICULTURAL KNOWLEDGE of that district. Perhaps, nothing but 
 TWELVE MONTHS’ RESIDENCE, 
ACTUAL OBSERVATION, and 
 SELF-PRACTICE, is equal to the task.69  
 
This passage is one of several less-than-subtle stabs at Young throughout the book. Nonetheless, 
residence, direct observation, and “self-practice” was indeed the standard to which Marshall held 
himself. Travel was not sufficient for him; only residence would suffice. He could not let himself 
count on the words of others, but must observe everything closely for himself. He also believed that 
good farming could not be carried out by proxy, which is why he began writing the Minutes of 
Agriculture only when “He had long been convinced of the imbecility of BOOKS and presently 
discovered the unfitness of BAILIFFS.”70 It is in Marshall, much more so than in Cobbett and Young, 
that we see an ideology of knowledge that advocates the trappings of hard subjectivity and reliance 
on direct, embodied experience.  
 While Marshall began to build his reputation on early works like the Minutes, and a 
companion volume of Experiments, his life-goal was to produce a volume about the rural economy 
and farming practices of every region of England. He managed to publish volumes on Norfolk 
(1787), Yorkshire (1788), and Gloucestershire (1789), the midland counties (1790), and the southern 
counties (1799), always residing in each of these places for at least a year before allowing himself to 
publish the volumes. However, he ran out of cash eventually and could not find an organization that 
would provide him with funding. In the early 1790s, he began to think about institutional 
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agricultural education, and set about trying to form an agricultural college (an ambition he never 
fulfilled) and a national board of agriculture. It is this latter ambition that Marshall looked upon 
most bitterly in retrospect. 
Marshall credits himself with having given Sir John Sinclair the idea of forming the Board of 
Agriculture and Internal Improvement (this claim is somewhat dubious, but it is easy to see how it 
seemed so from Marshall’s point of view.) The idea for such a board was not unique to him, but he 
had discussed it with Sinclair several times. However, the Board was finally formed in 1793 with 
Sinclair as its president—a move that Marshall claims was done behind his back while Sinclair knew 
he was on the road between London and the highlands of Scotland for another agricultural trip. 
Marshall first heard of the Board’s formation upon receiving a letter from Sinclair, asking him to 
write a General View of the central Scottish highlands.71 In the meantime, Arthur Young was elected 
secretary to the Board, a move which Marshall took as a personal slight. Although Marshall 
cooperated with Sinclair’s request to publish a General View of the central Scottish highlands, he felt 
a personal enmity toward the Board, its president, secretary, and publications for the rest of his life. 
 As we have already seen, Marshall and Young—who oversaw the assembly and publication 
of the General Views, in addition to authoring several of them—had different notions about what 
qualified as the proper methods and conditions for the production of agricultural knowledge. 
Marshall’s general distrust of books and dislike of the county-boundary system of surveying were 
sure to set him against the General Views in the first place. 72 But instead of ignoring them, he took it 
upon himself to publish a digest and review of every single one—around 100 books. Over the last 
ten years of his life, he compiled this digest—cutting or ridiculing whatever was wrong or useless in 
a particular General View, and quoting whatever was correct or helpful.  These ended up making five 
volumes of 500-600 pages each. He finished it not long before his death, and considered it the 
capstone of his life’s work. 
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The reviews are a sleight of hand on Marshall’s part. His first several publications prided 
themselves on being the result of first-hand experience, practice, and record-keeping. They were, in 
some sense, an agricultural autobiography: Marshall deliberately moved to different places with a 
view to publishing these volumes, and literally made a life out of these agricultural endeavors. In this 
sense, the man who focused so much on experience at the expense of text succeeded, far more than 
Young or Cobbett, in making his experience into text. But, more remarkably, when the General Views 
began to flood the marketplace and Marshall feared that buyers would consider his texts to be 
interchangeable with them, he decided to filter them through his own life and make his own 
experience and knowledge the standard by which they were judged. In the end, the General Views 
seemed to be merged with those texts he himself had written out of his own experience. In the 
“Advertisement” to the review of the Southern Department, the last book he published before his 
death, he says 
The agents of the Board I have ever considered MY ASSISTANTS, and laborers in 
MY OWN FIELD. 
Notwithstanding, however, this interruption into my original design, [that is, 
not being able to carry out the surveys himself]—which, during the last forty years, I 
have held constantly in view, as my leading object in life [. . .] I despair not to 
accomplish it. The most important, and by far the most difficult part of it,—the 
registry of the existing practices of England, at the commencement of the nineteenth 
century—IS NOW FINISHED.73 
 
On one hand, this declaration reaches the extremes of egotism. The authors of the reports to the 
Board, whose works Marshall has spent thousands of pages correcting, mocking, and decimating, 
appear here as no more than his assistants. Marshall even takes the role of the landowner and casts 
the reporters as laborers in his field. On other hand, this statement is a profound acknowledgment 
of the 72-year-old Marshall’s limits as an agricultural writer and a human being.  By digesting their 
works and subjecting them to his own knowledge and expertise, Marshall has made the works of 
others part of his own life. Like Young’s Elements and Practice of Agriculture and Cobbett’s edition of 
Tull, Marshall’s Reviews make the case for their originality by pulling apart the works of others, 
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rearranging, and digesting them. The finality with which Marshall announced the end of the reviews 




WRITING and PLOUGHING are two different Talents; 
and he that writes well, must have spent in Study that 
Time, which is necessary to be spent in the Fields by 
him who would Master the Art of Cultivating them.  
To write effectually of Ploughing, one must 
not be qualified to write Learnedly. 
—Jethro Tull, 1731 
The aim of this chapter is not to suggest that agricultural reform in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Britain was a solitary endeavor. In fact, agricultural writers’ insistence on the sole 
validity of personal experience and their refusal to acknowledge each other’s work is strange, given 
the enormous cooperative effort by legislators, landowners, surveyors, and laborers to make the land 
as productive as possible. The number of agricultural societies appearing in the cities and towns of 
Britain mushroomed alongside the number of books on agriculture entering booksellers’ stalls. 
While there were only a handful of local agricultural clubs in existence before the 1760s, Nicholas 
Goddard estimates that over fifty sprang up by 1820, not including national organizations like the 
Board of Agriculture and Internal Improvement and the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, 
Manufactures, and Commerce.74 Furthermore, agricultural science itself does not stand alone, as 
even its early practitioners recognized, but is a composite science made up of botany, geology, 
chemistry, zoology, and meteorology.75 It is also easy to forget about those who actually did the 
work, and that while enthusiastic landowners and professionals may have been designing and writing 




Anyone who came to write about agriculture by the 1760s was already a late-comer. Late, as 
Tull suggests, because he had misspent his own life, taking too much time learning how to write 
rather than working his fields. And late because he arrived at the tail end of history, trying to correct 
and refine a practice that was thousands of years old. Or, as we might put it now, late because he 
spent too much time trying to transform an ancient practice into a body of modern knowledge. In 
the decades following the works I discuss here, agricultural science would be subsumed into 
chemistry, gaining more legitimacy.76 But between the first conception of agriculture as a science in 
the 17th and 18th centuries and its transformation into a branch of chemistry in the mid-19th 
century—that is, in the gap between becoming modern knowledge and the prominence of 
objectivity—selfhood and personal experience were the surest proof of knowing for those who 
described and experimented with modern agricultural practice.  The only recourse was, as Kames 
said, to take heart and begin again in the darkness with that slenderest thing: “I.” In the final 
chapter, we will see that “I” of the author disappear almost completely in Jane Austen’s Mansfield 
Park and instead we will see narrative, not as the telling of a life story, but as the orchestration of 




Fig. 1: “The expence of an Ox twelve years.” Kames, Henry Home, Lord. The gentleman farmer. Being 
an attempt to improve agriculture, by subjecting it to the test of rational principles. The second edition, with 




Fig. 2: “27. April, 1775.” William Marshall. Minutes of agriculture. London, 1778. British Library. 





Fig. 3: “Extent of Arable and Pasture Lands.” William Pitt. General view of the agriculture of the county of 
Northampton, London, 1809. Kress Library of Business and Economics, Harvard University. The 




Fig. 4: “Pease. Profit and Loss.” Young, Arthur. A Course of Experimental Agriculture. Volume 1. 




Fig. 5: “The fifth Year’s Account of the Produce of Milk and Butter, &c. from a Cow, the property 
of Mr. William Cramp.” Communications to the Board of Agriculture. Parts I. and II. Volume 7. London, 
1797. British Library. Eighteenth Century Collections Online.   
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Mansfield Park’s Grounds of Knowledge 
 
The literary methods of knowledge-production we have seen so far arose from the 
assumption that the task of writing is to represent the world from a coherent set of beliefs about 
how knowledge is made. These methods, whether employed by poets, philosophers, natural 
historians, or agriculturalists, differ in the needs they stemmed from and the effects they produced, 
but they are all characterized by forging a link between verisimilitude, beliefs about knowledge, and 
aesthetic or generic expectations. Thus in Chapter One, through the transition from the poetry of 
the 1740s to the 1770s and beyond, we saw the “natural” poetic style of Collins and the Wartons 
concerned with the question of whether or not the material world can be represented in poetry. In 
Chapter Two, we saw two different finely honed methods of representation emerge out of this new 
tradition: Charlotte Smith’s notes and John Clare’s descriptions. In both of these methods we can 
see, however, that Smith and Clare were less concerned with representation per se, but how those 
methods conveyed a sense of direct experience to the reader. In Chapter Three, agriculturalists 
constructed data not only in the form of facts and figures, but also in memoir and detailed 
witnessing in order to gain admission into agricultural discourse. In all of these cases, the changing 
representational practices we have seen are a reflection of not only beliefs about how real 
environments, animals, and plants should be rendered, but about how the mind of the reader can 
recognize them.  
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All of these pieces of literature have another commonality, until now unspoken: a single 
focal point for the dissemination of knowledge, whether it is an agriculturalist telling his life story or 
the solitary voice of descriptive, lyric, and didactic poetry. The transmission of knowledge in these 
cases, however it is accomplished, passes directly from a single-voiced text to the reader. But how do 
practices of knowledge production function in literature whose environments and the subjects who 
move in them are avowedly unreal, and in which each of those subjects has his or her own stake in 
making knowledge? The task of this last chapter is to understand the representation of environment 
as a knowledge making practice in an important, if idiosyncratic novel: Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park 
(1814.) By the end of the eighteenth century, the novel as a genre self-consciously adopted a 
representational aesthetic which carried its own set of philosophical problems and possibilities.1 But 
Mansfield Park is a stubborn novel in that it refuses to play along with many of the conventions of 
fiction. By means of its unappealing heroine and boring storyline, the novel draws attention to itself 
as a piece of fiction, rather than allowing the reader to seamlessly enter the world of its characters. In 
doing so, the novel both upholds and exposes the workings of narrative in representing the “real” 
and conveying knowledge about it. 
As the well-educated daughter of a farming clergyman, Austen lived in a world not that 
different from, say, Charlotte Smith or Arthur Young.2 Like other authors I have discussed, she 
draws on picturesque and other discourses of landscape description, natural history, natural 
theology, and agricultural writing throughout her novels.3 However, the way in which these systems 
of making knowledge function in her fiction differ from any of the works we have read so far. In 
this final chapter, we will turn to a mode of knowledge-production where knowledge of the 
environment most often passes from character to character without direct reference to the reader’s 
edification. Environmental knowledge in Mansfield Park exists not in the well-trodden pathways of 
character development and plot, but in the unswept corners of narrative. 
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In this chapter, considerations of method are more salient than considerations of genre. I do 
not read Mansfield Park as an exemplar of its genre. To do so would be to gloss over its un-novel-like 
qualities, the places in which it frustrates the expectations of fiction readers and seems more 
interested in toying with its own conventions than telling an interesting story with interesting 
characters. Mansfield Park is the most appropriate of Austen’s novels for thinking about environment 
and the knowledge of it but not because landscape gardening and aesthetics are more important to 
its plot than that of any of her other novels. Rather, it is because of how environmental details are 
rendered by the novel’s narrative style. Despite the great amount of detail about vegetation and 
agriculture included in the novel, Mansfield Park is not interested in land or landscape itself, but is 
interested in how characters see and know it. This is a reflection of Austen’s most consistent artistic 
problem: how does knowledge about people and things pass through the channels, not of official 
information or private conversation, but through of, observation, and movement in the world? 
Much has been said about environment and landscape as they appear thematically in Mansfield Park, 
although this focus usually leads back to irresolvable questions about the novel’s ethical and political 
commitments.4 I am looking to Austen, then, not for moral endorsements, but to understand how 
environmental knowledge works in a representation of multiple viewpoints and consciousnesses, a 
representation in which the narrator calls upon the reader’s attention in some places and at other 
times compels us to look away.  
My treatment of the actual, thematically environmental scenes will dwell less on Mansfield 
Park’s more famous moments and will focus on details incidental to the plot: Dr. Grant’s apricot 
tree, a few parsonage hedges, the roads between Mansfield and Sotherton, and the thing that 
underlies them all: soil. I will first look at some circumstances surrounding the writing and reception 
of Mansfield Park before moving on to the distribution of knowledge within the story itself.  Then I 
will look at two episodes in the novel that show how the reader is allowed to gather information 
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about Mansfield Park’s environs—that is, indirectly through the conversation of characters. 
Afterward, I will specifically examine the strange incidences of soil being mentioned in the novel and 
read them alongside contemporary agricultural reports about the soil in Northamptonshire, the 
county in which Mansfield Park is set.5 By doing so, I am not simply setting the mentions of soil in 
their historical context but showing the stakes of making knowledge in fiction versus public 
scientific works.6 
 
Novel-writing, Fact-gathering, and “good Sense” 
On the eve of Emma’s publication, Austen wrote to James Stanier Clarke, the Prince 
Regent’s librarian, to confirm that an advance copy would be sent to the royal household. She also 
responded to and politely declined his suggestion that in a future novel she include the character of a 
clergyman who is “Fond of, & entirely engaged in Literature—no man’s Enemy but his own.”7 
Austen claimed to be “quite honored” by his proposal, but as to being able to execute it,  
I assure you I am not. [. . .] Such a Man’s Conversation must at times be on subjects 
of Science & Philosophy of which I know nothing—or at least be occasionally 
abundant in quotations & allusions which a Woman, who like me, knows only her 
own Mother-tongue & has read very little in that, would be totally without the power 
of giving. [. . .] And I think I may boast myself to be, with all possible Vanity, the 
most unlearned, & uninformed Female who ever dared to be an Authoress.8 
 
Those who knew Austen knew that she liked to both assert and exaggerate her ignorance.9 While her 
“boast” to Clarke is obviously tongue-in-cheek, she offers no correctives to it, allowing it to end the 
letter. Clarke has no choice but to acquiesce and ask for “an English Clergyman after your fancy.”10 
Austen’s tactical use of real or pretended ignorance gives her the power to disoblige herself from 
Clarke’s request, which, coming from someone connected to the royal household, might have 
otherwise been difficult to refuse.  
However, despite its practical use in this context, the ignorance of science, philosophy, and 
literature that Austen wields has its basis in the belief that fiction and characterization must be 
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founded on real, recognizable knowledge. In the words of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, although I am 
putting them to very different use here, “ignorances, far from being pieces of the originary dark, are 
produced by and correspond to particular knowledges and circulate as part of particular regimes of 
truth.”11 What Austen does not know is controlled by what she does know, and by accepted means 
of making and disseminating knowledge. Fiction is indeed embedded in “regimes of truth.” Within 
the narratives themselves, the knowledge that Austen’s characters profess must be controlled by the 
act of storytelling. It would not do for a fictional clergyman to speak of things that Austen herself, 
or her narrator at least, would be “without the power of giving.” While well-read gentlemen and 
highly accomplished women do appear in her fiction, Clarke’s clergyman is impossible because by 
the rights of probability in human behavior, a man “Fond of, & entirely engaged in Literature” must 
always be talking of it. Austen’s sense of the probability of character is what allows her to see how 
such a character must be rendered, and her probability of learning leads her to believe she could 
never render him convincingly. Austen’s refusal to include Clark’s clergyman for want of knowledge 
is much like Charlotte Smith’s omission of Henrietta O’Neill’s poem from the 5th edition of Elegiac 
Sonnets on the grounds of its natural historical errors. (See Chapter Two.) In both cases, aesthetic 
successes must be sacrificed to correctness of facts. Correctness was certainly a concern for Austen 
as it related to novelistic probability. But while much has been said about probability and possibility 
as they relate to people and social structures in her work, less has been said about the probability of 
what these people know, not only from books, but about the environments in which they live.  
 Contrary to what Austen’s refusal of Clarke’s advice suggests, however, she did not limit 
herself to writing about what she already knew. From a January 1813 letter to her sister Cassandra, 
we know that she was using her network of personal connections to obtain information about at 
least two factual matters while she was writing Mansfield Park: the process of ordination in the 
Church of England and the agricultural status of Northamptonshire, where the novel is mainly set. 
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After comparing the lengths of Sense and Sensibility with the soon to be published Pride and Prejudice, 
she changes the topic to the novel she was currently writing, eventually to become Mansfield Park. 
—Now I will try to write of something else;—it shall be a complete change of 
subject—Ordination. I am glad to find your enquiries have ended so well.—If you cd 
discover whether Northamptonshire is a Country of Hedgerows, I shd be glad 
again.12 
 
We do not know the exact outcome of either of Cassandra’s inquiries, but as we will see below, 
Mansfield Park contains several incidental details about hedgerows. In her attention to land use, 
Austen has filled Mansfield Park with consistently imagined details, giving the effect of reality similar 
to Smith or Clare’s. But the novel is selective in what it portrays—while fields, roads, gardens, and 
landscaped grounds appear often and the Portsmouth seaside and the stars are briefly described, 
there are almost no animals but game birds and horses; very little in the way of detailed landscape 
description; and no clearly defined flowers or trees except Lady Bertram’s roses and the Grants’ 
apricot tree. This is not a novel that concerns itself with natural history, or with portraying anything 
like a complete ecosystem. For better or worse, Austen’s novel is not concerned with the kind of 
biological and geological diversity we see in Smith and Clare, who take it upon themselves to 
describe and catalogue the many types of life forms within their purview whether their readers 
wanted them to or not. 
At the time of Mansfield Park’s composition, Austen was thinking of the different purposes 
of fiction in not only entertaining but edifying her audience. In writing to Cassandra a week later, 
Austen spoke of her dissatisfaction with Pride and Prejudice, which had just been published and was 
circulating among the periodical press as well as among families in her neighborhood.  
The work is rather too light & bright & sparkling;—it wants shade;—it wants to be 
stretched out here & there with a long Chapter—of sense if it could be hand, if not 
of solemn specious nonsense—about something unconnected with the story; an 
Essay on Writing, a critique on Walter Scott, or the history of Buonaparté—or 
anything that would form a contrast [with] the playfulness and Epigrammatism of 




What Austen means by “sense” is ambiguous—does she mean a kind of religious or moral 
seriousness? Does she mean less outlandish characterization? Useful models for female conduct? It 
is hard to say, but it is telling that the second-best alternative to sense, “solemn specious nonsense,” 
is nonfiction: instruction, literary criticism, and history. That Austen never seriously entertained the 
idea of inserting nonfiction into her novels is apparent to anyone who has read them. But she was 
clearly thinking about the relationship between fiction and nonfiction, and the latter’s usefulness to 
the former. Later on in this chapter I will read Mansfield Park alongside a particular genre of 
nonfiction—contemporary agricultural reports—but the important thing to note here is that 
Austen’s projected inclusion of nonfiction would be primarily for aesthetic effect rather than the 
edification of the reader. So was Mansfield Park a book of sense? Austen herself seemed to think so. 
She corrected the “too light & bright & sparkling” nature of Pride and Prejudice with the more solemn 
and serious Mansfield Park, and Emma, it seems, was an effort to steer a middle course between the 
lightness of the one and the gravity of the other. At least this is how it appeared to her when she 
confessed to James Stanier Clarke, in the same letter quoted above, her anxiety about having done 
so: “I am very strongly haunted by the idea that to those Readers who have preferred P&P. it will 
appear inferior in Wit, & to those who have preferred MP. very inferior in good Sense.”14 
 
Story, Character, and Narrative Method 
The plot of Mansfield Park is a fairly simple one, and it may be helpful to ground ourselves in 
the larger arcs of the story before focusing on the details. The novel begins when the 9-year-old 
Fanny Price is taken from her crowded family home in Portsmouth to live with her wealthy relatives, 
the Bertrams of Mansfield Park, Northamptonshire. The family includes Sir Thomas and Lady 
Bertram, Lady Bertram’s scolding, busybody sister Mrs. Norris, and four children: Tom, Edmund, 
Maria, and Julia. Timid and trampled-upon, Fanny grows up alongside and falls in love with 
150 
 
Edmund despite the caution that the Bertrams have taken to prevent her rising above her station to 
marry either son. When Fanny is eighteen, Henry and Mary Crawford, a rich and fashionable brother 
and sister, move into the neighborhood. Edmund, oblivious to Fanny’s feelings, falls in love with 
Mary, who gives him mixed signals because as a clergyman and second son he will not have a 
fortune large enough to support her lavish lifestyle. Meanwhile, Henry begins to dally with the 
feelings of both Bertram sisters—even though Maria is already engaged to the rich and stupid Mr. 
Rushworth—and unequivocally rejects both when he loses interest. The jilted Maria marries 
Rushworth and takes Julia to London with her for the social season. Henry then decides to amuse 
himself by returning to Mansfield Park and making Fanny fall in love with him. Fanny, still in love 
with Edmund and disgusted with Henry’s behavior toward her cousins, refuses his advances. But in 
the process of pretending to favor Fanny with his attentions, Henry actually falls in love with her 
and makes a serious proposal of marriage which she rejects. Sir Thomas, unaware that Henry had 
been toying with his daughters and angry that Fanny would reject a proposal by a wealthy man, 
sends her to Portsmouth for an extended family visit for the first time since she arrived at Mansfield. 
Fanny returns to her family only to be distressed at how dirty, noisy, and uncouth they are. While 
she waits out her time at Portsmouth, news of the Bertrams’ great scandal breaks: Maria has run 
away with Henry and Julia has eloped with a foppish friend of her brother Tom’s. Mary Crawford, 
who sees the incident as “folly,” rather than “sin,” disgusts Edmund enough that he breaks off all 
contact with her. Fanny, vindicated in her rejection of Henry, vastly favored by Sir Thomas over his 
own two daughters, and without a rival in love, returns home. In time, Edmund falls in love with her 
and they marry happily. 
 Despite its fairy tale ending, Mansfield Park is notoriously the least favored among readers of 
Austen’s novels, and for this fact the blame has usually been laid at the feet of Fanny Price. Fanny 
lacks the wit and charm of other Austen heroines, particularly the “light & bright & sparkling” 
151 
 
Elizabeth Bennett of Pride and Prejudice. Instead, her defining characteristics are her close observation 
of other people and fully-formed ethical sense, which make her able to discern the motives of others 
with a quickness that no one else in the novel shares. She combines this acuity with traits that nearly 
undermine it at every turn, and which in themselves do not endear her to most: timidity, self-doubt, 
and passivity, even when resisting the urgings of others to abandon her principles.15 But readers’ 
dislike for Fanny may have less to do with her personality itself, than what her personality reveals 
about her place in the book’s narrative and social structures. Fanny, upon arriving at Mansfield Park 
as a child, was “too little understood to be properly attended to” by the wealthy, handsome, and 
well-adjusted Bertram family; at the same time, she herself “could not cease to fear, [but] began at 
least to know their ways, and to catch the best manner of conforming to them.”16 Edmund soon 
proved to be the only person who cared enough to learn about her inner life, and this pattern 
changes little over the years of her residence at Mansfield. 
While Fanny’s thoughts and feelings remain opaque to those who have nothing to lose 
through their ignorance, her place in the Bertram family is dependent upon knowing and 
conforming to its expectations. Therefore, her extraordinary powers of observation stem from years 
of fearful conformity and complete dependence upon others. In Fanny, we see a kind of double 
consciousness, a reminder that those on the margins of a society are ultimately its knowledge-
bearers.17 While Fanny’s consciousness is not fused with the narrator’s, she is our focalizer for much 
of the novel, and therefore reading it can be as painful of an experience for us as living it is for her. 
We are often left, like Fanny, to observe the most unpleasant and uninteresting goings-on, to hear 
conversations that are not meant for her benefit, and barely for ours. And, like Fanny, we see things 
that her ultra-sensitivity reveals but to which the other characters are oblivious. This chapter, then, is 
also arranged according to these narrative situations. The first half focuses on two episodes which 
are lengthy but incidental to the plot, the kind of talk that one would be forced to overhear at dinner 
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and card parties: the Grant/Norris argument about an apricot tree, and Henry Crawford’s account 
of his discovery of Thornton Lacey. In the second half, I will turn to accounts of Fanny’s own 




Despite the lack of ecological diversity in Mansfield Park, land use and landscape gardening 
are among the few reliable subjects of polite conversation among the Mansfield social circle. This 
makes sense for political reasons, given that the wealth and interests of the characters are land-
based, but unlike many other critics I find discussions of landscape gardening to be resistant to easy 
political interpretation. This resistance to interpretation has to do both with how details about the 
land are narrated, and the fact that the substance of conversations about landscape is mostly about 
modes of knowledge, intelligence, and inquiry. The most famous scenes having to do with landscape 
in the novel—Mr. Rushworth’s tentative plans to hire Humphry Repton, Fanny’s long-distance view 
of Mary Crawford riding her mare, and the scene at the Sotherton haha—can all be read in this light, 
but I would instead like to draw attention to two conversations about landscape that bring problems 
of knowledge to the forefront. 
It makes sense to begin with Henry Crawford, the only character who combines enthusiasm 
for landscape and estate improvement with enough taste, intelligence, and funds to manage it. We 
know that he has already made improvements to his own estate in Norfolk: “I had not been of age 
three months before Everingham was all that it is now. My plan was laid at Westminster—a little 
altered perhaps at Cambridge, and at one and twenty executed.”18 Upon learning this, Mr. 
Rushworth, before quite realizing that Henry is his love rival, invites him to his 700-acre estate 
Sotherton Court as a consultant. The trip ends badly for most involved as Henry’s mission evolves 
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into a flirtation with Maria Bertram in front of her fiancé and on her fiancé’s land. But if Henry fails 
to come through when asked for his advice, he is more than happy to give it when not asked. 
Later in the novel, after Maria and Rushworth are out of the picture for the moment, Henry 
takes up the topic of improvement again, which no one had dared to discuss since the day at 
Sotherton. While playing cards, Henry casually mentions to Edmund what had happened on their 
hunt the day before: 
They had been hunting together, and were in the midst of a good run, and at some 
distance from Mansfield, when his horse being found to have flung a shoe, Henry 
Crawford had been obliged to give up, and make the best of his way back. “I told 
you I lost my way after passing that old farm house, with the yew trees, because I can 
never bear to ask; but I have not told you what with my usual luck—for I never do 
wrong without gaining by it—I found myself in due time in the very place which I 
had a curiosity to see. I was suddenly, upon turning the corner of a steepish downy 
field, in the midst of a retired little village between gently rising hills; a small stream 
before me to be forded, a church standing on a sort of knoll to my right—which 
church was strikingly large and handsome for the place, and not a gentleman or half 
a gentleman’s house to be seen excepting one—to be presumed the Parsonage, 
within a stone’s throw of the said knoll and church. I found myself in short in 
Thornton Lacey.”19 
 
This, the novel’s most aesthetically and visually complete piece of landscape description, comes 
from Henry and not the narrator. Henry’s description is tightly visually controlled and his terms are 
specialized. The “steepish downy field” is a good example—in the OED there are only three 
examples of the use of each adjective (downy, in this case, meaning of the nature of downs) and 
Henry’s use of “steepish” is the first.20  Even when describing views from carriages or from the 
ramparts at Portsmouth, the narrator is never as particular in her language or exact in her placement 
of details as Henry is here. Austen’s narrators are certainly capable of such description—think of the 
description of Pemberley in Pride and Prejudice, for instance—so why is Henry Crawford is our great 
landscape descriptor? 
  Edmund seems to have a similar skepticism of Henry’s role as descriptor—as if Henry’s 
place in the social circle makes him an inappropriate disseminator of knowledge about Thornton 
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Lacey. After Henry delivers his triumphant description and gives Edmund room to reply, it becomes 
clear that before Thornton Lacey itself can become a topic of discussion, they must establish 
between them the means by which one can know it: 
“It sounds like it,” said Edmund; “but which way did you turn after passing 
Sewell’s farm?” 
“I answer no such irrelevant and insidious questions; though were I to 
answer all that you could put in the course of an hour, you would never be able to 
prove that it was not Thornton Lacey—for such it was.” 
“You inquired then?” 
“No, I never inquire. But I told a man mending a hedge that it was Thornton 
Lacey, and he agreed to it.” 
“You have a good memory. I had forgotten having ever told you half so 
much of the place.”21 
 
Edmund is not so ready to be swept up into Henry’s visual language: it may sound like Thornton 
Lacey, but that is no guarantee that it looks like, or is, Thornton Lacey. A verbal description, even 
one as aestheticized and well-constructed as Henry’s is not enough for Edmund to cede any ground. 
His cageyness is well-founded, since Henry’s arrogant declamations soon extend from definite fact 
into speculation as he follows with a torrent of radical and expensive landscape design suggestions: 
“The house must be turned to front the east instead of the north—the entrance and principal 
rooms, I mean, must be on that side [. . .] And there must be your approach—through what is at 
present the garden. You must make you a new garden at what is now the back of the house[.]”22 
Like his method of giving landscaping advice which brooks no dialogue or alteration, 
Henry’s mode of acquiring and disseminating knowledge does not allow for either asking or 
answering questions. Nonetheless, Henry is right—at least in knowing he found Thornton Lacey, if 
not his landscaping ideas. He tells both the man mending the hedge and Edmund that the place is 
Thornton Lacey and the narrator offers no greater authority than his. In his ability to understand 
that he has seen Thornton Lacey, Henry is superior to Edmund both in memory and intuition—“I 
had forgotten having ever told you half so much of the place.” It is important to remember that the 
reader never sees Thornton Lacey directly, even after Fanny moves there at the end of the story. We 
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may just as impotently put “irrelevant and insidious questions” to the novel about his description of 
it because we will never get a straight answer from the book. And while Henry’s refusal of inquiry is 
of a piece with the vanity of his character, it is impossible to fit his method of knowing landscape 
into any kind of moral schema of the book. In Henry Crawford, moral depravity is combined with 
probably the sharpest intellect and powers observation of any character, with the possible exception 
of Fanny. 
Importantly, it is only after a break in this exchange that the narrator interposes and provides 
us with knowledge of what Thornton Lacey even is. Once Edmund acquiesces, we learn: “Thornton 
Lacey was the name of his impending living, as Miss Crawford knew well.”23 “Living” means, in this 
case, the parsonage that Edmund will inhabit upon being ordained. The reader is the last one to 
know. In this order, we see Crawford’s description of Thornton Lacey’s situation and 
picturesqueness, find out that it has been the subject of previous, unrecorded conversations, and at 
only at last do we understand that it is Edmund’s future home. Our knowledge of landscape in this 
scene is not only mediated by the words of Crawford, but by the narrator, who sets it from us at 
several removes.  
 A similar dispute and reversal of narrative order occurs at the book’s first dinner party, in 
which the subject of landscape improvement initially appears. This is the scene in which Humphry 
Repton is mentioned and the Sotherton scheme is hatched, but of more interest to me is Dr. Grant’s 
and Mrs. Norris’ spat about the Moorpark apricot tree. Amidst the general talk of improving 
Sotherton Court, Mrs. Norris gives a long speech about the improvements that she and her late 
husband had done, or intended to do, when they lived at Mansfield parsonage, ending with a self-
serving compliment to Dr. Grant, the new incumbent. 
“We were always doing something, as it was. It was only the spring twelvemonth 
before Mr. Norris’s death that we put in the apricot against the stable wall, which is 
now grown such a noble tree, and getting to such perfection, sir,” addressing herself 
then to Dr. Grant. 
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 “The tree thrives well beyond a doubt, madam,” replied Dr. Grant. “The soil 
is good; and I never pass it without regretting that the fruit should be so little worth 
the trouble of gathering.” 
 
That the apricot tree thrives, and that the soil is grows in is good are the two agreed-upon articles 
here (as we will see, the quality of the parsonage’s soil is a matter of common knowledge, or at least 
agreement, among the inhabitants of Mansfield.) However, a great amount of ambiguity and dispute 
can grow from these earthly matters of fact. Mrs. Norris takes offense at Dr. Grant’s assessment of 
the fruits and responds, not with a defense of their taste, but with the matter nearest her miserly 
heart: 
 Sir, it is a moor park, we bought it as a moor park, and it cost us—that is, it 
was a present from Sir Thomas, but I saw the bill, and I know it cost seven shillings, 
and was charged as a moor park. 
 
Mrs. Norris does not attempt to dispute Dr. Grant’s taste—she does not even allow that differences 
of taste could occur, or that taste itself is a significant factor when considering the worth of the tree. 
Instead, she resorts directly to name and price, literal worth. If the tree is a Moorpark, and it 
certainly is because it was charged as a Moorpark, then the worth of its fruit cannot be disputed. Dr. 
Grant, on the other hand, considers his own taste to be, not only the arbiter of whether or not the 
fruit is good, but whether or not Mrs. Norris got Sir Thomas’ money’s worth. In a twist on the 
eighteenth century debates about the standard of taste, Dr. Grant seems to have solved this 
philosophical problem by assuming the universality of his own.24 
 “You were imposed on, ma’am,” replied Dr. Grant; “these potatoes have as 
much the flavor of a moor park apricot, as the fruit from that tree. It is an insipid 
fruit at the best; but a good apricot is eatable, which none from my garden are.” 
 “The truth is, ma’am,” said Mrs. Grant, pretending to whisper across the 
table to Mrs. Norris, “that Dr. Grant hardly knows what the natural taste of our 
apricot is; he is scarcely ever indulged with one, for it is so valuable a fruit, with a 
little assistance, and ours is such a remarkably large, fair sort, that what with early 
tarts and preserves, my cook contrives to get them all.” 
 
Following this stalemate between Dr. Grant’s appeal to his taste and Mrs. Norris’ appeal to price, 
Mrs. Grant interposes with her own “truth”: that apricots are valuable “with a little assistance,” that 
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whether or not the apricot tree is a Moorpark, the fruit from it is “a remarkably large, fair sort,” and 
that Dr. Grant does not know their true taste because they are made into tarts and preserves before 
he can eat any fresh. This intervention does not invalidate Dr. Grant’s account of the fruit, but is 
complimentary enough toward the tree that it preserves Mrs. Norris’ self-congratulations on the 
notion of the tree being a decided improvement to the property. While Dr. Grant and Mrs. Norris 
have no other recourse than forthrightly appealing to the authority of their choice, only Mrs. Grant 
has enough tact to make the truth effective—the fruits are valuable, but only when cooked with 
sugar, not for eating fresh. 
Mrs. Norris, who had begun to redden, was appeased, and, for a little while, other 
subjects took place of the improvements of Sotherton. Dr. Grant and Mrs. Norris 
were seldom good friends; their acquaintance had begun in dilapidations, and their 
habits were totally dissimilar.25 
 
Again, the narrator provides the reader with information necessary to fully understanding a 
conversation only after the conversation has passed. Mrs. Norris speaks for nearly two thirds of a 
page on the numerous improvements she and Mr. Norris had made to the parsonage grounds 
because in reality she had been forced to pay Dr. Grant dilapidation sums for damages incurred to 
the parsonage while the Norrises were resident.  
 The little apricot argument, then, has its roots in two philosophical problems: the problem 
of the standard of taste and the problem of how truth claims are warranted. Furthermore, these two 
problems are lodged both in character and narrative situation. Given that the tree was planted a year 
before Mr. Norris died and Mrs. Norris left the parsonage, Mrs. Norris has never personally 
experienced the taste of the apricots, since it often takes young transplanted fruit trees one or two 
years to bear fruit. Therefore, she relies too much on written knowledge (literally, the bill of sale) to 
make claims about something she has never experienced. Dr. Grant, on the other hand, knows what 
the fruit tastes like but relies too much on his own experience to make greater claims about the 
worth of the tree and whether or not Mrs. Norris was imposed on.  And while the authority to 
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which each party implicitly appeals during the dispute is the cause of the conflict, its root is that 
both Dr. Grant and Mrs. Norris are tactless know-it-alls. Only Mrs. Grant, “with a temper to love 
and be loved,” can tell the truth in an effective manner.26 
 
“The soil is good” 
 So Dr. Grant claims. But how does he know? And how would Austen or her readers know? 
While Austen never directly records the results of Cassandra’s inquiry about whether 
Northamptonshire is a country of hedgerows, she shows a remarkable acuity on the subject. Hedges 
are a common feature of property in the Northamptonshire of the novel. Thornton Lacey is 
surrounded with hedges, and Mrs. Grant’s shrubbery has been transformed into its current state 
from an old hedgerow. However, while hedges exist, the county has not been entirely and 
systematically enclosed, for Mansfield Common still exists, which we know because the young 
people excepting Fanny take a day trip to the Common early in the novel.27 In asking Cassandra 
about Northamptonshire’s hedgerows, Austen was after a clear picture of what the county is like 
agriculturally. Soil is mentioned twice more in the story, in each case connected with observations 
about the difference in interest and temperament between Fanny and Mary Crawford. First I want to 
look at each of these scenes, and then read them alongside James Donaldson’s General View of the 
Agriculture of the County of Northampton (1794) and agriculturalist William Pitt’s 1809 volume of the 
same name. 
On a chilly fall afternoon Fanny and Mary are sitting in the shrubbery outside Mansfield 
parsonage, where Mary lives with the Grants, her sister and brother-in-law. Much like Dr. Grant and 
Mrs. Norris, Fanny and Mary are “seldom good friends,” although Mary has little idea of Fanny’s 
antipathy toward her. Given the fact that they have nothing in common, their walks together feel 
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like a duty to Fanny and their conversations tend to be one-sided. On this occasion, Fanny muses 
aloud: 
Every time I come into this shrubbery I am more struck with its growth and beauty. 
Three years ago, this was nothing but a rough hedgerow along the upper side of the 
field [. . . ] and perhaps in another three years we may be forgetting—almost 
forgetting what it was before. How wonderful, how very wonderful the operations of 
time, and the changes of the human mind!28 
 
Fanny’s attention quickly jumps from the hedgerow-turned-shrubbery itself to her and others’ 
mental faculties in perceiving it. In thinking about the shrubs further, she states, “My uncle’s 
gardener says the soil here is better than his own, and so it appears from the growth of the laurels 
and evergreens in general” and marvels “that the same soil and the same sun should nurture plants 
differing in the first rule and law of their existence.29 
Fanny’s abstruse musings aside, from this passage we learn that there is a distinct difference 
between the soil of the main house and the parsonage, although they are very close together. But 
later on, we find that Fanny does not have to rely on her uncle’s gardener’s opinion, but can discern 
differences in soil with her own eyes. During the ill-fated trip to Sotherton, she had seen the soil 
from a moving carriage much as an agriculturalist would:  
Their road was through a pleasant country; and Fanny, whose rides had never been 
extensive, was soon beyond her knowledge, and was very happy in observing all that 
was new and admiring all that was pretty. She was not often invited to join the 
conversation of others, nor did she desire it. Her own thoughts and reflections were 
habitually her best companions; and in observing the appearance of the country, the 
bearings of the roads, the difference of the soil, the state of the harvest, the cottages, 
the cattle, the children [. . .].30 
 
Fanny’s observations, however delightful to her, do not offer much pleasure or information to us, 
particularly since we do not know by what criteria she is judging the soil to be “different.” The 
things she sees are as mundane as the narrator’s mode of describing them. As in Joseph Warton’s 
Enthusiast or John Clare’s descriptive poems, these observations are not arranged into a scene or 
vista; nor are they chronologically narrated as a set of particular encounters—two modes of natural 
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description found in much fiction of the period. Rather, they seem to have been removed from the 
site of Fanny’s perception and rearranged into classes. Because of this, Fanny’s observations, though 
odd, pass quickly and leave little impression. They seem, in fact, to be there for one purpose: to 
show the contrast between the thoughts of Fanny and those of Mary Crawford, who has nothing in 
common with her except a romantic interest in Edmund Bertram: 
[Fanny] found entertainment that could only have been heightened by having 
Edmund to speak to of what she felt. [. . .] [I]n everything but value for Edmund, 
Miss Crawford was very unlike her. She had none of Fanny’s delicacy of taste, of 
mind, of feeling; she saw nature, inanimate nature, with little observation; her 
attention was all for men and women.31 
 
The narrative here, even as it sympathizes with Fanny, seems to replicate Mary Crawford’s attitude 
toward the world—that is, it depicts nature as a boring, rote list of words and immediately directs 
our attention back to social interactions. While the narrator gives depth to Fanny’s character in this 
scene, the mundane list of observations does not present an appealing or sympathetic alternative to 
Mary Crawford’s social mindset. In fact, the things Fanny observes seem to have no purpose at all. 
Why is the reader presented with this information, then? I want to suggest that we may have a 
different understanding of landscape in Austen if we consider, not how it contributes to plot and 
character, but it how functions at the level of knowledge production. What does Fanny learn now 
that she is “beyond her knowledge,” and what, if anything, do her thoughts convey to us? Nothing 
very specific—just the quite needless information that there are such things in the 
Northamptonshire countryside as cottages, cattle, and children; and that the harvest is in progress, 
the countryside has an appearance, and the roads have bearings. “The difference of the soil,” which 
also appears among this offering of non-information, strikes one as a strange thing for a young, 
upper-class woman to notice. After all, how does Fanny know that the soil is different? For the rest 
of the chapter, I want to think through this strange instance of knowledge production and what it 
might mean for larger epistemological questions relating to the novel. 
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 Taking some time out to understand what agricultural discourse was like in Austen’s time 
will help us understand the stakes of making practical knowledge about the real—the agriculturalists’ 
goal—and creating an effect of the real, the novelist’s goal, at least in part.32 In the last chapter, we 
saw how agricultural writers in Austen’s time turned to various forms of life-writing to substantiate 
their scientific claims. In doing so, they drew not only upon the power of personal testimony, but 
also the power of narrative. Whether intentional or not, then, there is a cross-current between fiction 
and non-fiction here as they trade methods of knowledge production back and forth. While we have 
no direct evidence that Austen read agricultural writings, it is telling that the practical-minded John 
Martin of Emma “read the Agricultural Reports” but not Gothic novels, although many farmers 
would have probably thought of reports like the Communications to the Board of Agriculture or any of the 
General Views to be fanciful reading in themselves.33 
It is possible but not provable that Austen’s source of information came from one of the 
two General Views of Northamptonshire published by the Board of Agriculture and Internal 
Improvement. What she says about the soil and agriculture of Northamptonshire in the novel is 
entirely consistent with what these two books report, so she must have had a reliable source in any 
case. The first edition of the General View of the Agriculture of the County of Northampton (1794) was 
authored by the Scottish agriculturalist James Donaldson, about whom we know nothing except 
what can be gathered from his agricultural writings. Donaldson’s report on the soil is as follows: 
“There is great variety in the soil of this district, and several very distinct kinds are found in almost 
every parish or lordship.”34 He then goes on to sort the different kinds of soil into five classes, 
differentiating them by depth, color, and texture, and whether they are clayey, loamy, or sandy. 
Although Donaldson does not reveal his method of gathering information, it is likely that he 
followed the fashion of other agricultural writers of the day and surveyed the countryside from a 
carriage, in addition to consulting with locals. At any rate, the speed with which the Board published 
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the first set of reports prevented any reporter from an extended stay in the area on which he wrote 
about.35 We must conclude, then, that, to Donaldson, the soils of Northamptonshire are different 
enough to be readily separated and identified, even on cursory survey. 
After Donaldson’s Northamptonshire, the Board requested a second edition in 1797 and 
commissioned agricultural writer William Pitt to do the work. Pitt made two tours of the county and 
combined his own findings with direct quotes from Donaldson.36 The work was not published, 
however, until 1809 and, unlike most of the other General Views. Pitt’s first remarks on the soil of 
Northamptonshire are as follows: 
Mr. Donaldson has observed upon “the great variety in the soil of this district,” in 
which I cannot at all agree with him. The nature of the upland-soil is more uniform 
than I have ever before observed over so large an extent of country, so much so that 
it is impossible, by colouring a plan of the county, to discriminate the varieties.37 
 
Pitt corrects himself two pages later, saying that on his second tour, “I had observed several 
districts of lighter soil than I had generally noticed before. [. . .] The soil of the country has, 
therefore, a considerable variety, but seldom changes abruptly.”38 He then spends five pages 
describing the different kinds of soils and where they might be found in the county. 
The contradiction between Donaldson’s and Pitt’s accounts of the soil is, to say the least, 
unsettling. The quality and variability of soil, after all, should be a verifiable, positive scientific fact—
and yet here, their accounts can hardly be reconciled. Pitt’s explicit dialogue with Donaldson’s text 
brings the problems of knowledge in agricultural writing to the forefront. For the reporters to the 
Board, was there ever a method of gathering facts that did not turn out to be faulty? For the readers 
of these reports, the question of knowledge is just as fraught: since we know nothing about 
Northamptonshire soil to begin with, how can we ever trust the senses and writings of others? 
The naming and classification of soil at this time was non-standardized. In his Minutes of 
Agriculture, William Marshall enters into a discussion of how one might term soils, and as precise as 
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Marshall would like to be, we can see that there is still a great amount of room for vagueness here. 
(See Chapter Three for more on soil and William Marshall.) 
Soils are infinitely various; no two distinct portions being identically the 
same, in matter and state. 
All culturable Soils are Compounds, and consequently the ordinary 
distinctions are in some degree arbitrary; there being no such thing, in reality, as a 
cultured field of Clay, Sand, or Gravel: these terms are, nevertheless, very useful in 
Agriculture; as they convey strong ideas of very clayey, very sandy, and very gravelly Soils.39  
 
Marshall offers his own table of soil types, which includes fifteen names.40 But the methods of 
naming soil—particularly unimproved soil—were, even decades after Marshall wrote this, still 
complex. Here are just some of the names for different types of soil that are to be found in Volume 
4 of Communications to the Board of Agriculture, 1805: “a thin-skinned cold soil,” “a yellow brick earth,” 
“wet, sour, and very tender,” “thin skinned warren,” “stone brush and light loam,” “Strong surly 
Clay Soil,” “clay land of a poorish, sterile sort.” These terms are used alongside more 
straightforward descriptors like, “clay,” “sand,” and “loam.”41 In either case, these terms are 
scientific after their own fashion—descriptors like “strong,” “wet,” “sour,” “cold” had largely 
agreed-upon meanings among farmers and agriculturalists.  But there is one article in this volume 
that differs: Humphry Davy’s “On the Analysis of Soils, as connected with their Improvement.”42 
Davy was invited by Arthur Young to give many papers at Board meetings, and Davy’s discussion of 
soil in this case is quite prescient. Unlike his fellow correspondents, he limits himself to spare soil 
terminology: the basic types of soil and the chemicals and minerals they contain. Davy’s article was 
only one of several that Arthur Young invited him to prepare for the Board during the first two 
decades of the 19th century, and in the sharp contrast they form with the writings of the other 
agriculturalists, they are a fore-taste of soil-science’s subsumption into chemistry by the 1840s.  
Whether Austen would have read any of the available reports on Northamptonshire is 
impossible to know, but in any case Fanny’s observations read more like the table of contents to 
such a report than the detailed landscape description of eighteenth century poetry and fiction. And 
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whether or not Austen deliberately echoes agricultural discourse in this moment, I contend that 
agricultural writing is nevertheless relevant to our reading of this passage. Reading the novel 
alongside agricultural reports allows us to take the soil on its own terms, and rather than read 
Fanny’s recognition of the soil’s difference as a minor point of characterization, to recognize it as a 
place where the novel’s mechanisms of knowledge production become visible. 
 For Donaldson and Pitt, problems of knowledge center on empirical collection of data—
that is, how to perceive and report on the landscape in front of them with accuracy. Nobody 
questions that there is soil in Northamptonshire, or that it is a relevant topic of discussion for an 
agricultural report, but we do want to know its precise nature, rendered in terms as clear as possible. 
The problem for Austen is exactly the opposite—as I said above, Mansfield Park’s status as fiction 
frees it from nearly all expectation of empirical validity. However, it is difficult to understand why 
the soil is relevant to the novel at all, since it has such a small part in plot and characterization. Facts 
like these do not fit into a novel; they seem at odds with narrative style. The list of Fanny’s 
observations in which the soil is included has never been of much interest to critics, who often skip 
over it to the next sentence, which asserts Fanny’s “delicacy of taste, of mind, of feeling” in 
comparison to Mary’s social interests. Next to such a seductive and convincing statement about 
character, the landscape Fanny sees pales in comparison. Nevertheless, I want to resist jumping to 
the conclusion that the list simply exists to show Fanny’s virtuous, if boring, love of nature as 
compared to Mary’s unreflecting obsession with people. 
The soil feels so out of place because it is a surplus of knowledge whose origin and use are 
unknown. When we ask how Fanny has come to know about the soil, or how she can perceive its 
difference, we find that there is no answer. That is, the soil is evidence of learning, perception, and 
recognition for Fanny that nevertheless lies beyond the reach of our knowledge as readers. It shows 
us that our knowledge of the world of the novel is not commensurate with either that of the 
165 
 
narrator or of the characters. This is not to say that Mansfield Park’s soil is useless or irrelevant—on 
the contrary, it performs the important task of letting us know the limits of what we know as 
readers. Rather than forming part of the “background” that sets off the book’s plot and characters, 
the things Fanny sees in the countryside are part of a fully formed world of knowledge which 
thecharacters inhabit but into which the reader can never entirely assimilate. Our experience of the 
novel, then, is less like being fed factual information than inhabiting a situation of knowing (a 
moving carriage, perhaps?) whose horizons are clearly marked. 
The practice of reading across genres—or rather, holding the considerations of genre in 
suspension while we examine the philosophical problems attendant on textual production—is, I 
think, a necessary practice for reading Austen. I have attempted to do so, not simply to historicize or 
contextualize both Mansfield Park and Donaldson and Pitt’s reports (although they are important 
practices as well), but to throw the problems of fictional and empirical knowledge production into 
relief. Even if Austen is not burdened with representing the “real,” we can and should still attend to 
how she produces fictional knowledge and what we might make of fictional knowledge that seems 
otherwise useless. The contradiction in the writings of Donaldson and Pitt shows that we cannot 
afford to accept their agricultural writings—or perhaps those of anyone—without question. But, 
Fanny’s notice of the difference of the soil—made in passing with no elaboration or qualification—
demands that we take the difference of the soil for granted in a way that is not possible in real life. 
And even if we, as readers, know we must come to terms with our ignorance and take Fanny’s 
observation for granted because we have no other options, we still may know what kinds of 







In his essay “Jane Austen and the Enclosures,” Robert Clark asks: “Is it not strange that we 
never get to know what Austen’s characters see out of the carriage window?”43 Clark asks this 
question as a way of making visible what is generally absent from the carriage rides and landscapes in 
Austen’s novels: agricultural enclosures and the social upheaval they created. But his question rests 
upon two assumptions that Mansfield Park, as we have seen, works to wedge apart: first, that literary 
characters can see like real people if only their authors would let them, and second, that what the 
reader knows and what the characters see are tantamount to the same thing. The truth is that while 
we often see out of the carriage window in Austen’s novels, what we see may not always lend itself 
to our use. Just as not everything in Austen’s fiction, in the words of William H. Galperin, is 
“subject to that narrator’s acts of containment and interpretation,” not all the information in her 
novels is subject to our interpretation or understanding.44  
Mansfield Park is a novel that explicitly refuses to make environmental knowledge—that is, it 
refuses to give us detailed descriptions or natural historical detail—even as it engages with the 
question of what goes into making that knowledge. Unlike Smith and Clare, or Young, Cobbett, and 
Marshall, Austen shows us her sense of epistemic virtues, not in order to convey environmental 
knowledge to us, but to show us the limits of narrative in making that knowledge. “Let no one 
presume,” the narrator states in the novel’s concluding pages, contemplating Fanny’s happiness, “to 
give the feelings of a young woman on receiving the assurance of that affection of which she has 
scarcely allowed herself to entertain a hope.”45 Deft evasions such as these pepper Mansfield Park’s 
pages and chastise us for grandly assuming what it is that the novel presumes to convey, or the 
reader presumes to know. It is this check on presumption—ours and her own—that sets Austen 
apart from the other authors in this dissertation. For others, the presumption of knowing, however 
unfulfilled, forms the cornerstone of their translation of epistemic virtues into print. For Smith and 
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Clare, the seeming immediacy of their natural historical detail was in fact conditioned by complex 
understandings of what it means to mediate knowledge of the environment in a text. For Young, 
Cobbett, and Marshall, gaining credibility by making narratives out of their life experiences always 
led them back to the texts of others. But Austen, in her narrative twists and the unknown 
provenance of her characters’ knowledge, is explicit in her refusal to pretend at an unmediated 
encounter with environment through her novel. In her tentative explorations of how environmental 
knowledge can be represented in fiction, she comes closest to Collins and the Warton brothers’ 
working out what it means to represent our material world in poetry. While we may never presume 
to know the hedgerows and soil of Northamptonshire through the pages of Mansfield Park, Austen 
does something far more valuable in giving us a spacious field in which to contemplate the limits of 
our own environmental representations. 
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 Knowing Real Nature in Contemporary British Culture 
 Austen’s refusal to suggest that the landscapes of Mansfield Park are transcripts of the real is a 
reflection of long-standing and ongoing problems in British environmental thinking and writing. 
The question of whether and how works of writing and art represent the material world, far from 
being solved in the two hundred years between Mansfield Park’s publication and the present, have 
come to seem as urgent as ever. Despite the pleasantly landscaped estates of her novels, Austen lived 
in a time where human beings made drastic changes to the natural environment including the 
destruction of forests, draining of wetlands, and introduction of invasive species. Fanny’s whispered 
lament as she hears of Mr. Rushworth’s plans to cut down the oak avenue on his estate shows that 
environmental elegy was already a too-familiar genre of writing: “Cut down an avenue! What a pity! 
Does it not make you think of Cowper? ‘Ye fallen avenues, once more I mourn your fate 
unmerited.’”1 Even so, Austen only saw the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution, on the 
other side of which we mourn the fate unmerited of far more than avenues of oak trees. While 
environmental concerns have only grown in scale since Austen’s time, the epistemological concerns 
raised in Mansfield Park still persist. In this final section, then, I want to discuss the main ideas of this 
dissertation through their presence in two different examples of contemporary British culture.  
 
A Disappearing Real in the “New Nature Writing”? 
  In June of this year, English nature writer Mark Cocker published an essay, “Death of the 
Naturalist: Why is the ‘New Nature Writing’ So Tame?” in the New Statesman.2 Using Helen 
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MacDonald’s bestselling memoir H is for Hawk (2014), which describes how raising a Goshawk for 
falconry helped her regain her bearings after her father’s death, Cocker discusses the recent 
autobiographical turn of nature writing in Britain. The “new nature writing” he refers to is the 
renewed popularization of nature writing over the past decade. Writers like Richard Mabey, Robert 
MacFarlane, and Cocker himself, who dominate the genre, are serious naturalists but write about the 
environment by weaving natural history, ecology, and conservationism into personal narratives often 
centered on local landscapes and diminutive ecosystems, much in the tradition of Gilbert White’s 
Natural History of Selborne. Tim Dee, another English nature writer, describes this new trend by saying 
that 
New nature writing is modest. It has become apprehensive in both senses of the word. A 
cautious but knowing approach and retreat seems de rigueur. The new nature writer is 
personal and intimate and the opposite of the self-aggrandising big game hunter or 
summiteer. Recent books take various forms: memoirs, anthologies, essays, 
anthropologies, cultural geographies, travelogues and natural histories. Many of them 
combine several of these modes within their pages. They are commonly feral in feel.3 
 
 The (often white, male, middle-aged) new nature writer presents him or herself with humility, 
allowing natural historical knowledge to leak out through the cracks of personal narrative, rather 
than present it explicitly. For Cocker, writers must strike a balance between memoir and natural 
historical fact. 
 However, nature writing is threatening to lapse into tameness by the simple fact that there 
may not be much true nature left in Britain to write about—memoir with nature as its excuse. “[I]n 
so many of the new books,” Cocker complains, “nature and culture have been replaced by landscape 
and literature.” In other words, the balance between memoir and knowledge in these new books 
move between, not the human and the non-human, but written representations of environment and 
landscape, which may be “as much an imagined as it is a real place.” Landscapes, Cocker claims, can 
be stripped of biodiversity and still remain aesthetically pleasing; landscapes can lose wildness and 
unpredictability but remain open for self-indulgent naturalists’ attempts to “re-enchant” them for a 
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mass readership through prose. The project of re-enchanting the landscape, then—a project that 
many nature writers take upon themselves—may not be possible when the ecosystem is stripped 
completely of its wild elements. 
The problem with this formula [re-enchantment] is that landscapes readily persist 
when all that makes a place enchanting – the filigree of its natural diversity – has long 
since vanished. [. . .] The real danger is that nature writing becomes a literature of 
consolation that distracts us from the truth of our fallen countryside, or – just as bad 
– that it becomes a space for us to talk to ourselves about ourselves, with nature 
relegated to the background as an attractive green wash.4 
 
Cocker questions the integrity of British nature writing at a moment when all Britons are fast losing 
access to wild creatures and environments. Furthermore, since no one likes to hear bad news (and it 
is difficult to sell a memoir based on bad news only, unlike MacDonald’s H is for Hawk, which offers 
a narrative of redemption), the harsh truths of disappeared British wildlife and poisoned ecosystems 
may disappear from nature writing as well. In order to maintain its integrity, the new nature writer 
must not be willing to describe sanitized landscapes, but must be ready to bear witness to 
wildness—and to note when such wildness is absent. 
What is at stake for Cocker, then, as it was for Joseph Warton, is a literature of the “present 
and real.” Cocker calls for a new nature writing that does not merely balance portrayals of literature 
and landscape—both of which are only representations of real environments—but nature and 
culture. To this end, he cites the writer Richard Mabey, whose work “could be summarised as a 
movement along a single axis between culture – land practice or literature, science, the visual arts, 
sculpture, whatever – and nature. It is metaphorically and actually rooted in a soil of real, living 
things.”  But Mabey’s Nature Cure (2005), which Cocker specifically cites as a progenitor of the new 
nature writing, puts more of an emphasis on literature and landscape than Cocker suggests. Mabey is 
one of the most widely-read British nature writers living, with over thirty books on ecology and 
natural history to his name. Mabey’s memoir begins with his leaving his lifelong home in the 
Chiltern Hills for the flat, fenny landscape of Norfolk. He is forced to leave because an episode of 
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severe depression has left him unable to financially support himself, so he must leave to live rent 
free in a run-down building on his friends’ property. Over the next couple of years, Mabey meets a 
new partner, Polly, who inspires him to start writing again, after which he slowly begins to find work 
as a writer and commentator, finally reconnecting with his old passions of bird watching, foraging, 
and being outdoors. Finally cured and financially independent, he resettles nearby, having adopted 
the new landscape as his home.  
Throughout Nature Cure, there are several extended discussions of John Clare’s life and 
poetry (although only one or two mentions each of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats.) 
Appropriately, literature and writing are the keys to the cure of Mabey’s depression that no amount 
of time spent outdoors could lift. (“I was blind to the swifts for the first time in my life. While they 
were en fete I was lying on my bed with my face away from the window, not really caring if I saw 
them again.”)5  Well-meaning friends’ attempts to get Mabey outside failed to lift his spirits, but he 
began to truly heal when Polly suggested that he write his autobiography. At the end of the book, 
Mabey muses on his own path to health in light of the title of his book. “The idea of a ‘nature cure’ 
goes back as far as written history. If you expose yourself to the healing currents of the outdoors, 
the theory goes, your ill-health will be rinsed away.”6 But for Mabey, it was not being out in nature 
that cured him, but the act of writing about himself in nature.  
What healed me, I think, was almost the exactly opposite process, a sense of being 
taken not out of myself but back in, of nature entering me, firing up the wild bits of 
my imagination. If there was a single moment when I was “cured” it was the flash of 
loving inspiration by Polly that sat me down under the beech tree in my old home, 
and made me pick up a pen again, it was those first stumbling imaginative acts that 
reconnected me, more than the autumn breeze through the trees.7 
 
Mabey writes that later he did re-connect with nature at a physical level, but that connection came 
after he started to heal through writing. Mabey, in his honesty, shows that the act of being a nature 
writer might have less to do with being out in nature than Cocker assumes. These two men, who are 
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now literally neighbors, are carrying on the question that has persisted since the time of Joseph 
Warton: what do written representations of environment actually represent?8  
 
Andy Goldsworthy and the Place of the Real in Environmental Art 
 Since the late 1970s, British sculptor Andy Goldsworthy has been working with the medium 
of the earth. Although he has made many large, semi-permanent outdoor sculptures, such as 
earthworks and dry stone walls, he is probably best known for his ephemeral sculptures which may 
last only a few minutes, hours, or days. These sculptures are made out of ice, snow, and water; leaves 
and flowers; thorns, twigs and the stalks of weeds; snow and sand thrown into the air, pigment 
thrown into the water; stones delicately balanced on each other. For the most part, Goldsworthy 
does not work in public and so these sculptures would never be seen unless they were recorded by 
some means. After the practice of ephemeral sculpture endangered his standing as a student at 




Fig 6. Andy Goldsworthy. Two stones / America and Scotland / laid yellow leaves in one / and red in the other 
/ STORM KING, NEW YORK, OCTOBER 1995 / PENPONT, DUMFRIESSHIRE, 
NOVEMBER 1995 1995. Cibachrome print, (each) 127 x 81 cm. Princeton University Art Museum. 
Available from: ARTstor, http://www.artstor.org (accessed October 10. 2015) 
 
 In the early 1990s, Goldsworthy published two short statements about the place of 
photography in his work, one as a preface to Hand to Earth (1990) and one as a postscript to Stone 
(1994), both simply entitled “The Photograph.” In the first, he begins by stating that “My approach 
to the photograph is kept simple, almost routine.  All work, good and bad, is documented.”10 
Despite this simplicity of use, however, photography is not unimportant, nor is it simple in itself. He 
goes on to say, 
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There is an intensity about a work at its peak that I hope is expressed in the image. 
Process and decay are implicit in that moment. A drawing or painting would be too 
defined. The photograph leaves the reason and spirit of the work outside. They are 
not the purpose but the result of my art.11 
 
While the photographic image plucks the ephemeral work out of time, the laws of nature come with 
it: we not only see the sculpture, we also see it about to melt, collapse, or blow away. Drawing or 
painting, on the other hand, would be “too defined” because images fixed on paper are not subject 
to heat, gravity, or wind like we imagine photographed objects to be.  
Goldsworthy also hints here, and states more clearly later, that the photograph is his chosen 
medium of representation because it can never be a complete representation of the sculpture. A 
photograph leaves “the reason and spirit of the work outside” its boundaries. A drawing or painting 
can stand on its own as an object, but a photograph is a reminder of a real, long-gone thing. Thus, 
Goldsworthy’s photographs do not exist only for the sake of documenting the sculpture but add a 
philosophical dimension to his work. Photography is an interpretive process, but as Goldsworthy 
makes clear, the photograph also allows for the appearance of elements in the piece that go beyond 
his short-sighted interpretation of it in the moment. In the photograph, a sculpture is unmoored 
from his will. In Stone, he elaborates: 
I construct the image after the work’s completion. During the making I become 
aware of the relationship with the surroundings . . . a nearby tree, rock, mountain . . 
which needs to be explained in the photograph. Sometimes it is a particular 
movement, light or moment with which the work aligns that is important. I have laid 
work in wait to be activated by time and light [. . .] These elements often determine 
how and when the photograph is taken.12 
 
The image is a carefully constructed one, and while Goldsworthy does not make sculptures for the 
purposes of photography, he nevertheless makes them with the eventuality of their being 
photographed in mind. Without being able to see the work as a photograph, his work could become 
short-sighted. “I have a social and intellectual need to make photographs,” he continues, 
Photography is my way of talking, writing and thinking about my art. It makes me 
aware of connections and developments that might not otherwise have been 
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apparent. It is the visual evidence which runs through my art as a whole and gives 
me a broader, more distant view of what I am doing. On the occasions when film 
has not come out, that work feels dislocated – like a half-forgotten memory. The 
rigorous test which the photograph gives my sculpture confirms its success or 
failure.13 
 
However, he ends this paragraph by pushing back against the too easy question of which is the 
“real,” or more important: the sculpture or the photograph? “To interpret the relationship between 
the work outside and its image by deciding which is the art is too simple.”14 For in the answer to this 
simplistic question is the possibility that aesthetic value—the status of “art”—will be given over 
wholly to the sculptures or the photographs. The latter is an interpretation of his work that he has 
foreseen. Clive Adams, in his introduction to the catalogue raisonné of Goldsworthy’s photographs up 
to 1989, notes that “The term ‘photowork’ was first applied to this work [ephemeral, photographed 
sculptures] in Rain sun snow hail mist calm, published in 1985, but Goldsworthy prefers to simply refer 
to all his work as ‘sculpture.’”15 “Photowork” is a term that implies that the essence or purpose of 
the work lies in the photos. Even though it seems that some of his critics have persistently 
disagreed, Goldsworthy refuses to allow his work to be equated with, or reduced to, photographs.  
The photograph is incomplete. The viewer is drawn into the space between image 
and work. A bridge needs to be made between the two. It is necessary to know what 
it is like to get wet, feel a cold wind, touch a leaf, throw stones, compress snow, suck 
icicles. . . often reaching back into childhood to when those experiences were more 
alive. 
 If the photograph were to become so real that it over-powered and replaced 
the work outside, then it would have no purpose or meaning in my art.16 
 
The art critic William Malpas takes a rather cynical view of the place of the real in Goldsworthy’s 
work. Acknowledging, but quickly leaping over “the space between image and work” that 
Goldsworthy intends, he says: “Goldsworthy has to face up to the fact that most people know about 
his art (and love his art) from photographs. [. . .] For the punter [UK slang: “a customer”] who 
consumes art in books and printed material (or on TV or radio or the web) the ‘real’ art object 
doesn’t need to exist: what counts is the media representation or simulation of it.”17 In fact, Malpas 
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continues, despite the art public’s need to know that Goldsworthy’s works are “real,” they need not 
be so to be consumed with the same avidity: “Goldsworthy could have faked everything” and it 
wouldn’t make much of a difference to consumers, even lovers, of his art.18 
 While suggestions like these may shield us from the apparently frightening territory of 
earnestness and imaginative involvement in encounters with art, they ultimately do so by trading 
aesthetic experience and philosophical engagement for a poor sort of skepticism. A strength of 
Goldsworthy’s art is that it abides in, rather than resolving, the question of where aesthetic 
experience resides. Malpas says that Goldsworthy’s two statements on photography “reveal a 
confusion and ambiguity regarding photography and art.”19 But to me, Goldsworthy’s statements are 
well aware of the irresolvable complexity and ambiguity of aesthetic encounters already present in 
his work, and seek to foreclose simplistic interpretations by the viewer. 
Barbara Hurd’s nonfiction piece “Stones” elegantly arrives at an understanding of the 
tension between the real and the represented in Goldsworthy’s work, in which Hurd recognizes the 
tension between the fully known and the unknowable. Imagining that Goldsworthy is on the beach 
with her building one of his sculptures, she writes, “I would be able to see his entire structure, could 
even circle it, examine it from all angles, have some confidence that there’s nothing, visually at least, 
that’s eluding me.” However, the fantasy of knowing is just that: a fantasy. “But he’s not here and 
what most of us know of his work is through photographs.” Rather than seeing the photographs as 
limiting, however, she sees in them a call for exploration. “In them the sea stretches the eye 
sideways, up, and out toward the horizon. Their invitation is to distance, expansion, which reminds 
us how limited our vision is, how vast the sea and sky are, how impossible it is, as my mother might 
have said, to know even a fraction of them.”20  The gap between image and work is an indeterminate 
space; it is a place where we are uncertain, where we are made to know what we don’t know; where 
we in fact realize that our ideas about nature and art have nowhere to land. This art asks us to keep 
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roving, seeking beauty and seeking answers, rather than retreat into the refuge of stale, mechanical 
skepticism about what is “real” and what is “fake.” 
Goldsworthy’s works have a texture of the real while at the same time refusing to allow 
themselves to be conflated with the real, much like Clare’s descriptions, Smith’s notes, Austen’s 
isolated environmental details, and the charts and journals of agricultural writers; the photograph is 
his method of achieving it. With the visual arts, we arrive at the end of a long list of methods for 
capturing our living, material environment: autobiographical prose, poetry, memoir, tables, charts, 
and notes. In all of these, authors we have read struggle with the relationship between the 
represented and the real and find their own, if only stopgap means of accounting for the truth in 
their works. Rather than a cynical dismissal of the material world, this struggle reflects ongoing 
engagement with the non-human. This struggle is a refusal to let landscapes become wallpaper or let 
books replace flowers. Novels may not let us fully know hedgerows and agriculturalists’ charts may 
never let us fully know the field, but the works I have discussed here remind us that we can only 
deeply invest in the real environment if we are also invested in our means of knowing it.   
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